' SARDAR MUHAMMAD SAJAWAL KHAN (CHAIRMAN).---Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan a retired Head Constable has brought this appeal before this Tribunal to impugn the order dated 1-11-1984 of Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarabad (respondent No,1) by which he was punished and compulsorily retired from service. Through this appeal he also impugns the order dated 24-9-1988 of Deputy Inspector-General of Police (respondent No,2) and the order dated 29-5-1988 of Inspector-General of Police (respondent No,3) by which his appeal and representation against his compulsory retirement were rejected by them.
2. The relevant facts submitted by the appellant in the memo. Of his appeal are that on 28-6-1983 he was placed under suspension and was supplied with a charge sheet containing some unfounded and baseless charges. He submitted his reply to the charge-sheet but the Inquiry Officer without associating him in the inquiry proceedings recommended against him the punishment of stoppage of promotion for 2 years. The Superintendent of Police (respondent No,1) contrary to the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer issued him a show-cause notice without mentioning therein the punishment proposed to be awarded to the appellant by the Inquiry Officer and without affording him an opportunity of being heard awarded him the punishment of compulsory retirement under the impugned order. The appellant brought numerous representations and applications before respondents Nos.2 and 3 against the said order of his illegal retirement but according to the appellant, he was not informed about the decision taken thereon till 8-6-1989 when it was communicated to him through a registered post that his representation was rejected. The appellant seeks the reversal of the impugned orders on the following grounds:-
(a) that the impugned orders are void ab initio because there does not exist any provision in the relevant Police Rules or Police Act, as to punishment of compulsory retirement. The Superintendent of Police (respondent No,1) held no powers to make the order of compulsory retirement against the appellant and as such the impugned order being illegal and without jurisdiction is not maintainable.
(b) that the appellant was condemned unheard and was not afforded an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal.
(c) that the impugned order is against all the norms of justice and equity and is not maintainable on that account.
3. It is prayed by the appellant that the impugned order dated 1-11-1984 made by respondent No,1 and the impugned orders dated 24-9-1988, 29-9-1988 and 29-5-1989 of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 may be set aside and the appellant be ordered to be reinstated on his post.
4. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order dated 1-11-1984 made by superintendent of Police (respondent No,1) Muzaffarabad was delivered to the appellant in the Wing Office at Mirpur and in compliance with that order the appellant had deposited his uniform and other store articles on 25-11-1984. After having received his pension, he deliberately missed the opportunity of filing his appeal against the impugned order at the proper time before Deputy Inspector-General of Police and thereby had impliedly accepted his retirement. It was after a long time he submitted a time-barred appeal direct to Inspector-General of Police which was dismissed by him for being time-barred and incompetent. The order of Deputy Inspector-General of Police made on appeal is final and no revision or representation before the next higher officer was competent. The appellant has been making repeated applications and the same were also dismissed under the impugned orders dated 29-9-1988 and 29-5-1988 about which the appellant was duly informed well in time. The appeal at this forum is also time-barred and is not maintainable in its present shape.
5. We have heard the arguments as were addressed at the Bar by the learned counsel of each party and have also examined the record of service of the appellant as was maintained in the Office of Inspector-General of Police. The appellant has not mentioned the detail of charges in his appeal although the same are contained in the impugned order made by Superintendent of Police (respondent No, 1). The main charge brought against the appellant is that he posted an application to Superintendent of Police (Reserve) (respondent No, 1) from the post of Dera Sher Khan alleging therein that he was deprive of his promotion while corrupt and inefficient Head Constables junior to him were promoted. He also complained it to Superintendent of Police (Reserve) that Muhammad Hanif his orderly Head Constable had demanded from him a sum of Rs,500 as illegal gratification for the selection grade to be granted to him and he missed that chance because he had failed to fulfil his demand. The charge-sheet as was supplied to the appellant is not on the file and presently it is not possible to ascertain about other contents of the charge-sheet. The inquiry report is also not available on the tile. There is no doubt in it that the Police Rules nor the Police Act as are enforced in the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir do not prescribe compulsory retirement as a penalty for being awarded to a Police Officer held indisciplined and for that reason the impugned order dated 1-11-1984 made by Superintendent of Police Muzaffarabad (respondent No,1) is undoubtedly without jurisdiction and ab initio void, Under the Police Rules, the appellant was entitled to bring an appeal against the said illegal order before the respective Deputy Inspector- General of Police within a period of one month but he failed to avail of his remedy at the proper time and brought a time-barred C appeal before Inspector-General of Police which was dismissed on 23-7-1986. Subsequently, he made repeated applications to the Prime Minister and other quarters for his re-instatement but to no avail.
6. This fact is well established that he brought a time-barred appeal before Inspector-General of Police on 13-11-1985 long after the period provided for filing appeal before Deputy Inspector- General of Police. The appellant is not correct that he was not informed about the decisions taken on his appeal and representations as were submitted by him to Inspector-General of Police. In his application for mercy addressed to the Inspector-General of Police it is accepted by him that all his applications dated 5-7-1985, 1-7-1986 and 6-8-1986 were rejected and this alone is the sufficient proof of the fact that he knew the fate of his applications long before 2nd of February, 1987. Apart from that his application dated 2-9-1988 was treated as appeal and decided on merits by Deputy Inspector-General of Police vide Order Book No,203, dated 24-9-1988.
7. The appeal of the appellant at this forum is dated 1-7-1988 which is hopelessly time-barred. It is contended that no limitation runs against an ab initio void order and as such the present appeal is within time. It is very true that limitation does not run against an order which is passed without jurisdiction and is held ab initio void provided it is not conveyed to the affected person, but we cannot contribute to this view that an aggrieved person does have the limitation to seek his remedy at law at any time at his sweet-will. It may be noted here that the assumption about a void order to be struck down regardless of the consequences of its decision is totally a fallacy because it is so illegal that it does not exist in the eye of the law. But this does not alter the fact that it was passed and by describing it as void Courts cannot alter the fact that the order was passed. An order which is passed can create consequences, therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that a void order must also be struck down. (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104). In fact, the limitation starts running against an aggrieved person from the date he gets knowledge of the order which is ab initio void and is arbitrarily passed against him. In the instant appeal the appellant was informed about the impugned order passed against him well in time and he submitted his pension claim for being sanctioned in his favour. Again he was also informed of the result of his appeal and applications.
8. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that no application has been made for condonation of the period lapsed, we reject this appeal. No order as to the costs.