' SALAHUDDIN MIRZA, J.---The facts leading to the filing of this Constitutional petition are that petitioner Sikandar Hayat was employed as a timekeeper with respondent No,3 M/s. National Motors Limited. On 14-6-1981 one Afsar Ali, a person belonging to the village of the petitioner (who hails from Mardan) lodged a F.I.R. Under section 307/34, P.P.C. Against the petitioner and two others.
Feeling apprehension about his arrest, the petitioner submitted a leave application on 16-6-1981 for seven days leave and proceeded to Mardan. The leave was subsequently granted by respondent No, 3 vide order dated 21-6-1981 in which the petitioner was specifically directed to positively report back for duty or. 25-6-1981. However, the petitioner did not report back for duty and sent various telegrams and applications from Mardan seeking extension of leave on medical grounds. On 9-7- 1981 respondent No,3 issued show-cause notice to the petitioner on his Karachi address (Annexure 'A') asking him to show cause for unauthorised absence from duty with effect from 25-6-1981, an act which amounted to misconduct under Standing Order 15(3)(e) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. A reply to the said show-cause notice was sent by the petitioner on 16-7-1981 (Annexure `A-1') in which the petitioner stated that although he had returned from his native place Mardan on 14-7-1981 but he again fell sick during the return journey and was still unable to resume duty. He was, however, arrested by the police on 9-8-1981 in connection with the case registered against him under section 307/34, P.P.C.. On 11th August, 1981, respondent No,3 sent further notice to the petitioner, alleging that his claim that he was sick was false and in fact he had absconded from law. This notice (Annexure 'B') was sent care of S.H.O., P.S. Chakiwara and the petitioner was informed that since his plea of bail had been rejected by the Court and there was no likelihood of his early release, therefore, the enquiry earlier ordered on the charge of misconduct for remaining unauthorisedly absent for more than 10 days could not be kept pending indefinitely and the petitioner was finally called upon to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 20th August 1981 and he was warned that if he could not appear then the enquiry proceedings would be dropped and his services would be terminated with effect from 23rd August, 1981 as "Termination simpliciter". Since petitioner did not appear on 20th August, 1981, his services were terminated vide impugned order of that date (Annexure '13-1') and he was directed to make arrangement to collect all his dues and one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice in full and final settlement. Feeling aggrieved from this order the petitioner served grievance notice dated 16th November, 1981 (Annexure 'C') and when he did not receive any reply he filed grievance petition under section 25-A of IRO before the IInd Sindh Labour Court at Karachi. Learned Labour Court vide its order dated 30-10-1983 (Annexure `E') dismissed the said grievance petition after holding that the termination of service was in accordance with Standing Order 12(1) and was therefore proper and valid. The petitioner preferred appeal against this order before learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which vide order dated 9-2-1986 Annexure `G' upheld the order of the learned Labour Court and dismissed the appeal after holding that the respondent No,3 was, under the circumstances, within its rights to dispense with the domestic enquiry and to terminate the services of the petitioner by way of termination simpliciter because they could not be expected to keep the vacancy of the timekeeper vacant and await indefinitely the release of the petitioner from Jail. Still feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction and prays that the order dated 20-8-1981 whereby respondent No,3 terminated his services and the orders dated 30-10-1983 and 9-2-1986 passed by the learned Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal respectively be declared as null and void and illegal with the appropriate consequential relief. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Mr. Herold A. Meik, Manager, Industrial Relations of respondent No,3 had no power to terminate the services of the petitioner because he had claimed to have been authorised to do so through a general power of attorney but he had not produced the said power. We note that Mr. Herold stated in his cross- examination that he was in possession of such power of attorney and he could produce the same.
