SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.~ 1. Leave to appeal was granted in a large number of petitions involving the question of levy of Iqra Surcharge and additional customs duty when in exercise of statutory powers under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, the Federal Government had already exempted the charging of the customs-duties either wholly or partly. Numerous petitions on the same subject have also come up for hearing with such appeals.
2. The appeals and petitions have been divided into two separate categories. Those listed in Annexure-A involve only a question of interpretation of law with regard to exemption from the charging of the customs duty and the charging provisions imposing Iqra Surcharge and Customs- duties from which the exemption is denied. The other category listed in Annexure-B comprises those appeals and petitions which have, apart from the aforementioned purely legal question, an element of factual controversy with regard to the quality or the identity of the goods and whether such goods were then being locally manufactured or not.
3. So far as the petitions and appeals listed in Annexure-A involving pure interpretation of statutory provisions are concerned, reference has to be made to S.R.O. No. 700(I)/80, dated 26th of June,.
1980 which remained effective and in the field till June, 1984 when it was substituted by S.R.O. No. 500(I)/84, dated 14th of June, 1984. These Notifications had issued under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) which reads as hereunder:-- "19. General power to exempt from customs-duties:--
(1) The Federal Government, subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions, if any, as it thinks fit to impose, may, by Notification in the official Gazette, exempt any goods imported into, or exported from, Pakistan or into or from any specified port or station or area therein, from the whole or any part of the customs-duties chargeable thereon.
(2) A Notification issued under sub-section (1) shall be effective from the day specified therein, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of the official Gazette in which such Notification appears is published at any time after that day."
4. By the Notification of 1980 (SRO 700(I)/80) the plant and machinery imported for initial installation or for balancing, modernization, replacement or installation of the projects approved by the Government for the areas specified in Column 2 of the Table given therein were exempted from customs duties leviable thereon under the First Schedule to the Customs Act, to the extent specified in corresponding entries of Column 3 of the Table subject to certain conditions which are not material for the category of appeals listed in Annexure-A. For certain areas in the Table, like Azad Kashmir, the whole of the customs duty leviable was exempted, all Government financed industrial estates located in the areas other than those excluded, were exempted to the extent of 75% and in certain other specified areas exemption was to the extent of 50% duty leviable. Some of the appellants had obtained machinery and goods for installation etc., in areas where the exemption extended to the whole of the duty leviable. There was no dispute or controversy with regard to the enjoyment of such an exemption. On the 17th of June, 1982 was enforced Finance Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance No. XII of 1982). The following provision was made in section 2:-- "2. Surcharge on imported goods.-(l) There shall be levied and collected an additional customs duty as surcharge on the importation of the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), at the rate of five per cent of the value of the said goods as determined under section 25 of the said Act: Provided that for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 (III of 1951), the additional customs duty shall not constitute a part of the duty paid value.
(2) The Federal Government, subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions, if any, as it thinks fit to impose, may, by Notification in the official Gazette, exempt any goods imported into Pakistan, from the whole or any part of the additional customs duty leviable under sub-section (1)."
In the Finance Ordinance, 1983 (Ordinance XIV of 1983), enforced on 12th June, 1983, an amendment was made in section 2 of the previous Finance Ordinance, 1982, just reproduced. Section 6 which made this amendment is reproduced hereunder:-- "6. Amendment of Finance Ordinance, 1982 (XII of 1982) .-In the Finance Ordinance, 1982 (XII of 1982), in section 2, in sub-section (2), after the brackets and figure "(1)" at the end, the commas, words, brackets and figure, "and no exemption from payment of customs duty under the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), or any other law for the time being in force shall be deemed to apply to the additional customs duty leviable under the said sub-section" shall be added and shall be deemed always to have been so added.
Finance Act, 1985 (Act I of 1985) made the following provision by its section 5 with regard to the imposition of Iqra Surcharge:- "5. Iqra Surcharge on imported goods.-(l) There shall be levied and collected an additional customs duty as Iqra Surcharge on the importation of the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), at the rate of five per cent of the value of the said goods as determined under section 25 of the said Act: Provided that, for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 (III of 1951), the additional customs duty shall not constitute a part of the duty paid value.
