1. SALEEM AKHTAR, J: --This appeal is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh dated 12-2-1977 by which Constitution Petition No. 558 of 1965 filed by the appellant was dismissed Respondent No. 5 acquired 271.38 acres of land by four different grants in Deh Tarhadi, Taluqa Tando Allahyar, District Hyderabad on full rate conditions as per A-Form Nos. K- 9684 and K 10404. These grants stood cancelled under the automatic cancellation policy notified by the Government with effect from Rob' 1956-57 and Rabi 1957-58 for non-payment of instalments. Thereafter, We appellants and one Mehr Dad gave offer to purchase the land on full rate in respect of 152.2 acres. The Assistant Revenue Officer accepted the offers on 9-6-1960 and upon execution of Kabuliats, Ijazatnamas dated 10-6-1960 were issued. They paid the full cost of the land by instalments. On 19-5-1960 the fifth respondent, who was the original grantee of land, applied for the regrant of land. The Colonization Officer, without affording an opportunity to the appellants and Mehar Dad of being heard, cancelled the grants in their favour and regranted the land to respondent No.5: This order was challenged in appeal by the appellants and Mehar Dad before the Divisional Commissioner, which was heard by the Additional Divisional Commissioner and allowed by order dated 23-6-1961. Respondent No.5 filed Revision against this order which was dismissed by Mr. S.M. Ikram, Member of the Revenue Board, by order dated 22-6-1962 and the appellate order was confirmed. Mehar Dad expired and his legal representative Murad, with the permission of the Assistant Revenue Officer, accorded on 2-1-1964, sold the land to the third appellant. The fifth respondent filed a time--barred review application before Mr. A.K.M. Leghari, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan on 17-3-1964 which was allowed by his order dated 4-8- 1965 thereby setting aside the earlier order of his predecessor dated 20-6-1962. The appellant challenged this order in a Constitutional Petition before the High Court, which was dismissed.
2. Leave to appeal was granted in the following manner:---- "In seeking leave to appeal the learned counsel for the, petitioners contended that subsection (2) of section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 provides a limitation of 90 days for the filing of a review petition from the date of the revisional order. But in the instant case the review application was entertained by Mr. A.K.M. Leghari after a lapse of 4 years from the date of the revisional order. As such he had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide it on merits so as to disturb the vested rights which had accrued to the petitioners. Accordingly the learned Judges in the High Court were also in error in holding that his order was not without jurisdiction. His next contention was that there was no error apparent on the face of the record. As such Mr. A.K.M. Leghari disturbed the decision on merits which amounted to a rehearing of the case as if it was an appeal and that this was not the scope of the review jurisdiction. The learned Judges in the High Court also erred in upholding his order:"
3. From the narration of facts it is obvious that the revisional order was passed on 20-6-1962, and the review application was filed on 17-3-1964. The power of review is exercised by virtue of section 8 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1957 which reads as follows:---- "8. Review of orders by the Board.---(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree passed or order made by the Board and who, from the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for other sufficient reason desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply to the Board for a review of judgment and the Board may, after giving notice to the parties affected thereby and after hearing them, pass such decree or order as the circumstances of the case require ...........
(2) Every application for a review of a decree or order under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date of that decree or order."
4. The scope and grounds to review an order have been specified by subsection (1) of section 8 while subsection (2) prescribes period of limitation of 90 days for filing review application computed from the date of decree or order. Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable to the review application. Therefore, the application for review must be filed within 90 days from the date of the order of and delay in filing such application beyond the period of limitation cannot be condoned by applying section 5 of the Limitation Act.
