SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---Four Petitions have been filed seeking review of our three judgments, all dated 18th June, 1989, one passed in CA. No.501/80, the second in CA. 503/80 and the third amongst others in CA. 505/80 and 507/80, whereby the appeals of the petitioners were dismissed.
2. In Civil Review Petition No.59-R of 1989, the claim of Mst. Fatima, a married daughter of Mst. Churi, the claim-holder, to be treated as temporary allottee on the strength of the claim of Mst. Churi having been received after verification in that estate and her brother Noor Muhammad and her father Boota being recorded temporary allottees of that estate, is reiterated. Further strength is sought to be derived from Paragraph 5 of Rehabilitation Scheme Part-II.
3. Mst. Fatima was claiming to be a temporary allottee on the strength of the temporary allotment of her brother and her father but as a fact it was held that, she was not the recorded member of the family of either and that she was a married lady and residing in a different village. In this situation in a congested District she could not claim as of right the status of a temporary allottee.
4. Mr. A.R Shaikh, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the Petitioners contended that she had a very small claim and adjustment could as well have been allowed to her within the maximum limit of 2,000 Produce Index Units fixed under Paragraph 5 of Rehabilitation Scheme Part-II. As it was a question of her vested right, the same could not be recognized without her being a temporary allottee in a congested district where so many irregularities in the allotment had been noticed which had led to the whole sale revision of the allotments. The finding of fact being against her, it is not possible to extend to her the benefit of being a temporary allottee on the basis of allotment of her brother and father.
5. As regards the three other Petitions, the learned counsel submitted that though he had been throughout challenging validity of the order passed by Mr. I.U. Khan, but its validity having been upheld by the last Court, he had a right to object to the manner in which it was implemented because strict order of preference as prescribed in the guidelines given by the Rehabilitation Commissioner had not been observed.
6. This is a matter which was not within the scope of appeal directly and if any grievance has arisen with regard to the implementation of the guidelines handed down by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, then the Petitioners had to take up their grievance before the appropriate Settlement Authority in accordance with law instead of seeking review of the judgment.
In none of these Petitions there is merit and these are dismissed.