' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises out of an application under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, filed by Mst. Robina Shaheen, respondent No,3, against Rizwan Mahmood. The parties were married on 3rd April, 1987 but unfortunately disputes and differences arose between them. The marriage has since been dissolved by the petitioner by pronouncing Talaq on 25th March, 1989, which became effective on 25th.
' Earlier the petitioner had filed an application for maintenance which was allowed by the Arbitration Council, Ward No,31, Kot Khawaja Saeed on 25th August, 1988 and the petitioner was directed to pay maintenance to respondent No,3 at the rate of Rs,5,000 per month for the period 1st June, 1987 to 31st August, 1988. That order of the Arbitration Council was unsuccessfully challenged before the Collector, who dismissed his revision petition on 18th April, 1989. He has now filed the present constitutional petition assailing the order of the Arbitration Council and the Collector.
2. This petition was admitted to consider the contention that as respondent No,3 was residing in Ward No,16, the Arbitration Council Ward No,31, Lahore, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the same argument and in support thereof has placed reliance on Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. There can be no cavil with the legal proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under the law an application for maintenance can be filed before the Arbitration Council within the local limits of which the wife resides. In the present case, however it is to be seen that no objection to the effect that respondent No,3 was not residing within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Council Ward No,31 was raised by the petitioner at any time either before the Arbitration Council or before the Collector. The learned counsel for the petitioner when confronted with this position, contended that the objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can always be raised. This contention of the learned counsel has no merit. It is since long well settled that an objection as to the territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and if not raised, is deemed to have been waived. The petitioner having appeared without any protest before the Arbitration Council has acquiesced in the proceedings, and cannot be permitted to challenge the same for the first time, before this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
3. Be that as it may, there is nothing on the record to show that respondent No,3 at the relevant time was not residing within the limits of Arbitration Council of Ward No,1. The learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the correctness of the address given by respondent No,3 in the application for maintenance filed by her but what he contends is that the locality of Ghorey Shah is situated in Ward No,16 and not 31. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has pointed out that Ward No,31 was previously numbered as Ward No,16 and the place where the respondent No,3 was residing is within the territorial jurisdiction of Ward No,31. He has in this connection placed on record the certified copies of the plans of both the wards which support his contention. There is nothing on the record placed by the petitioner to rebut these documents or the assertion that the residence of respondent No,3 is within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Ward No,31.
4. The learned counsel next attempted to argue that the order passed by the Arbitration Council on 28th December, 1984 was ex parte and there was no justification for the Arbitration Council to have proceeded to decide the dispute in the absence of the petitioner or his counsel. As already noted, this is not one of the grounds for the consideration of which the petition was admitted. Moreover, it is not disputed by the learned counsel that the petitioner had due notice of the proceedings before the Arbitration Council and was contesting the same. However, as the learned counsel ceased to appear, the Arbitration Council was justified in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner.
5. Learned counsel pointed out that he has placed on record an affidavit of the learned counsel, who represented the petitioner before the Arbitration Council to the effect that at the time when the case was being adjourned to 28th July, 1988, he had objected to it on the ground that he would be busy in the marriage of his niece but the Chairman, Arbitration Council had assured him that he shall adjourn the proceedings in case he does not appear. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, submitted that no such assurance was given to the learned counsel for the petitioner by the Chairman. He has also pointed out that the order dated 21st July, 1988 was duly signed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but he never indicated that he would not be appearing on the next date.
6. Be that as it may, it is not possible to resolve this factual dispute in the present proceedings, where no evidence can be recorded. Suffice it to say that admittedly the learned counsel for the petitioner had failed to appear on 28th C July,1988 nor any one else was present on his behalf. The Arbitration Council was, therefore, justified in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner.
7. The last contention raised by the learned counsel is that the grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs,5,000 is exorbitant. The Arbitration Council found it as of fact that monthly income of the petitioner was Rs,15,000. The Collector E found no reason to interfere with this finding in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. There is hardly any ground to interfere with the impugned order by this Court.
As a result of what has been said above, this petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.