(2) The Federal Government, subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions, if any, as it thinks fit to impose, may, by Notification in the official Gazette, exempt any goods imported into Pakistan from the whole or any part of the additional customs duty leviable under sub-section (1), and no exemption from payment of customs duty under the Customs Act, 1969, or any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the additional customs duty leviable under the said sub-section."
5. Arguments addressed at the Bar in all these petitions and appeals had a wide range, covering the Constitution, the statutory law on customs-duties, the significance of concluded contracts, the principles of estoppel or promissory estoppel and the requirements of reasonableness, fairness, equity and justice in such cases.
6. On the Constitutional plane, the more basic objection has been raised by Mr. Rashid Akhund, Advocate (representing appellants in C.A. 717/89, 744/88 etc.). It is that Article 2 and Article 7 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 had the effect of continuing the Constitution of 1973 and doing away with the limitation as to the duration of an Ordinance as prescribed in the Constitution (Article 89). It did not either expressly or impliedly do away with the other requirements of Article 89 viz. That "such Ordinance shall be laid before the National Assembly". That requirement of the Constitution having not been satisfied the Finance Ordinances of 1982 and 1983, portions of which have been reproduced above, did not have the validity and efficacy of law of the land. Any demand of duty based on it could not be raised or enforced against the appellants.
7. This contention of the learned counsel omits to take note of another, and a more compulsive and overriding Constitutional provision viz., Article 270-A of the Constitution, the relevant provisions of which read as hereunder:-- "All other laws made between the fifth day of July, 1977, and the date this Article comes into force are hereby affirmed, adopted and declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, to have been validly made by competent authority and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, shall not be called in question in any Court on any ground whatsoever."
8. The vires of Article 270-A of the Constitution and its amplitude has not been questioned or disputed in these proceedings from any quarter. This provision, therefore, precludes any question being raised on the ground taken up by the learned counsel.
9. The second objection on the Constitutional plane, raised by numerous learned counsel, is to the competence of the Federal Government to levy any such tax as is under consideration. In the Finance Act of 1985 the disputed tax is specified as Iqra Surcharge. 'Iqra' has the dictionary meaning |of learning, reading, reciting and going by the pith and substance of the tax it amounts to education tax. According to the learned counsel, education does not find a place either in the Federal Legislative List or in the Concurrent Legislative List and has necessarily to be treated as exclusively a Provincial subject. For that reason neither the Federal Legislature could legislate nor could the President pass an Ordinance levying such a duty. Hence, the levy is ultra vires the Constitution.
10. It is correct that 'Iqra' has the dictionary meaning as suggested. It is also correct that education as such is not mentioned either directly or indirectly in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List. What is contained in the Federal Legislative List at serial No.16 is "Federal Agencies and institutes for the following, purposes, that is to say, for research, for professional or technical training, or for promotion of special studies". At serial No.17 in the same List is mentioned "education as respects Pakistani students in foreign countries and foreign students in Pakistan." In the Concurrent Legislative List at serial No. 38 exists the entry "Curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centres of excellence and standards of education." These entries do not cover the field of adult literacy which was suggested by the use of the word 'Iqra'. This argument fails on twp points. Firstly, the charging sections consistently mention it as additional customs duty. Not only in name but in substance too it is customs duty because it has been levied on the import of goods, has reference to goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 and the value of the goods is to be determined under section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969. At serial No. 43 of the Federal Legislative List is mentioned "duties of customs, including export duties", in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 12, 4th Edition, Para 501, Page 65, contains the following recital of law:-- "Duties of customs, or customs-duties, in the strict sense are pecuniary charges or tolls payable upon goods exported from, or imported into the country, as contrasted with excise duties which are payable upon goods produced and consumed within the country."
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 25 at Page 140 it is mentioned that "customs-duties are taxes assessed on merchandise imported from or exported to a foreign country".
11. The levy under examination satisfies in name and substance the strictest legal definition of customs duties.
12. Secondly, the argument draws for its strength not so much on the nature and stage of the levy, on imports, but the ultimate purpose for which the money collected was proposed io be utilised.
This is not permissible within the framework of the Constitution. Article 78(1) of the Constitution provides as hereunder:-- "All revenues received by the Federal Government, all loans raised by that Government and all moneys received by it in repayment of any loan, shall form part of a consolidated fund, to be known as the Federal Consolidated Fund."