5. The power to exercise review jurisdiction emanates from the statute and, therefore, it has to be exercised within the four corners of the prescribed conditions and limitation. Such power can be exercised if application is filed by a party within a particular period fixed by the Act and unless the power to extend the time has been conferred, on expiry of such period, such jurisdiction cannot be exercised by any authority. As section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable and power to condone the delay or extend the period of limitation has not been conferred by law, the authority exercising review power cannot, in breach of the statutory provisions, assume power and extend the time. After the expiry of 90 days from the date of order respondent did not have the jurisdiction to apply section 5 of the Limitation Act. From the order of the Member, Board of Revenue- it is clear that objection was raised on behalf of the appellants that review application was barred by time which was summarily rejected by observing that he was justified in condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judges of the High Court, while dealing with this aspect of the case, referred to M/s. Lyallpur Sahiwal Bus Service (Regd.), Lahore v.
6. Appellate Authority and others PLD 1970 Lah. 775, where a time-barred appeal was allowed setting aside the order of the revisional authority rejecting appellant's claim for the grant of road permit.
7. This order was challenged in the High Court in the Writ Petition on the ground that a time barred appeal was entertained. The Division Bench repelling the contention observed that Member, Revenue Board had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and however wrong might the order be it was not without lawful authority. In this regard reference can be made to Jamal Shah v. Election Commissioner PLD 1966 SC 1. In this judgment Cornelius, C.J. While referring to Badrul Haque Khan v.
8. The Election Tribunal, Dacca PLD 1963 SC 704 quoted the observation of Kaikaus, J. Who had rejected the plea that misinterpretation of the relevant provision of the Act was a "clear error of law" such as would make the decision "without lawful authority". The main reasoning being that "when there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction". In Jamal Shah's case while referring to the aforestated contention Kaikaus J. Observed as follows:- "It is a distinction attaching only to judicial tribunals that their acts within their jurisdiction though illegal are not null and void. So far administrative officers and authorities are concerned there is no distinction between illegality and want of jurisdiction. When an administrative officer acts illegally he acts without jurisdiction. An administrative officer has authority to pass order or to take action if certain facts exist. If those essential facts do not exist his order or action is void.
9. While referring to Article 98 of Constitution of Pakistan (1962) it was further observed:-- "Although errors committed in the exercise of jurisdiction cannot be corrected under para (ii), para
(i) may be of great help in resolving this difficulty. It does not contain the words `is of no legal effect' and under it the High Court can direct a person to perform his duty under the law. The High Court can direct a judicial tribunal to exercise the powers conferred on it in accordance with law so as to avoid any illegal step in .The exercise of jurisdiction. As long as the judicial tribunal has not passed Anal orders there will be difficulty in having recourse to pare (i). When it has passed final orders those orders will be valid in spite of any illegality committed in the exercise of jurisdiction and a question may arise as to how that order can be quashed. It may be possible to take the view, however, that the Tribunal may in spite of the passing of the final order be directed to proceed in accordance with law from the stage where the illegality was committed so that subsequent proceedings are automatically nullified."
10. Again at page 55 the following rule was laid down:--- "While I would not be prepared to accept that the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 98 to correct all errors of law relating to the merits of a dispute before a Tribunal I should not be understood as holding that a failure on the part of the Tribunal to properly apply its mind to a question of law arising before it is beyond the scope of Article 98. There may be error apparent on the face of the record which may be due to an oversight; or the Tribunal may not have properly applied its mind to an aspect of the matter before it. There is a duty cast on every judicial tribunal to properly apply its mind to questions of fact and of law. It there be any failure in the proper application of the mind the High Coin-1 can always quash the order and direct that the case be; decided afresh in accordance with law. The High Court cannot, however, itself determine the merits of a dispute before the Tribunal. That has to be done by the Tribunal."
