' NAIMUDDIN, J.---The petitioner was convicted under section 161, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2) of Act H of 1947, by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption and was sentenced to undergo R.I. For 12 months and to pay a fine of Rs,1,000 or in default to undergo further R.I. For.6 months. The co-accused was, however, acquitted of the charge.
2. The case against the petitioner, who was a Sanitation Inspector in Sukkur Municipality, was that he demanded Rs, 250 from the complainant, who was a sweepress, for showing her favour in getting her leave period decided and the drawal of leave salary.
3. Against the conviction the petitioner filed an appeal in the High Court of Sindh at Sukkur, which was dismissed by the High Court by the order impugned before us in this petition for leave to appeal. The High Court by the impugned judgment, however, reduced the sentence from 12 to 6 months and also reduced the fine from Rs,1,000 to Rs,500 and in default also halved the sentence.
3. The only point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also urged before the High Court, was Chat there is no evidence against the petitioner except the confession of the co- accused which in itself was no evidence and should not have been treated as such. In support the learned counsel has relied on Shera and 3 others v. The State PLD 1972 Lahore 563, (ii) Jahangiri Lal and others v. Emperor AIR 1935 Lahore 230 and (iii) Joygun Bibi v. The State PLD 1960 SC 313. The contention that the conviction is based only on the confession of the co-accused is mis- conceived. The High Court has dealt with this point in the following words: "The facts of the present case show that confession of co-accused Karim Bux is not the only evidence on which the appellant had been convicted. As a matter of fact, the confession of co- accused Karim Bux is only corroborative evidence and the primary evidence on which the prosecution relied is the evidence of the complainant and Mashir Wazir Ali and the Special Magistrate Mr. Dur Muhammad. There is no reason to suspect that the complainant would falsely involve the appellant. In fact the complainant is a poor sweepress and she would not have gone to the Anti-Corruption police had she not been completely frustrated in her endeavours to get her salary for the leave period which was not paid to her for more than two years."
4. It is, however, correct that the confession of a co-accused, even when admissible, is not evidence and can only be taken into consideration but cannot form the basis of the conviction of the co-accused. It was so held in the case of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 53.
Referring to (i) Bhuboni Sahu v. The King PLD 1949 PC 90, (ii) Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159, (iii) L.S.Raju v. The State of Mysore AIR 1953 Born. 297, (iv) Rafiq Ahmed v.
The State PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 317, (v) Maqbool Hussain v. The State PLD 1960 SC 382, (vi) Ibrahim and another v. The State PLD 1963 Kar. 739, (vii) Shera and 3 others v. The State PLD 1972 Lah. 563 and
(viii) Abdul Sattar v. The State PLD 1976 SC 404, which were cited before the Court, it was opined by Anwarul Hag, CJ. At pages 108-109 of the Report as follows:- "129. This submission indeed has the support of the authority. In the case of Bhuboni Sahu, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that 'a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of evidence contained in section 3. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of these infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case, it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence. The confession of a co- accused can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction.' The other judgments mentioned by the learned counsel follow the same rule. Nothing was said by the learned counsel for the prosecution to the contrary."
But, in the present case conviction is not based on the confession of the co-accused, as stated above. Therefore, the submission of the counsel has no substance.
5. It was then argued that the sentence awarded to the petitioner is harsh and it may be reduced.
The sentence awarded is legal. The High Court has also treated the accused leniently by reducing his sentence to half. If we further reduce it, we shall be encouraging corruption and defeating the purpose for which Act II of 1947 is enacted.
6. We, therefore, find no merits in this petition and accordingly dismissed it.