Under Article 79 of the Constitution, the withdrawals from the Consolidated Fund take place under the authority of Majlis-e- Shoora.
13. It is not possible, therefore, to relate the proposed expenditure with the levy or to make the proposed expenditure the test for examining the validity of the levy.
14. Another Constitutional objection to the levy is that it is neither a customs duty nor any other duty but expressed to be 'Surcharge'. Ballentine defines 'Surcharge' as "an additional amount added to the usual charge, an exaction". In Black's Law Dictionary,' 'Surcharge' is described as "an overcharge, an exaction imposed or encumbrance beyond what is just and right or beyond one's authority or power". According to the learned counsel, such a Surcharge as has been levied, amounts to a penalty and there is no power possessed by the Federal Legislature to penalise without determining and adjudicating on the fault or the delinquency for which such a penalty is prescribed. The learned counsel has referred to the use of the word 'Surcharge' in the margin of section 2 of the Finance Ordinance of 1982, in support of the submission. Additionally, it is stated that 'Surcharge' as a distinct item is not at all mentioned as one of the subjects in the /Federal or the Concurrent Legislative Lists which could empower the Federal Government to legislate on the subject.
15. The word 'Surcharge' has definitely been used in the charging provision. At the same time, it is not the only material word in the charging provision. The charging provision is complete only if we read it as "an additional customs duty as Surcharge on the importation of goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969." One word cannot be tom out of the context for giving a meaning different from what the context requires. Read as a whole, it is clear that what was being imposed was an additional duty and this additional duty was in the nature of customs duty and was to be distinguished as Surcharge. It was leviable only on import and only on the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969. These words made it clear that it was a customs-duty. It was in addition to the customs duties already imposed. It was to be known as a 'Surcharge', and it was leviable at the rate of five per cent.
16. In the Finance Act of 1985/the expression used was "an additional customs duty as Iqra Surcharge on the importation of the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969".
Here also, it was clear from the reading of the taxing provision that an additional tax was being imposed. It was in the nature of customs-duty. It was to be distinguished as 'Iqra Surcharge'. It was leviable on import of goods only such as were mentioned in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969.
17. The objections to the levy and relatable to the statutory provisions are more than one. In the first place it was contended that under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Customs Act, 1969, customs- duties were to be levied "at such rate as are prescribed in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force". The expression "under any other law for the time being in force" necessary refers to all laws other than Customs Act under which duties in the nature of customs-duties are imposed. On the strength of this provision, the duties imposed by the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and the Finance Act, 1985 under examination came to be assimilated to the duties imposed under the Customs Act. On this reasoning, it is contended that the power of exemption contained in section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 is so general and extensive that the exemption granted thereunder will be available subject to the notified conditions, limitations and/or restrictions to the customs-duties of both categories; the one leviable under the Customs Act and the other under the law for the time being in force. On this contention it is argued that the Exemption granted by recourse to section 19 of the Customs Act will be available equally well against the impositions made by the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and the Finance Act, 1985.
18. There are three defects in this argument. The first is that the first exemption order that issued and is in controversy before us related to 1980 (S.R.O. No. 700(1)/1980). It did not anywhere give the indication of doing away with or not applying any future duties of customs that may be imposed. It related to the duties as were leviable under the Customs Act when the Notification issued. There was no indication in this Notification that future discretion of either the executive authority of the Federation or of the Legislature was being surrendered. In any case, the executive authority of the Federation could not surrender such a legislative discretion because that would be encroaching on the legislative field. Secondly, the very words of the Notification allowed exemption by a reference to goods and the duties mentioned in the First Schedule to the Customs Act. Nothing more could be read into it and the levies made under other laws could not get affected by such a Notification.
Thirdly, the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and the Finance Act, 1985 are special provisions, exhaustive in themselves, because not only they contain the charging provision but also a power of exemption reserved therein in the same terms as is contained in section 19 of the Customs Act relatable to duties under the Customs Act. Where a self- contained and a special law exists, the general law and the general exemption power contained elsewhere cannot be utilised or invoked for claiming relief under the Special Law. Whatever doubts in this regard existed, they have been set right by the declaratory provision made in the Finance Ordinance, 1983 to the effect that "no exemption from payment of customs-duty under the Customs Act, 1969 or any other law for the time being in force" shall be deemed to apply to the additional customs-duty leviable under the said sub-section and this was not only added then but was deemed always to have been so added.