11. The observations, made in this judgment related to an election dispute in s which jurisdiction of the Court was restricted, in view of Article 171 as explained, by Kaikaus, J. In the following manner:---- "Of course Article 171 does not destroy the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98. Article 171 provides for the decision of election disputes in a certain manner and the High Court can always act under Article 98 in enforcement of Article 171 and of the law enacted by virtue of that Article. If the learned Member (or the election tribunal) fails to exercise jurisdiction, or exceeds jurisdiction, or acts illegally or with material irregularity in its exercise, the High Court can pass an appropriate order. I have already explained that there is a duty cast on every judicial tribunal to apply its mind properly to all aspects of the dispute which it is called upon to decide and any lapse in this respect will attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98. However, so far as the merits of the election disputes are concerned they are, in the words of Article 171, `to be finally determined' by the authorities mentioned therein and even if an error of law on the merits had been within the scope of Article 98. Article 171 would have been a bar to the High Court interfering on this ground. All questions of law which have to be decided for determination of the election disputes must be decided and finally decided only by the authorities mentioned in Article 171. The dispute in the present case was whether the ballot paper should be rejected or accepted and it was for the learned Member to determine this dispute finally."
12. These observations clearly point out to the jurisdiction which the High Court can exercise under Article 199. After the judgment in Badrul Haque's case PLD 1963 SC 704 it has remained the recognized principle that when there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the same without jurisdiction. This observation was made in a case relating to election dispute where the power of the High Court under Article 98 was to be exercised subject to the Constitution i.e.. "subject to the terms of Article 171 relative to the determination of election dispute" and the requirement of the Constitution was and is that such dispute should be decided under law framed by the National Assembly. In Jamal Shah's case while referring to Badrul Haque's case Cornelius, C.J. Pointed out that "Kaikaus, J. Expressed himself as being prepared to concede that admission of inadmissible evidence would be an act which is without lawful authority and also conceded the possibility that improper allocation of onus may affect the ultimate decision in the case so as to render it without lawful authority". The principle that where; there is jurisdiction to decide the Tribunal may decide "rightly or wrongly" is restricted to judicial tribunals and not to administrative officers and Authorities.
13. However, where decisions of judicial tribunals are based on inadmissible evidence affecting the result of the case or no evidence or the tribunal fails to properly apply its mind to questions of law and fact parising before it resulting in error apparent on the face of record, the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 199 can quash such decisions.
14. The principle enunciated in Badarul Haq Khan's and Jamal Shah's cases was followed in Muhammad Hussain v. Sikandar PLD 1974 SC 139 in which the reservation to the applicability of this principle as pointed out earlier was not considered for the simple reason that leave to appeal was granted to consider "whether the High Court by setting aside the order of the learned Member of Board of Revenue, purely on equitable considerations had exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution". In the facts and circumstances of the case the principle did apply. Again in Zulfikar Khan Awan v. The Secy. Industries and Mineral Development, Government of Punjab 1974 SCMR 530 same principle was followed as the order of the Tribunal was challenged on the ground of being merely erroneous "as distinguished from without jurisdiction".
15. In this context reference may be made to UtilityStore Corporation of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal PLD 1987 SC 447 where the respondents were salesmen and were promoted as Supervisors but after seine time they were retrenched from service due to reorganization. They served grievance notice on the appellant but as no relief was granted they filed application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance alleging that being promotees they could not be retrenched as they had a right to be accommodated in their original post of Salesmen and entitled to their pay and back benefits. The Labour Court upheld this plea which was confirmed in appeal by thePunjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellant filed Constitution Petition in the Lahore High Court but did not succeed and it was held that impugned orders were not unjust and unfair and as the Labour Court and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to decide what was just and fair, on the facts of the case no interference was required. Leave to appeal was granted inter alia to consider whether due importance was not given to section 25-A(1) and (5) and further whether word `Just' and `Fair' used in section 25-A could be interpreted to override law or the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunals. Muhammad Haleem C.J. Observed;------ "There is no dispute as to the ambit of the adjudicatory process. The objection, however, was that the Tribunal which was cognizant of the grievance could not adjudicate upon it as there was no issue to be tried in regard to any violation of a right guaranteed or secured by or under any law.
