AJMAL MIAN, J.--Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment dated 17-10-1989 passed by a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No.52 of 1984 filed by the petitioner, dismissing the same.
2. The facts to be noted are that the petitioner was registered Trade Union and acted as the C.B.A.
Upto 1983 in respect of respondent No.3 corporation (National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur), hereinafter referred to as the Corporation. It appears that in 1983 the Registrar of Trade Unions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the I.R.O., authorised the General Manager of the Corporation to file an application under Section 10 of the I.R.O. For cancellation of registration on the ground that the petitioner Union could not have been registered in view of Section 1(3)(a) of the I.R.O. (which provides that the I.R.O. Shall not apply to any person employed in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordinance Factory maintained by the Federal Government), before the Labour Court, Peshawar, which application was allowed by an order dated 19-2-1984 and the registration was cancelled. Against the above order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P. But the same was dismissed on 2-4-1984. Thereupon, the petitioner filed aforesaid writ petition which was dismissed on the grounds found favour with the two Courts below and also on an additional ground that after the deregistration of the petitioner Union, it was not a juristic person and, therefore, could not be treated as an aggrieved party in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution.
Against the above judgment/order, the petitioner has filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
3. Alongwith the above petition for leave, the petitioner has filed an application under the proviso to Rule 1 of Order 13 read with Order 33 Rule 6 of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules, 1980, for the condonation of delay of 14 days.
The ground for condoning the delay has been given in para. 2 of the application, which reads as follows:- "2. That it may be submitted here with respect that the petitioner-Union had applied for a certified true copy of the impugned judgment the same day i.e. On 17-12-1989 when the judgment had been announced by the learned High Court. On the receipt issued by the Copying Agency the tentative date given for receipt of the certified copy of the impugned judgment was 27-12-1989. The petitioner, however, visited the Copying Agency on 9-1-1990. The copy was ready and the same was delivered to the petitioner the same day i.e. On 9-1-1990. The petitioner thought that since the copy had been applied for the same day the judgment had been announced, the time of 60 days for filing leave petition against the same would be counted from 9-1-1990 and would end on 10-3- 1990. So keeping this date in view the petitioner-Union started raising funds for engaging the counsel and meeting other expenses for filing leave petition. Yesterday i.e. On 2-3-1990 the petitioner-Union contacted the undersigned A.O.R. For the purpose of filing the above-noted leave petition and it was only then that they came to know that the time for filing leave petition had already run out and that the filing of petition on 3-3-1990 would be barred by 14 days. The petitioner-Union was informed that since the copy had been made ready for delivery on 19-12- 1989, only 2 days spent in preparation of the copy of the impugned Judgment would be excluded.
The petitioner-Union, however, took all steps immediately and without wasting a single day are filing the petition today i.e. 3-3-1990."
4. Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that factually the above petition is barred by time by 6 days and not 14 days, whereas Mr. Naeem Bokhari, learned A.S.C. Appearing for the caveator/Corporation, has submitted that factually the petition is barred by time by 14 days. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the above controversy as even if we were to treat the above petition as barred by time by 6 days, the question which requires consideration, is as to whether the petitioner has been able to show a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. It is a well-settled principle of law that the delay of each day is to be explained. In the instant case the reason given for the delay in the above-quoted para. 2 of the application apparently cannot be treated as sufficient ground. The petitioner was given 27-12-1989 for collecting the certified copy of the impugned judgment. There seems to be no justifiable reason for collecting the same on 9-1-1990.
Mr.Naeem Bokhari has referred to the case of Mst.Hajran v. Sardar Muhammad PLD 1970 SC 287; the case of Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji and others 1970 SCMR 558; the case of Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102; the case of Muhammad Bashir v. Muhammad Shat and another 1989 SCMR 310 and the case of S.Iqbal Hussain Shah and another v. Mst Akhtari Begum and others 1989 SCMR 1441. In support of his contention that the ignorance of law is no ground for condoning the delay and that delay of each day is to be justified etc.
5. Then it was contended by MrAbid Minto that, since the petitioner has also raised the question of violation of fundamental rights contained in Article 17 of the Constitution, the Court may treat the above petition for leave as a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, he candidly conceded that the above question was not agitated before the High Court. We are not inclined to convert the above petition for leave to appeal into a petition under Article 18-4(3) of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, dismissed as, being time-barred.