' Resume of the necessary facts culminating into the present proceedings are that the ejectment petition having been instituted by petitioner No.1 on 15-11-1971, inter alia, alleging default in the payment of rent, wherein relationship of landlord and tenant was refuted by respondents 1 to 10, was allowed on 7-5-1973 and consequent upon concurrent affirmation thereof in S.A.O. No. 243/73, possession of the suit premises was eventually parted unto petitioner No.2 on 22-3-1981, who during the interregnum had stepped into the shoes of the former through alienation. Subsequent whereto by virtue of an application dated 3-5-1981, recovery of arrears of rent cumulatively amounting to Rs,26,780/(i.e,Rs,8,550 and Rs,18,230 encompassing the respective periods of the petitioners) was sought under section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Re4.:. Restriction Ordinance, 1959 which was allowed by the learned Rent Controller or 8-12-1981, however on appeal it was set aside by the learned District Judge, Lahore vide the impugned judgment dated 30-3-1982 on the ground that in the circun..Tances of the case the Rent Controller had become functus officio with the conclusion of the proceedings; legality whereof has been assailed on the basis of the law enunciated in the case of Syed Akhlaque Hussain v. Habib Ismail Bajwa (1974 SCM R 504) wherein coaching the proposition in the following terms:-- "The only question that is left for our consideration is whether the Rent Controller, having already struck off the defence on the failure of the defendant/respondent No.1 to comply with the order of the Rent Controller to deposit the rents and having passed the order of eviction of the respondent, became functus officio, and as such could no longer determine the rent finally as required in the 2nd part of section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959"
' It was held that "it is evident that the order provisionally fixing the rent in the event of a dispute about the rate and its deposit is an interim or interlocutory order. Under the second part of the section, the statutory duty is cast on the Rent Controller to finally determine the rent, and until this act is performed, the proceeding does not legally conclude.
' We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that the Legislature regarded the passing of the order of eviction as the last or ultimate act of the Rent Controller which put an end to the proceeding for eviction under section 13 of the Ordinance and the Rent Controller thereafter was precluded from finally determining the rent as required under the said Ordinance."
2. There is no cavil with the legal proposition canvassed in the precedent law referred to by the learned counsel at the Bar; however, I am afraid it does not cater for the situation obtaining in the present case for the simple reason that it preconceives existence of an interim order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance ibid, inter alia, requiring the tenant to deposit arrears of rent by certain date, continual deposit thereof before 15th of each month pending adjudication of the lis, and in the event of any dispute as to its quantum, approximate determination thereof, which exercise, admittedly, was not at all ventured upon by the Rent Controller in this case; consequently. I am of the opinion that in the absence of the sine qua non, the juridical classification of the application out of which the present petition has emanated is a suit simplicter for recovery of money due, a concept utterly alien to the statute in question, and beyond the parameters of jurisdictional competence of Rent Controller; consequently, the impugned order is unexceptionable and the petition being misconceived is hereby dismissed; however, since the respondents despite service have not put in appearance, thus were proceeded against ex parte, therefore, there will be no order as to costs.