1. MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J:- In the year 1904 Mir Baz Khan etc; instituted a suit against Feroz Khan and his nephew Bhai Khan in the Court of Assistant Collector, First Grade, D.I.Khan for a declaration to the effect r that they were the occupancy tenants of land measuring 800 kanals and 13 marlas | as described in the title of the plaint, and situated in village Bah'adri, Tehsil and l District D.I.Khan. It appears that the dispute was compromised wherein Feroz I Khan in person and as guardian-ad-litem of his nephew Bhai Khan aflectcd a compromise with the aforesaid Mr.Baz Khan and others wherein their accupancy rights in respect of the suit area were conceded. To the mis- fortune of Mir Baz Khan and others aforesaid however, the compromise and decree dated 30-9- 1904 allegedly could not find its way into the subsequent revenue record prepared about fifty vears thereafter. In consequence, Habibullah-Khan, since dead and represented by his legal representatives, continued to be recorded in the revenue papers as the owners of khasra Nos.843,844,845,861 and 862, whereas the successors-in-inlerest of Mir Baz Khan were recorded as the tenants-al-will thereof on payment of half of the produce as rent. Consequent upon the promulgation of the N.W.F.P. Tenancy Act (XXV of 1950), Pir Ghulam and others sued the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No.1 to 6 on 3-9-1953 in the Court of Assistant Collector, First grade D.I. Khan for a declaration to the effect that being occupancy tenants of the land, they had become owners of the suit khasra numbers to the extend of 4/5th shares and based their claim on the compromise deed and the decree dated 30-9-1004 passed by the learned Assistant '
2. Collector First Grade, D.I.Khan. The suit was contested by Habibullah Khan on the ground that under the NWFP Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXV of 1950) the suit was not triable by a Revenue Court. The Assistant Collector, howevof, held that the N.W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXV of 1950 made no provision regarding declaration of occupancy rights and, therefore, by his order dated 25-8-1954 dismissed the suit holding that it could neither be brought in the present form, nor was it triable by a Revenue Court. Mr.Ghulam and others, thereafter, preferred an appeal which was also dismissed by the Collector vide his order dated 8-2-1956. Feeling still dis-salisfied, they filed a revision petition which was, however, ; accepted by the Additional Commissioner on 11-11-1956 and while setting aside the orders of the Courts below, he directed the return of the plaint to the petitioners therein for its presentation to the Civil Court. }3. The second round of litigation on civil side commenced with the filing of suit by one Noor Muhammad Khan on 22-5-1970 wherein besides declaration of his and that of defendants 2 to 9 title to the land aforesaid, he challenged the correctness of the entries in the revenue record showing them as tenanls-at-will under Habibullah Khan. This suit was dismissed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, D.I.Khan, on 27-1-1971 and the appeal preferred thereagainst to the learned District Judge also met with the same fate on 9-4-1973. Still feeling aggrieved, Noor Muhammad filed a revision petition in this Court assailing the judgments and decrees of the to Courts below. Shah Nawaz Khan, J., as his Lordship then was, dismissed the revision petition in limine and held that the petitioner and others should first obtain a declaration of their occupancy rights before they could claim benefit of section 4 and 4-A of the N.W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950. It was directed that section 83 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 would continue to apply which lays down a special procedure for settling the matter in question. It was further observed that an application to obtain the requisite dcclaralon of occupancy rights was competent. In consequence, Noor Muhammad, petitioner ' herein, commenced the third round of litigation and brought a fresh suit on 26-2- ]1975 in the Court of Assistant Collector First Grade, D.I.Khan, for the declaration J and assorted that thus were entitled to the benefits accruing under the NWFP | Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXV of 1950), whereby they have become owners in possession of 4/5lh shares thereof. The further declaration claimed was to the I effect that the ejectment of the defendants at the instance of Habibullah Khan, defendant No.1, since dead and represented by his legal representatives, was void and -ineffective qua their occupancy rights. By way of consequential relief, jrestoration of possession of the suit land to the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 30 j from the successors-in-inlcrest of Habibullah Khan, defendant No.1 was also 1 claimed. The Assistant Collector, by his order dated 21-6-1983, dismissed the suit. , Noor Muhammad's appeal to the Collector, D.I.Khan was also dismissed vide his order dated 14-7-1686 and a revision by him in the Court of Additional Commissioner, D.I.Khan was also dismissed on 25-2-1989.4. Since no alternative remedy was available to the petitioner, therefore, he has filed this petition under Article 199 of the construction of Islamic Republic of Pakistan calling in question the orders dated 21-6-1985, 14-7- 1986 and 25-2- 1989 respectively passed by respondents No.35,34 and 33 to be declared illegal, ineffective, void, unlawful, ultra vires and without jurisdiction and has sought declaration of title of the petitioner and those of proforma respondents No.14 to 32 to the suit property detailed in this petition.5. Mr.Sanaullah Khan Gandapur, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended.