1. ' ABDUL HAMID KHAN (MEMBER).--The appellant when posted as M.M.P.I Attock entered a D.D. Report on :11-10-1986 in the Rozenamcha' wherein he reported that he was insulted by Raja Mumtaz Ahmad, D.S.P. When the former Visited him in the latter's office in the presence of Nawazish Ali Kiani, S.H.O. Hasanabdal, a Traffic Clerk and a Constable. He attributed this unwarranted treatment on the part of the D.S.P. To an incident which occurred in 1976 when the appellant was posted as S.H.O., Police Station Arifwala where the relatives of the D.S.P. Were also residing. According to the appellant, Raja Mumtaz Ahmad wanted him to help and favour his relatives in a money dispute but the appellant declined to oblige. This annoyed the D.S.P. And ever since he has been nourishing a grudge against the appellant.
2. After obtaining comments of the D.S.P., Raja Mumtaz Ahmad who denied the allegation and stated that he had only advised the appellant to maintain discipline, departmental proceedings under the Police E&D Rules were initiated against the appellant and he was served with a show- cause notice. It was alleged that the appellant had recorded a false and concocted story in the aforesaid D.D report and thus committed an act of insubordination. The appellant instead of submitting his reply to the show-cause notice returned it to the authorized officer after recording on the back of the notice that he may be furnished a copy of the comments given by the D.S.P. So that he may prepare his defence accordingly. The authorized officer did not accede to this request and considered that it was an attempt to delay the proceedings. In the circumstances, the authorised officer (S.P., Attock/respondent No,2) found the misconduct of the Inspector as having been proved and imposed the minor penalty of forefeiture of two years' approved service. The appeal submitted by the appellant was also rejected by the D.I.-G., Multan Range (respondent No,1) after affording him an opportunity for personal hearing. The present appeal is directed against the aforesaid two orders dated 25-11-1986 and 13-1-1988 of respondent No,2 and respondent No,1 respectively wherein it has been prayed that the two impugned orders be set aside.
3. We have heard the counsel for the two parties and also perused the record made available to the Tribunal. The following grounds of appeal were agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant:
(I) As the appellant was under the direct administrative control of the D.I.-G. Traffic Punjab, the S.P.
2. Attock could not initiate departmental proceedings against him. Likewise, the appeal filed before the D.I.-G., Traffic Punjab could not have been forwarded to the D.I.-G., Multan Range as the appellate authority in his case was the D.I.-G., Traffic Punjab who should have decided his appeal.
3. The plea is based on a standing order of 1982 of the I.-G.P Punjab which laid down that "M M.P.Is in the districts would function under the functional control of the S.P. The overall administrative and functional control in all the matters, including submission of returns/statistics, will be of the D.I.-G, Traffic Punjab. The A.C.Rs on their working would be initiated by the S.P. Of the respective districts and countersigned by the D.I.G.
4. Traffic.... "
5. ' The nature of the allegations required that a formal enquiry should have been conducted in this case as there was no material on record to warrant the conclusions drawn by respondent No,2.
(iii) No reasonable opportunity was afforded to the appellant to show cause by respondent No,2 as he was neither given a copy of the comments offered by the D.S.P., Raja Mumtaz Ahmad nor he was heard in person before the imposition of the penalty.
6. ' The learned D.A. Did not agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that respondent No,2 (S.P. Attock) was not competent to initiate departmental action against the appellant. He was of the view that if the above standing order provided that the S.Ps should initiate the A.C.Rs, "on the working" of the M.M.P.Is working under them how could they evaluate their work unless they also had administrative control over them. According to him the practice in vogue in the Police Department is that for all intents and purposes the S.Ps. In the districts are vested with comprehensive powers to effectively control the traffic personnel working in the districts otherwise they would not be in a position to write on various aspects of their performance and conduct. As regards the objection in respect of the matter of appellate authority the learned DA. Expressed the view that although the M.M.P.Is were under the administrative control of the D.I.-G. Traffic it did not make much difference if the appeal was forwarded to and decided by the D.I.-G. Multan Range. In this behalf also the prevalent practice in the Police Department is that the appeal is decided by the Range D.I.-G. Under whose administrative control the appellant may actually be working at the time of hearing of the appeal. The fact that the D.I.-G. Multan Range heard and decided the appeal has not made any material difference and the order passed by him is, therefore, quite legal.