Thereupon the learned Labour Court adjourned the hearing and directed him to produce the said power on the next date. However, when the case came up for hearing on the adjourned date, learned counsel for the petitioner did not insist upon production of the said general power of attorney and proceeded with his cross-examination as if the cross-examination had been left incomplete on the last date of hearing due to shortage of time or some such reason. This power has however been filed by respondent No,3 as Annexure XX to their counter-affidavit. Para. 1 of this general power of attorney authorises Mr. Herold A. Meik to take disciplinary actions, including dismissal from service, against the workers. This para. 1 is quoted below: "To sign and issue all types of notices which may be issued to the workers of this Company and authorise to take disciplinary action against any worker including his dismissal from service and is authorised to employ, terminate workers whether temporary, probationers, daily-rated and permanent. He is authorised to appoint any apprentice/trainee, and to terminate his apprenticeship training period as and when it becomes necessary."
' It is thus sufficiently established that Mr. Herold A. Meik was fully competent to take disciplinary action against the workers, including the petitioner, and the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary is without any force. However, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that he had not asked Mr. Herold to produce general power of attorney on the adjourned date for cross-examination because he had admitted in his further cross-examination that "he did not exercise the powers vested in him by virtue of the power of attorney executed by the Managing Director in his favour in respect of service matters." Learned counsel then argued that although the general power of attorney did not authorise Mr. Herold A. Meik to take disciplinary action against the workers and to terminate their services but since on his own admission he had not exercised this power (vested in him by virtue of the power of attorney), therefore, the impugned order of termination of service dated 20-8-1981 was in excess of the authority vested in him because by virtue of his post of Manager, Industrial Relations, he had no such power and although he was vested with such powers under the power of attorney but on his own admission he had not exercised those powers. To say the least, this line of argument violates all conceivable principles of logic. What Mr. Herold meant when he stated that he did not exercise the powers vested in him by virtue of power of attorney executed by the Managing Director in his favour in respect of service matters was that the action was not taken by him as regards the termination of the service of petitioner, that the action was taken by the Managing Director himself and such decision had only been communicated under his signatures. This is clear from the following words written under his signatures: "Herold A. Meik, Manager, Industrial Relations, for Managing Director."
' Thus what Mr. Herold meant was that this order of termination of service was actually the order of the Managing Director and he (Mr. Herold) had only signed it on behalf of the Managing Director.
The entire argument of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard amounts to practically nothing.
3. Learned counsel of the petitioner had referred to 1983 PLC 733 (M/s. Sindh Alkalis Limited v. Pam Jan) which is on the interpretation of section 2(c)(iii), section 3 and section 15(4) of the Standing Orders. In our view this judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case it is 'termination simpliciter' of which the petitioner is aggrieved and in this regard learned counsel of the petitioner relies on 1982 SCM R 950 (Pakistan Cycle Industrial Co-operative Society Limited v. Muhammad Serwar Butt and others) but this judgment can be distinguished inasmuch as the criminal case in which the petitioner was involved did not arise out of any labour dispute and, therefore, question of mala fides could not be inferred. The petitioner was involved in a case of moral turpitude in which he could get sentence up to life imprisonment and the petitioner being a Timekeeper, his post could not be left vacant indefinitely and, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned order which appears to have been validly passed under Standing Order 12(1).
Termination simpliciter of a workman is permissible under Standing Order 12 and the employer is only obliged to state reasons for such action taken by him. Such a procedure appears to have been followed in the present case. No doubt, an order of termination of services of an employee if tainted with mala fides or colourable exercise of power can be interfered with by the Court but the onus to establish the mala fides or colourable exercise of power would be on the workman himself.
In the present case nothing in this regard has been established. Therefore, we are of the view that the two learned Tribunals below rightly declined to interfere with the employer's action. There is ample evidence on record to show that the petitioner has not come before the Court with clean hands, that he misrepresented facts while applying for leave and proceeded to enjoy the leave applied for even before its sanction (it was sanctioned 5 days after the petitioner had already proceeded on leave) and did not report for duty after its expiry and remained unauthorisedly absent on the usual pretext of illness and did not report for duty even after his return to Karachi on 14-7-1981 until 9-8-1981 when he was arrested. We are, therefore, on this account also, not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner.
4. For the above-noted reasons the petition is dismissed.