16. This obviously reflects to the absence of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which the High Court failed to take note of and branded the order as just and proper' which it could not in the absence of a legal right having been violated."
17. Nasim Hasan Shah, J. Referring to cases of Muhammad Hussain Munir PLD 1974 SC 139 and Zulfikar Khan Awan 1974 SCMR 530 observed as follows:--- "The view of the learned Judge that this Court has ruled that even if the order of a Tribunal is wrong in law, the High Court still cannot intervene in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is not justified and I feel that the judgments of this Court in the cases of Muhammad Hussain Munir PLD 1974 SC 139 and Zulfiqar Khan Awan 1974 SCMR 530 have not been read in their proper context. It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it `rightly or wrongly' because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with the law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly when the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly.
18. Accordingly, when the Tribunal makes error of law in deciding the matter before it, it gocs outside its jurisdiction and, therefore, a determination of the Tribunal which is shown to be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction."
19. The view expressed in the cases of Badrul Haque Khan and Jamal Shah if considered in the overall observations, do not intend to apply in generality the principle that where a Tribunal has the jurisdiction. To decide a case it can decide it wrongly or correctly and in no case High Court can interfere in exercise of power under Article 199. With respect it would not be inappropriate to say that applicability of this principle as observed in Jamal Shah's case has been restricted to judicial tribunal alone. It does not apply to administrative tribunals or authorities. The cumulative effect of all the authorities referred above seems to be that where any tribunal in disregard of the law which confers jurisdiction decides a case in which the error becomes so apparent on the face of record that no judicial mind would accept it as an order passed in proper exercise of jurisdiction, the High Court would be justified to interfere under Article 199 of the Constitution. Few instances affording ground for such interference have been mentioned by Kaikaus, J., in Jamal Shah's case quoted above.
20. Applying this test to the present case we find that section 8 of the WestPakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 while conferring power to review an order correspondingly imposed a limitation that such application should be filed within ninety days from the date of the decree or order. In the absence of any provision conferring a power to extend the period of imitation; such order if passed would be wholly without jurisdiction. Respondent No.1 was conscious of the fact that the review application was filed beyond the period of limitation and for that reason applied section 5 of the Limitation Act without considerating that it has not been made applicable. This is an error apparent on the face of the record due to the fact that respondent No.1 did not properly apply his mind to the question of law and fact. This ground was sufficient to quash the impugned order of respondent No.1 by the High Court. Considering the fact that admittedly the review application was filed much after the expiry of 90 days it is not necessary to remand the case to respondent No.1 for decision.
21. The next submission of Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque is that the nature of the review jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Board under section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act,.1957 does not permit the rehearing of the matter on merits and in adopting this procedure respondent No.1 has exceeded his jurisdiction. Section 8(1) of the Act is substantially the same as Order XLVII. C.P.C. It is well-settled principle that no Court or authority possesses any inherent jurisdiction to review its decree or order. Such power can be exercised where it has been expressly conferred by statute.
22. Reference can be made to Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 Hussain Bukhsh v. Settl.
23. Commr., Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 65 and Baig H.H. Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi v. The Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1984 SC 67, The power to review can be exercised where there is mistake or error of law or fact apparent on the face of the record. To find out such error one has not to scrutinize the record or evidence but it should be self-evident from a perusal of the record itself and can be pinpointed without elaborate examination. Inconsequential or insignificant errors which do not go the root of the matter are to be ignored but if error has material bearing on the final result of the case it can be made a ground for review. Scope of review is completely different from appeal. The review proceeds on the basis of error apparent on the record whereas in appeal all questions of fact and law are considered by the appellate Court. A bare reading of the order of respondent No.1 makes it clear that he travelled beyond the boundaries and scope of review and decided the matter as if hearing an appeal. Respondent No.1 has thus exceeded in exercise of his jurisdiction.
24. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of High Court and Respondent No.1's order and restore the order passed by Mr. S.M. Ikram on 22-6-1962, with no order as to costs.