DECISION This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of SindLabourCourtNo.III, Karachi, dated August 18, 1973, whereby the learned Labour Court granted the application of the respondent Management filed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). Briefly put the facts are these.
2. Messrs Johnson & Johnson (Pakistan) Limited, hereinafter called the respondent), made an application under section 34 of the Ordinance for adjudication that the strike commenced by the Johnson & Johnson Employees' Union (hereinafter called the appellant Union), was illegal. It was submitted that the illegal strike was resorted to in contravention of a settlement arrived at between the parties on 16th February 1972, whereby the appellant Union had agreed that no demand would be raised during the pendency of the settlement for two years involving financial implications.
3. On behalf of the appellant Union, Mr. Sher Ali filed his affidavit but he could not appear for cross- examination. Therefore, his evidence was excluded from consideration. On behalf of the respondent Management, Mr. Shamim Mustafa, Operations Manager, filed his affidavit. He was cross- examined at length by the representative of the Union.
4. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion, in the first place, that the conciliation proceedings having been fixed for 10th March 1973, the commencement of strike on 9th March 1973, was illegal. In the ^second place, the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that there could be no strike in respect of demand raised in connection with a right guaranteed in law. Lastly, it came to the conclusion that the strike-notice was not given within seven days of the expiry of the period of ten days of communication received.
5. Mr. Hameed M. Siddiqul, the learned Advocate for the appellant Union, in the first place, contended that the learned Labour Court should have taken judicial notice of the contents of the settlement, which was arrived at between the parties on the 5th of April 1973. The question of taking judicial notice of the settlement did not arise. The learned Labour Court, however, could consider the contents of the settlement arrived at between the parties, which could not be denied by the Management. Mr. Siddiqul contended that on a perusal of the settlement arrived at between the parties, it would appear that the strike had commenced on the 12th of March 1973, and not on the 9th of March 1973. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Labour Court was wrong. On the other hand, Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Representative for the Management, contended conceding the fact that a settlement was arrived at between the parties on 5th April 1973, contended that the contents of the said settlement must be read along with the evidence of Mr. Shamim Mustafa. Mr. Shamim Mustafa clearly stated in paragraph 17, of his affidavit that out of a total number of 150 workers, 110 persons had gone on strike on 9th March 1973. Mr. Ghani, the learned representative for the respondent, submitted that what is stated in the memorandum of settlement is that all the workers resorted to strike from 12th March 1973. He emphasised the following sentence in the settlement:-- "On 12-3-1973 all factory employees failed to report for work."
6. There is much force in the contention of Mr. Ghani that what is stated in the memorandum of settlement must be read alongwith the evidence adduced by the management. It becomes clear that while on 9th March 1973, only 110 workmen had gone on strike, on 12th March 1973, all the workers went on strike. In these circumstances, I would hold that the conclusion of the learned Labour Court is not open to exception.
7. Mr. Siddiqui, the learned Advocate for the appellant, contended that section 26 of the Ordinance does not put any bar on the right of the Union to raise an industrial dispute in respect of any right that may have been guaranteed. There is not much force in this contention. The provision of subsection (1) of section 26 of the Ordinance itself shows that it is only when an industrial dispute has arisen that the right of the Collective Bargaining Agent commences to communicate its views in respect of the industrial dispute. Industrial Dispute has been defined to mean: "any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person;"
8. Lastly, the learned Labour Court has rightly held that the appellant Union was not competent to raise an industrial dispute during the period of operation of the settlement arrived at between the parties. In this connection, There must be a dispute or difference between the parties. In my view, where the Legislature has guaranteed a right to a party, the question of dispute or difference does not arise. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Thej question of debate on a matter which has been guaranteed by the Legisla-Lt ture does not arise. Moreover, the question of bargaining arises only when! the parties through negotiations can come to some arrangement between themselves. Where the law itself guarantees some right in favour of a party, the question of bargain would not arise. I would hold that the right to receive bonus under section 10-C of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called B the Standing Orders Ordinance), had been granted under certain circumstances to the labour. This cannot be subject-matter of negotiations between the parties. reference may be made to 1960 PLC 166, 1966 PLC 279 and 1968 PLC 87. A perusal of these decisions of the High Court would show that great sanctity has been attached to the settlement arrived at between the parties. A settlement arrived at between the parties must be given due weight, so as to maintain industrial peace. Even the Ordinance has fixed a period of operation of a settlement for two years. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that when a settlement had been arrived at between the parties, the terms of the settlement must remain binding on the parties for sufficiently long period, so that the management and the workers are able to work in amity and peace. I would hold that the Union could not raise a demand in respect of any matter involving financial implications during the pendency of the settlement dated 16th February 1972.
9. The provision of section 26 of the Ordinance is a mandatory provision. The said provision confers certain rights on the workers. It confers, upon the workers the right of strike. In all the Ordinances or enactments prior to the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the workers had no right to go on strike. In order that the Union or the Collective Bargaining Agent may resort to strike, it must also conform with the various ingredients laid down under section 26 of the Ordinance. One of the ingredients is that if the Union desires to go on strike, it must do so within seven days from the end of the period of ten days of the receipt of the communication of industrial dispute, ln the present case, the strike notice was given much after the expiry of seven days of the period of ten days for bilateral negotiations. The strike notice on this ground was also bad in law. For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and maintain the award of the learned Labour Court.