-Firstly,that the findings of respondent No.35 are based on misreading and non-reading of evidence who had without discussing the issues settled* in the the suit on the ground that "Dawa Haza Khilaf- , c-Halat Wa Qanun Hai". In fact, he has not exercised jurisdiction properly and has, thereby, passed an illegal order;Secondly,that respondent No.34 also failed to appreciate the evidence and the law on the subject and dismissed the appeal on the sole ground that the suit was the barred without taking into consideration the agonies of protracted litigation suffered by the petitioner;Thirdly,that the learned Additional Commissioner exercising the powers in revision has also committed material illegality by dismissing the revision petition without discussing the merits of the case. His simple verdict "that the learned counsel for the petitioner could not convince the Court that injustice has been done to the petitioner, I, therefore, uphold the concurrent finding of both the lower Courts and reject the re vision petition with no order as to costs", is no judgment in the eyes of law wherein the contentions of the counsel on either side have been reproduced without giving a finding thereon, andFourthly,that the decree of the Revenue Court passed and compromise affecdled in 1904 could not, in any way, be ignored by the Revenue Courts who were bound to give its effect in the revenue record.6. On the contrary learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned orders passed by respondents 33 to 35 and submitted that their findings that the claim of the petitioner and his proforma respondents was by itself barred by the were un-exceptionable. He, however, conceded that the Assistant Collector lst Grade was wrong to hold that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration that the petitioner's and the answering respondents held that's occupancy rights in the disputed land. Nonetheless, he maintained, that the respondents No.33 to 35 have fully addressed themselves to the points agitatedbefore them and decided the same specifically in accordance with law and facts made available on the record.7. We have carefully perused the record of the case and examined the J judgments of the various Revenue and Civil Courts made available on the record with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parlies. Undoubtedly, where was a compromise between Fcroz Khan and his minor nephew Bhai Khan on the one hand, and some of the predccessors-in- interest of the petitioner and respondents 6 to 32 on the other, whereby their claim to their occupancy rights Was conceded on ; the basis of which the Assistant Collector First Grade passed a decree on 30-9- 1904. This decree could not be incorporated in the subsequent revenue record for reasons best known to the petitioner and answering respondents. The status of prodecanern- in-inlcrest of the pctitioncr^and answering respondents continued to be recorded in the revenue record to be tpat of tcnants-at-will till the institution of .Their suit in the first round of this litigalibn on 3-9-1953- The Assistant Collector, First tirade; D.I.Khan "has found it as a fact that the petitioner and respondents 6 ,to 32 have not adduced any cogent evidence to show that notwithstanding the omission of their names as the occupancy tenants in the revenue record right from 1904, they continued to possess the suit land as the occupancy tenants.This finding of fact has been arrived at by a Court of competent jurisdiction which has been affirmed by respondent No.34 in his capacity as the collector and maintained by respondent No.33 as the revisional Court. We are of the considered opinion that the di iputed question of fact determinable by a competent authority of Special jurisdiction could not be scrutinized in our writ jurisdiction. Since the controversy has been earlier decided by a competent authority, it/could not be reopened by availing of the consalilutional jurisdiction of this Court without showing that the impugned orders passed by respondents 33 to 35 were a nullity in the eye of law. Besides what has been observed above, we have been able to lay our hands on an authority of a D.B. Of this Court in Mohammad Khairul Azam.
3. Vs. Mchtartaw Taj Mohammad (1986 C.L.C. 188), wherein it was observed that the finding of a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction holding that the matter being an old and closed chapter could not be reopened and if it was fully substantiated by the record needs no interferenes in the extra- ordinary jurisdiction. The case in hand is also an old one dating back to 30-9-1904 and since then the petitioners were not recorded as the occupancy tenants in the revenue record. Consequently, they had claimed relief in the Revenue Court in the first round of the litigation for a declaration of' their occupancy rights in the land which could not be granted to them. The suit brought by them before the Civil Court for declaration of their-title was rightly held to be incompetent. In consequence, in the second round of litigation, the subject matter would be taken to have been dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 83 of the NWFP Tenancy Act, 1950 read with section 85 thereof. Section 83 of the NWFP Tenancy Act, 1950 lays down a special procedure for settling the matter in question. It prescribes an application to obtain the requisite declaration of occupancy rights. If for any reason the matter is not concluded by an application and it is considered that a suit will be necessary and permissible, then the matter would fall within the purview of clause (d) of Second Group of section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. In the instant case,however, it has been conceded on behalf of the petitioner and the proforma respondents that they have been ejected in pursuance of a notice of ejectment since 16-5-1957. There is documentary evidence on the record to show that the petitioner and the answering respondents have been dispossessed in due course of law. Therefore, besides seeking a declaration of their occupancy rights in the revenue record within the purview of item (d)of Second Groups of section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, the possessory relief should also have been claimed within l2 years simultaneously from the civil Court and thus they having not availed the same, mere declaration even if it had been granted by the Revenue Court would not have been an efficacious relief.8. After careful perusal of the record of the case we have not been convinced that the findings of respondents 33 to 35 suffers from any infirmity or misreading or non-reading of evidence nor any such infirmity was pointed out to us. The criticism qua the judgments of the Revenue Courts, namely, respondents 33 to 35, would not be of much legal significance, because even if the said judgments do not come upto the standard prescribed under the law cannot be struck down in the writ jurisdiction on that score alone. The question which at the most can be determined is whether the Tribunal of special jurisdiction whose decisions have been assailed have done substantial justice. If it be so, then the impugned orders could not be declared as without lawful authority end of no legal effect. We find that impugned orders of the forums below do satisfy this legal requirement.9. As a result of what has been observed above, we find no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.