DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order dated 9-4-1990, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Seventh Sindh Labour Court at Sukkur, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was allowed and he was ordered to be reinstated with full back benefits.
2. I have heard Mr. Abdul Sattar Khatri, learned Advocate for the appellants and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent was appointed as Head Fireman on 16-5-1988 by the appellants on ad-hoc basis and his services were terminated on 12-4-1989. After serving grievance notice upon the appellants the respondent filed grievance petition before the Labour Court which the appellants resisted on the ground mainly on that the respondent was appointed on ad-hoc basis and as such he had no rights under the Industrial Relations Ordinance and that he was removed from service in the terms of his appointment letter/order.
4. It is not disputed that the respondent was workman but dispute is that as ad hoc appointee he could not claim any protection under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and he could not invoke the jurisdiction of Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
5. There are only five classes of workmen as described in the Standing Order 1 and the respondent as a workman has to be fitted in any one of the categories. There is no ad-hoc worker defined in the Standing Order 1, but there is temporary workman who is employed on a temporary work likely to be finished within nine months. There is no evidence to bring respondent within the aforementioned definition of temporary workman. The other category of workman is a permanent workman, who is employed on the work of a permanent nature and he successfully completed three months probationary period. The respondent in this case was allowed to work for nearly eleven months, therefore, it cannot be said that he did not complete three months probationary period satisfactorily. However, no order appears to have been passed either declaring the completion of three months probation satisfactorily, or terminating his services within 3 months.
This is lapse on the part of the appellants for which respondent cannot be punished.
6. No copy of termination order has been produced before the learned Labour Court but Mr. Khatri produced some office book in this Tribunal which shows that service of the respondent was terminated as an ad hoc appointee by the S.E. This also bears endorsement of the respondent that he received the copy. However, this order does not show the explicit reason for termination of service as required under Standing Order 12(3).
7. As pointed above there is no ad-hoc workman defined under the I.R.O. Or the Standing Orders Ordinance. Even under the Civil Service Act the ad hoc appointee is appointed for the six months or till the appointee in accordance with the rules is available. There is no evidence that such appointee was available when the services of respondent was terminated. It is contended that the respondent did not appear before the Selection Committee and therefore his services were terminated. This reason also is not shown in the termination order. Such termination order is not sustainable.
8. In view of the above discussion, the order of the learned Labour Court I D does not require any interference and is based on sound reasoning. As such the appeal is dismissed in limine.