19. One of the learned counsel representing some of the appellants (Mr. Rashid Akhund) contended by way of an alternative argument that if the duties imposed by Finance Ordinance, 1982 and the Finance Act, 1985 are not treated as Customs-duties leviable under the Customs Act, then the whole machinery provided in the Customs Act for recovery thereof would not be available and the action taken in levying the duty would be unauthorised and untenable under the law. According to the learned counsel, section 4 of the Customs Act authorises the Officers appointed under section 3 thereof to exercise such powers and discharge such duties as are conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act. If these levies made by the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and the Finance Act, 1985 are not treated as levies under the Customs Act, then the Officers appointed and dealing with the matters can have no authority whatsoever and on that ground also their actions had to be declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
20. It has already been pointed out while examining the nature of imposition and levy, that it is basically customs-duty, that it is additional to all other customs-duties, that in one case it is distinguished by the name of 'Surcharge', in the other by the name of 'Iqra Surcharge' and that under section 18 of the Customs Act it is assimilated for the purposes of being dealt with, so far as the machinery provisions requirements are concerned, by the Customs Act, the Officers and authorities dealing with it were fully authorised to deal with it.
21. Mr. Raza Kazim, Advocate, the learned counsel representing some of the appellants contended that it was on the assurance and the understanding extended by the Government itself that the industrialists undertook to install industries in unattractive areas where it was uneconomical and disadvantageous to establish industries. There was an element of promise that the exemption granted by the Notification will continue, that no additional burdens would be imposed and that the competitiveness of the industrialists would not be impaired to their disadvantage. In this respect the learned counsel has referred to the Article 173 (1) of the Constitution for making out a power in the Federation to make such contracts as it thought fit subject to the law of the land.
According to him, it will be highly unjust and inequitable to deny to such industrialists as acted on the exemption the benefits thereof by imposing subsequently such a heavy duty as was done by the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and Finance Act, 1985. On that reasoning it was contended that the discretion possessed under section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982 of granting such an exemption should be deemed to have been already exercised in favour of the appellants when such an exemption by the competent authority was granted in 1980. According to the other learned counsel, the exemption power is to be liberally interpreted to serve the object of exemption rather than to defeat it and it would be appropriate to do so in this case.
22. A reference to the Notifications under examination would show that there was no suggestion, indication, or commitment of any sort at all with regard to the future course of action as against the beneficiaries of those Notifications. The effect of these Notifications was that on satisfaction of certain conditions, certain exemptions from customs-duties and other taxes leviable alongwith it were to be enjoyed by a certain category of industrialists. That concession was not postponed to a future date It took effect immediately. There was no element of promise, commitment or surrender of future executive power of the Federal Government.
23. It is additionally to be noted that the Federal Executive Authority which was enjoying a delegated legislative power within the framework of Customs Act, 1969 (Section 19) could not fetter, surrender, limit or commit the Federal Legislative Power as such. To expect the Executive to commit the legislature with regard to a future course of action would be untenable in the scheme of the Constitution that we have.
24. The contracting power of the Federation also does not get attracted to the cases in hand because it was not a case of contract but it was a case of exercise of delegated statutory powers within the limits of the delegation contained in the statute itself. Contract implies the free and conscious agreement between the two parties with regard to their rights and liabilities arising out of the particular transaction. It is formally executed. It binds both the parties. Even such contracts are subject to the law of the land. They do not hold good against the law of the land which may be enforceable for the time being as public law.
25. The cases cited at the Bar, no doubt, give the impression both that a provision exempting a citizen from tax has to be interpreted strictly against the beneficiary. [United States of America v.
American Bell Telephone Company and Emile Berliner (40 L.Ed. 546), Mohammadi Steamship Co.
Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Karachi (PLD 1966 SC 828) and Sutherland's Statutory Construction (Volume 3, Ed. 3 at page 296)] and also that an exempting provision has to be interpreted liberally and beneficially so as not to deny the exemptions granted to the individuals. [Associated Newspapers, Limited and others v. Corporation of the City of London (1916)2 A.C. 429 and Hughes and Bank of New Zealand 1938A.C. 366.] The cases before us are not the cases where two interpretations are possible and the one beneficial to the citizen has to be preferred. The language, the context, and the impact of the various statutory provisions and instruments is clear enough and where it is so, the principle laid down by Lord Cairns in Charles James Partington v. The Attorney-General ((1869) L.R.V0L IV, H.L. 100) in the following words gets attracted:- "...as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, Where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute."
26. An objection taken in Civil Appeal No. 528/89 is that the customs-duty itself is illegal and ultra vires the Constitution because it is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and opposed to Shariah.
No arguments have been addressed with regard to it and no decision has been cited to establish the proposition in the form in which it has been pleaded.
27. It follows from the discussion that the levy of 'Iqra Surcharge' and 'Surcharge' by way of additional customs-duty under Finance Ordinance, 1982 and Finance Act, 1985 was legal and proper and the various exemptions enjoyed by the petitioners or the appellants under various Notifications under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 could not be availed of against these levies.
Therefore, all the appeals and petitions of the category listed in Annexure-A are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed by refusing leave to appeal in the petitions and on merits the appeals in which leave to appeal had been granted.
28. As regards the cases listed in Annexure B, the additional question that requires examination is whether exemption from regulatory duty or other duties, besides the 'Iqra Surcharge' and 'Surcharge', already dealt with, were refused to the importers on their goods on a finding of fact recorded by the Departmental Officers, on no evidence. The case of the appellants/petitioner in the cases of this category is that they imported Ring Spinning Machines and Cone Winding Machines etc., which at the relevant time, when they entered into contracts for the import, were not locally manufactured. They had stated so m the presentation of their cases and Bills of Entry to the Departmental Officers but without any enquiry whatsoever, it was held that these were locally manufactured and hence not liable to the exemption claimed. Such a question was raised in one of the Writ Petitions (W.P. 5581 of 1987) in the High Court and after discussing the following relief was granted in para 28 of the judgment:-- "28. It is clear from the Notification of 14th June, 1984 that cone-winding machines, ring spinning machines and such machinery as is manufactured locally is not entitled to exemption. The words "and such machinery as is manufactured locally" clearly show that "cone-winding machines and ring spinning machines" must also be of the same category i.e. Manufactured locally. Earlier, in S.R.O. 702(I)/80, dated 26th June, 1980, Explanation (ii) to the said Notification provided that automatic cone-winders being a substitute for locally manufactured cone-winders would not be eligible for the concession under that Notification. In Naveed Taxtile Mills' case PLD 1985 SC 92, it was attempted to show that imported cone- winders were no substitute for local cone-winders and that no manufacturer in Pakistan manufactured cone-winders and, therefore, imported cone- winders were entitled to exemption, which argument was rejected. Under Notification of 14th June, 1984, if cone-winding machines are manufactured locally, only then the exemption is not available; otherwise it is. The order of the Assistant Collector (Appraisement) Customs Dry Port, Lahore, does not indicate whether ring spinning machines were being manufactured locally. Unless they were, the petitioner would be entitled to the exemption. In these circumstances, the case of the petitioner requires to be remanded so that the Assistant Collector of Customs (Appraisement), Customs Dry Port, Lahore, can determine the question whether ring spinning machines were being manufactured locally in early 1987, when the letter of credit was opened by the petitioner, and, if not, whether the petitioner is entitled to the exemption of the customs-duty under the Notification dated 14th June, 1984."
29. The learned counsel representing the appellants/ petitioners in appeals/petitions in which the import of ring spinning machines and cone-winding machines is concerned, have contended that the same relief in the same terms should have been granted to them as the facts alleged were in no way different.
