DECISION This is an appeal against a decision of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi dated June 28, 1973, whereby tho leamed Court prohibited the strike by the workers of the respondent and ordered them to resume work forthwith. The impugned order was passed on application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the 'Ordinance'). I admitted the appeal on 2nd of July 1973. I passed the following order on the 2nd of July 1973 :-- "The appeal is admitted subject to the contention of the other side that an appeal lies."
2. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative of the appellant had contended that the impugned order though passed in application under section 45 of the Ordinance amounts to a disposal of the main application of the respondent and, therefore, it was an Award. As the point raised by Mr. Majeed requires consideration I admitted the appeal subject to the qualification I have already mentioned.
3. The facts giving rise to the appeal briefly put are these. The First National City Bank Employees' Union (hereinafter called the 'Union') gave a Demand Notice on the 9th of February 1973. The demand of the Union was confined to Bonus, only. On 24th of 1973, the Conciliator closed the Conciliation Proceedings. On the 9th of June 1973, Failure Certificate was granted to the Union.
The Union went on strike to press their demand for Bonus. The First National City Bank (hereinafter called the 'Bank'), made an application on the 13th of June 1973, under section 34 of the Ordinance before Labour Court No. V and also an application under section 45 bf the Ordinance. The learned Court, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order. It will be useful to reproduce the operative portion of the said Order :-- "I accordingly find that balance of convenience falls in favour of the applicants, and they are incurring irreparable loss. The respondent- Union is, therefore, directed to call off the strike, the workers are as such ordered to resume work forthwith. The matter, however, is pending for adjudication whether the alleged strike is legal or illegal."
4. An application was made by the Bank for early hearing of the appeal mainly because the filing of the appeal operates as stay of the Order appealed against. Mr. Majeed readily agreed that the matter may be fixed for today.
5. Mr. Majeed, the learned Representative for the respondent has raised several points before me which I propose to dispose of separately. Mr. Majeed contended in the first place that the application under section 45 of the Ordinance was not maintainable inasmuch as the main ingredient of section 45 was lacking in the present case. Subsection (1) of section 45 reads as under :-- "When a strike or lock-out in pursuance of an industrial dispute has already commenced and is in existence at the time when, in respect of such industrial dispute, there is made to, or is pending before a Labour Court, an application under section 34, the Labour Court may, by an order in writing, prohibit continuance of the strike or lockout."
6. Mr. Majeed relying on subsection (1) of section 45 of the Ordinance contended that an application under section 45 would be maintainable only - when it is established that application under section 34 is related ^ to the industrial dispute which was raised by the Union namely 'it is related to Bonus. Mr. Majeed contended that a perusal of the application under section 34 by the Bank would disclose that it did not relate to the Bonus. The question for consideration would be as to whether without holding that an appeal is maintainable 1 can go into the question of maintainability of the application under section 45 of the Ordinance. 1 am clearly of the view that unless I have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a decision of the learned Court on an application under section 45 of the Ordinance I cannot go into the merit of the con- A tention raised by Mr. Majeed. Mr. Khan, the learned Representative for the Bank contended that application does relate to the dispute raised by the Union. I would hold as I have already observed it will not be proper to go into the merit of the contention raised by the parties without holding that an appeal lies.
7. In the second place Mr. Majeed contended that the order of the learned Labour Court being without jurisdiction is a nullity.
In support of his contention Mr. Majeed relied on two cases one of the Privy Council and the other of the Supreme Court of Pakistan namely PLD 1949 P C 45 and PLD 1965 SC 671 in support of his contention that an order without jurisdiction is nullity and can be ignored. In the first place in order to hold whether the order is nullity I must have the jurisdiction to go into that question as an appellate Court. I may also observe that the order on the face of it cannot be said to be nullity as the learned Labour Court had jurisdiction to pass an order under section 45. The mere fact, even if it is assumed that the learned Court had disregarded the ingredients of section 45, would not characterise his order as nullity.
8. In the third place, Mr. Majeed contended that the impugned order amounts to the disposal of the whole application. I have gone through the relevant complaint under section 45 of the Ordinance. I have come to1 the conclusion that merely prohibiting the Union from continuing the strikers does not amount to disposal of the whole application. There are number| of points raised in the application under section 34 of the Ordinance.
9. Lastly Mr. Majeed contended that the Order amounts to an Award. In this connection he referred to the definition of the Award. The Award means disposal of an Industrial Dispute. The short question is as to whether an order prohibiting the party continuing to strike amounts to an industrial dispute. Industrial dispute is defined in the Ordinance. It means :-- " 'Industrial dispute* means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non- employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person." A mere prohibition of a party to continue strike would not amount to dis-| posal of any difference between an employer and a workman and which!^ is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms ofj employment or the conditions of work of any person.
10. While disposing of the point about the maintainability of the appeal I may observe that the policy underlying Industrial Relations Ordinance is to restore amicable relationship between the parties by prohibiting strike or lock-out in suitable cases where equity and justice demands. The Legislature considered it necessary that in either case when whether the application under section 45 is granted or rejected the parties should not t>e allowed to go in appeal so as to harass the other party.
11. With these observations I would hold that no appeal is maintainable. The appeal is dismissed.