7. The appellant's contention that he was not provided reasonable opportunity to show cause could not be rebutted comprehensively by the DA. In the face of record. The appellant had made a written request for the supply of a copy of the comments offered by the D.S.P., Raja Mumtaz Ahmad so that he could prepare his written defence arguing that unless he knew the basis on which the allegations were made against him, he could not effectively defend himself. Instead of supplying a copy of the requisite comments to the appellant or giving him a suitable reply justifying the non- supply of these comments, the authorised officer considered the request as an attempt on the part of the appellant to delay the proceedings and proceeded to dispose of the case ex-parte. In so doing, he also denied the opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant. He would thus clearly seem to have rushed with the departmental proceedings. We are firmly of the view that for holding departmental enquiries, be it a case of formal enquiry or an enquiry conducted under rule 6.3 of the E&D Rules, it is an implicit requirement that copies of the relevant documents on which the prosecution is basing its case should be furnished to the accused officer so as to enable him to offer his explanation. Such a request cannot be rejected by saying that it is an attempt to delay the proceedings. This being essential in order to satisfy the requirement of reasonable opportunity the failure to do so would invalidate the orders passed by the authorized officer and the ultimate order of the authority passed on the basis of the earlier order of the authorized officer. We consider that even if the provision of supply of a certain document may not be mandatory or a statutory requirement but it can be enforced on the ground of fairness and avoidance of prejudice to the officer. It is thus evident that non-supply of a copy of the comments of D.S.P., Raja Mumtaz Ahmad has materially prejudiced the officer as the non-availability of this document has prevented him from knowing the basis or grounds of the allegations against him and thereby placed him in a disadvantageous position for preparing his defence.
8. ' In this connection, we would like to refer to the case of Muzaffar Hussain Shah v. Government of Sindh PLC 1982 (C.S.) 582 wherein the learned Service Tribunal Sindh had observed that "the grounds of action have to be mentioned with clarity and wherever necessary, the charges should be definite with full particulars and the evidence on which the charges are based, should also be stated so that the accused officer should have opportunity to refute the charges. Mere asking for an explanation is not sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement. If the charges are based on any document or report, a copy of the same must be furnished to the accused officer to enable him to effectively meet the allegations contained in the charges."
9. It appears that the authorities had based absolute reliance on the D.S.P's version of the story completely shutting their minds to the pleas taken by the appellant which could only be termed bias arising perhaps out of the fact that the appellant as a subordinate had complained against an officer or it could be a case of sheer indifference on the part of the authorities. The fact is that this was a case wherein the charges could not be proved conclusively without holding a formal enquiry which would have afforded the appellant an opportunity to produce defence witnesses or cross-examine the witnesses which might have been produced by the prosecution. The incident, when according to the appellant the D.S.P. Insulted him which allegation has been denied by the latter who claims that he had only admonished the appellant to maintain discipline, occurred in the presence of at least three witnesses - Nawazish All Kiani, S.H.O. Headquarter, Hasanabdal, a Traffic Clerk and a Constable. Neither the learned DA. Contradicted this fact nor any document refuting this fact was produced before the Tribunal. It was, therefore, imperative that a regular enquiry should have been conducted to arrive at a just conclusion. The circumstances of the case clearly warranted the institution of a formal enquiry. We are of the considered opinion that if in cases of this nature formal departmental proceedings are held it will not only ensure justice and fair play but will also help the department in I deflecting charges of arbitrariness or capriciousness.
10. ' We are also not convinced with the explanation offered by the D.S.P. As briefly mentioned in the impugned order dated 25-11-1986 of the authorised officer, that he had only advised the Inspector to maintain discipline. It is on record that at that point of time the appellant was not working under the administrative control of the said D.S.P. It is, therefore, not clear as to in which capacity and under what authority did the D.S.P. Give this piece of advice to the appellant. Furthermore, the department has not been able to prove any motive on the part of the appellant for recording the D.D. Report against the D.S.P.
11. ' It is thus manifest from the foregoing that the order dated 25-11-1986 passed by respondent No,2 suffers from a number of serious defects of fundamental nature which have rendered it void and of no legal effect.
12. ' Since the basic order dated 25-11-1986 passed by respondent No,2 is untenable, being tainted with denial of natural justice to the appellant, the subsequent order dated 13-1-1988 passed by the appellate authority i,e, respondent No,1 on the basis of the basic order is also bound to crumble. In Yousaf All v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and others, PLD 1958 SC 104 it was held that "if on the basis of a void order subsequent orders have been passed either by the same authority or by other authorities, the whole series of such orders, together with the structure of rights and obligations built upon them, must fall to the ground because such orders have as little legal foundations as the void order on which they are founded."
13. ' Furthermore, the above order dated 13-1-1988 passed in appeal by the D.I.-G. Multan Range (respondent No,1) also mentions inter alia that the appellant admitted his fault before the S.P.
14. Attock in the orderly room. This is factually not correct. As already stated above, it is on record that no such opportunity of personal hearing was granted to the appellant by the S.P. Attock. Since one of the grounds on which the appellate authority has based its decision was factually incorrect, the validity of the order dated 13-1-1988 has become tainted on this account too.
15. As the two impugned orders suffer from multiple infirmities of serious nature and since the proceedings have been conducted in a manner which offend against the principles of natural justice we, therefore, proceed to accept this appeal and set aside the impugned orders dated 25- 11-1986 and 13-1-1988. There are no orders as to costs.
16. ' Judgment be communicated to the parties.