DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Couit No, VI at Hyderabad, dated 25-10-1989, whereby the grievance application of the appellant was dismissed.
2. The case of the appellant, in brief, is that he was a permanent workman employed by the respondents and was gate-stopped on 15-9-1988; 16-9-1988 and 17-9-1988. Whereupon, he wrote to the respondents, who had informed him that he had resigned from the service and his resignation had been accepted. The appellant alleged that he had not tendered his resignation.
He, therefore, after serving the grievance notice upon the respondents, filed the grievance petition.
3. I have heard Mr. Ahsanul Hague Siddiqui, learned Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. Syed Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, the learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The only point to be considered is whether the appellant had tendered his resignation. The respondents had produced photostat copy of the resignation Exh. R-2 and photostat copy of the receipt of the dues Exh. R-3. The appellant was confronted with these documents and he had denied his signatures and thumb-impression upon these documents. Thereafter, the respondents had moved an application that the specimen signatures of the appellant be obtained and Exhs.R-2 and R-3 be referred to the handwriting expert. They also produced the originals of those documents. The appellant gave no objection to this application and also gave his specimen signatures and thumb impression which are at pages 47 and 49 of the R & P. However, subsequently, the respondent moved another application on 2-10-1989, whereby they withdrew their application for referring the disputed documents to the handwriting Expert which was allowed by the learned Presiding Officer. The learned Presiding Officer, however, compared the specimen signatures with the signatures on the disputed documents' and came to the conclusion that they tally with the specimen signatures.
5. There is word on oath of the appellant that the signatures or thumb impression on these documents were not his, against the word of the respondents' witness, Muhammad Sadiq.
Muhammad Sadiq, however, does not state, that the appellant had signed the documents or thumb-marked them in his presence. Nor does he state that he was conversant with the signatures of the appellant. The respondents were conscious of the fact, that they had no evidence to prove the signatures on the disputed documents to be of the appellant and, therefore, applied for sending them for expert opinion. The fact that they withdrew the request for sending the disputed signatures to the Expert would raise adverse presumption against the respondents. No doubt, the learned Labour Court has got powers to compare the signatures himself. But, in the instant case, it was not only the comparison of signatures, but, it was also the comparison of the thumb- impressions on the disputed documents which the respondents claim to be of the appellant. The learned Labour Court was not in a position to compare the thumb-impression and, therefore, has refrained from giving any opinion on that point.
6. Mr. Ahsanul Haque Siddiqi, the learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon the decision in the case of Subedar Fazal Hussain v. Qazi Muhammad Bashir and 12 others, reported in PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 89; wherein it is held, as under:- "It is an accepted principle of law that the expert's evidence must always be received with great caution especially the opinion of handwriting experts. The Court should not surrender its own opinion to that of experts who are called before it. Although such evidence has to be received with great caution, yet the evidence and reasons, on which it is based, are entitled to a careful examination before rejection. The most important things, in such like cases to be examined, are the general characteristics, formations of letters in the handwriting (questioned or admitted), fixed pen-habits and mannerism. The identity or resemblance in handwriting has to be found out on the value of the effect of various considerations arising from individual characteristics which have been embodied in the technical language of experts. It is also settled that mere resemblance between two writings is not sufficient to create the conviction that they were written by one and the same person. In the world of today, which has shown much advancement in every direction is not difficult to forge the handwriting of a person in such a manner as to make it impossible for even the most acute and experienced Judge to discriminate between the false and true."
7. Thus the evidence of handwriting expert is also to be treated with caution. The casual opinion of the learned Presiding Officer that the signatures tally, without giving any details as to in what characteristics the signatures tally, would not be sufficient to hold that the signatures and the thumb impressions on the disputed documents were of the appellant. The burden of proof was upon the respondents in the face of denial by the appellant about the signatures and thumb impression. The respondents failed to discharge this burden. This failure is more conspicuous in view of the fact, that they withdrew their application for referring the disputed documents for expert opinion, thus raising presumption under the law against them.
8. In this connection, reference may also be made to the case of Sarejini Dassi v. Hari Das Ghose, reported in AIR 1922 Calcutta 12; wherein it is held as under:- "Although from the dissimilarity of signatures a Court may legitimately draw the inference that a particular signature is not genuine because it varies from an admittedly genuine signature, yet resemblance of two signatures affords no safe foundation that one of them is genuine."
9. Considering all the facts discussed above and the circumstances of the instant case, I am not satisfied that the appellant had tendered his resignation and had received the dues or that the signatures on the alleged letter of resignation or receipts are of the appellant. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the learned Labour Court and order the reinstatement of the appellant with full back benefits. Orders to be implemented within one month.