1. ' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is for setting aside of a judgment of the lower appellate Court passed on 19-6-1990, by which it reversed the judgment of the Family Court, and, decreed divorce to respondent No,2 in this Court. Parties were married on 27-7-1984. It proved extremely short-lived. They could bear each other for a few months, and, thereafter, separated not to meet again except in Court. There is no living issue from this marriage. A child was conceived but it aborted.
2. ' On 4-12-1985, respondent No,2 instituted a suit for divorce against the petitioner in the Family Court at Rawalpindi. She accused the petitioner of cruelty, maltreatment, false charge of immorality, existence of aversion, and, hatred for khula.
3. ' Petitioner resisted the suit. He denied the allegations against him. He also brought a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent. Both the suits were consolidated for a joint trial, and, common issues were settled in them. Upon evidence taken from the parties and its consideration, the trial Court found against respondent No,2, and, decreed restitution of conjugal rights against her vide its judgment and decree dated 5-9-1988.
4. ' Respondent No,2 assailed the decision of the Family Court in two appeals before the District Court at Rawalpindi. Appeals were entrusted for hearing to a learned Additional District Judge, who in disagreement with the conclusions of the trial Court allowed the appeals and after setting aside the judgment and decree of trial Court, gave divorce-decree to respondent No,2 Against this judgment passed in appeal a Constitutional petition was filed in this Court. It was admitted to hearing on 10-10-1990, by my learned brother, Mian Nazir Akhtar, J.
5. ' On behalf of the petitioner, it is argued that the lower appellate Court misread the record and gave incorrect findings. It was submitted that existing material did not justify a finding for divorce on khula. It was further submitted that without determining the returnable benefits received under contract of marriage, respondent No, 2 could not be freed. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondent No,2 supported the impugned judgment by reference to evidence on record. It was submitted that the relations between the parties were gravely worsened and seriously deteriorated leaving no prospects for survival of a happy marriage between them. As for returnable benefits, learned counsel argued that neither there was a claim nor evidence in support of it.
6. ' I must admit at the very outset that the lower appellate Court did not correctly read the record in so far as it found that the petitioner had taken a second wife. It was either a deliberate omission or an inadvertent error. In either case, it materially affected the approach of the lower appellate Court to the issues requiring decision by it. There was no proof of second marriage by the petitioner and yet the lower appellate Court found it so. The document on record merely showed a permission obtained for second marriage by the petitioner. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made much capital of this omission of lower appellate Court to read the record correctly and submitted that since the burden of the impugned judgment is second marriage of the petitioner, the case required sending back for its decision afresh. As said above, neither party had pleaded or relied upon second marriage and there is no proof of it either. Nonetheless, the lower appellate Court repeatedly referred to the second marriage of the petitioner and on its basis adversely commented upon him and his conduct. Obviously this kind of an approach by a Judge could not meet with approval. In ordinary circumstances, the case may have been sent back to that Court for its re-consideration and deciding it afresh. However, the facts and circumstances of the present case do not permit for taking such a course because it would greatly add to agony of respondent No,2, who is in Courts since 1985, trying to free her from the bondage of marriage with the petitioner. In an effort to save the marriage from breaking and to see for a possible chance about rehabilitation of marital relations, respondent No, 2 was called upon to appear in person and for that purpose the hearing in the case was adjourned. On the adjourned date, respondent No,2 appeared in person, alongwith her father. Petitioner was also present in the Court. I enquired from respondent No,2 as to the cause/causes for seeking permanent separation from the petitioner and whether there was any chance of a re-union between them. From her replies to the questions put by the Court, it appears that she is determined to stay away from the petitioner, and, under no circumstances, was willing to rejoin him as his wife. She narrated her own tale of woes and stated that during her stay with the petitioner, he accused her of immorality, and, gave physical ill- treatment. Recalling the events in the past, she stated that there was no love lost between them and, no possible chance for a happy reunion to sustain continuance of the marriage. She is a Matriculate. Presently, she is teaching in a school at Rawalpindi. She said her father posed no impediment. Petitioner is also an educated person. He shows eagerness to take back respondent No 2. But unfortunately, she was not willing to join him on any terms. Apart from the recorded material and failing of two attempts at re-conciliation in the Courts below, question-answer meeting with respondent No,2 in Court sufficiently re-inforces my impression that damage already done was beyond repair and there was no prospect in the offing for a happy restoration of relations between the estranged spouses. When such are the circumstances, it is better to separate than to live in an atmosphere perpetually surcharged with mutual distrust and hatred towards each other. Marriage bereft of its attendant bliss serves no useful purpose, Rather, it negates and defeats its very object. Respondent No,2 was prepared to break but not to bend in favour of the petitioner. Even considerable passage of time since the commencement of action in Court could not heal the wounds and bridge the existing differences. Instead the time has widened the gap. Even personation from the Court has not worked to bring them closer. In this state of human affairs, it is idle to think of a rapproachment. The marriage between the parties seems to have irretrievably broken down. In this view, though the lower appellate Court did not properly read the record in regard to second marriage of the petitioner, yet its conclusions on an overall view of the existing circumstances were not faulty. A petition for permission to take a second wife filed in mid-1986 by the petitioner, and, the order of the Arbitration Council passed on it, on 13-11-1986, is also a pointer in the direction of a broken marriage. Since then, four years have elapsed but things did not seem to improve. In this scenario life which is a precious gift from GOD must not be allowed to languish and frittered away in mutual squabbles. As for the benefits to be returned for grant of khula divorce, there is neither sure claim laid in the written statement nor reliable evidence in support of it. Upon this view of the matter despite some defect in the impugned judgment, occasioned by an incorrect reading of record, yet upon a careful review and overall analysis of all the circumstances of the case, it did not call for an interference in equitable jurisdiction of this Court. As finding on issue of khula is sufficient for the decision of the writ petition, it is unnecessary to advert to other matters decided by the lower appellate Court. In this view, interference is declined and writ leaving the parties to bear their costs in this Court.