30. In another judgment disposing of three Writ Petitions (W.P. No. 2577/88, 2854/88 and 3032/88) the same learned Judge observed as hereunder:-- "On behalf of the petitioner it is further contended that the ring spinning frames and automatic cone-winders were not manufactured locally by anybody in Pakistan when the goods were indented in early 1987. However, the records of the Customs Authority show that Spinning Machinery Company of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Kot Lakhpat, Lahore, has been manufacturing rings spinning frames from 1982 and the Textile Winding Machinery Co. Ltd., 32-34 Sector 16, Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi, has been manufacturing automatic cone-winders since 1983-84. It appears that in July, 1986 the Spinning Machinery Company of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore, was in some financial difficulties, as the Government wanted to disinvest its shares, but the Government changed its mind and the company continued to maintain its operations. It appears that during this period when the company was in difficulties, some of the companies that had placed orders with it e.g. Mst. Nagina Textile Mills, Hyderabad/Karachi, Lahore Textile and General Mills Ltd., Lahore, and others Monnoo group of companies, cancelled their orders and took their earnest money back.
However, the fact remains that both these companies were in operation from 1982/1984 and manufactured ring spinning frames and automatic cone-winders on the dates the petitioners placed orders for the import of their goods. Nothing therefore, turns on this objection."
31. In the first place, a controverted question of fact as was raised in these petitions must be decided on ascertained facts. In none of the orders passed by the Departmental Authorities there is disclosure of any fact leading to the inference that at the relevant time when orders were placed locally manufactured substitutes were available. It is true that it is not expected of the departmental officer to write a detailed order but where such large number of cases are involved, and many more of similar nature/type are likely to arise, it is expected that at least in one, the relevant basis for forming an opinion is recorded and all other matters are decided by reference to it. Otherwise, it will be merely the ipsi dixit of the officer concerned.
32. "Such machinery as is manufactured locally" has to be given a pragmatic and realistic meaning in the context of industrialisation in the country. For example, if a machinery is locally manufactured, prior to and subsequent to but not during the year when the order is placed, the exemption cannot be refused on the ground that local manufacture has been taking place notwithstanding the gap forcing the entrepreneur to seek it from abroad. Here, and on this subject, a beneficial and pointed adjudication at first by the departmental officers is called for. Hence, we convert the Petitions in Category B into appeals and the appeals of this category (Category mentioned in Annexure B) are allowed only partly, in so far as denial of relief from customs-duty etc. Has been denied on the ground that the machinery or a part of it is locally manufactured. This part of the cases shall stand remanded for fresh determination by the departmental officer after ascertaining the full facts of each case. Their claim with regard to exemption from Surcharge, or Iqra Surcharge, or reduction from any portion of it is rejected as in the case of Cases in Category A.
ANNEXURE-A Civil Appeals Civil Appeals Nos. 263 of 1983,107,108,110 to 118, 138 to 150, 215, 216, 324, 326 to 334, 339 to 348,351, 352, 354, 355, 360 to 363,366 of 1988, 44 to 48,137, 184, 186, 308 to 312, 369, 371, 464 to 467, 469, 471 to 473, 514, 517, 518, 521 to 523, 525, 526,528, 529, 534, 536, 539, 546, 548, 550, 551, 553 to 558, 583, 584, 586, 587, 663, 702 to 705, 708, 712 to 715, 717, 718, 720, 723 to 727, 729, 731, 732, 734, 736, 737, 739, 740, 744 to 752, 754,758,759 of 1989, 54, 79 to 83,101 to 106 of 1990.
Civil Petitions Civil Petitions Nos. 636-R to 639-R, 641-R to 644-R, 657-R to 667-R, 671-R, 673-R, 683-R, 684-R, 686- R, 1268 to 1271, 1314, 1340, 1344, 4-R, 13-R to 15-R, 27-R of 1989 and 97 of 1990.
ANNEXURE-B Civil Appeals Civil Appeals Nos. 109, 119, 349, 350, 353, 356 to 359 of 1988, 43, 138, 185, 187, 313 to 316, 368, 370, 402, 468, 470, 474 to 478, 515, 516, 519, 520, 524, 527, 530 to 533, 535, 537, 538, 540 to 545, 547, 549, 552, 559,582, 585,588, 699, 700, 701, 706, 707, 709, 710, 711, 716, 719, 721, 722, 728, 730, 733, 741, 742, 743, 753,755,756, 757, of 1989 and 107 of 1990.
Civil Petitions Civil Petitions Nos. 434, 627-R to 631-R, 634-R, 648-R, 669-R, 670-R, 672-R, 682-R, 1181, 1256, 1343 of 1989, 5-R and 162 of 1990.