DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Third Sindh Labour Court at Karachi dated 10-10-1989, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was allowed arid he was ordered to be reinstated with full back benefits.
2. I have heard Mr.Noor Muhammad, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan. Learned Advocate for the respondent and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. The brief facts of the case are, that the respondent was admittedly working as Manager, Mahmoodabad Branch of the appellants bank, when he is alleged to have committed certain acts of misconduct. After domestic enquiry, he was dismissed from service vide order dated 19-4-1977.
Aggrieved by this dismissal order he served grievance notice upon the appellants on 22-12-1985 and thereafter he filed grievance petition on 5-3-1986 which was resisted by the appellants on the ground that the respondent was not a workman and that the grievance notice and petition were time-barred.
4. I will take first the ground of limitation. Admittedly the dismissal order was passed on 19-4-1977.
Under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 the respondent had to bring the grievance to the notice of the employer within three months from the date cause of action arose to him. Admittedly the respondent moved a petition before the Martial Law Authorities on 13-11-1977 for reinstatement which was dismissed. Admittedly he was prosecuted for the alleged acts of misconduct which constituted criminal offence and was convicted by the trial Court on 19-4-1978, but the High Court set aside the conviction on 4-12-1983. Thereafter the respondent moved an appeal to the President, National Bank of Pakistan which was dismissed on 12-4-1984. He then filed a Constitution petition before the High Court which dismissed in limine. Thereafter he moved a petition to the Chairman, Pakistan Banking Council on 27-7-1985 which was also rejected by the President. National Bank of Pakistan on 12-9-1985. According to Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, the cause of action arose to the respondent after rejection of the appeal on 12-9-1985 which order is said to have been received by the respondent on 24-9-1985.
5. It is settled law that where rules provide for filing of appeal and appeal is decided, period of limitation would run from the date the appeal is decided. However the rules provide for one appeal only and not two appeals. Rules further provide that appeal is to be filed within 90 days from the date cause of action arose. As pointed above, the first appeal was filed by the respondent to the President, National Bank of Pakistan on 15-2-1984, which was nearly 7 years after the dismissal order was passed on 19-4-1977. This appeal was dismissed on 12-4-1984. The second appeal was presented not to the Chairman, National Bank of Pakistan but to the Chairman, Pakistan Banking Council on 2-7-1985 and it appears to have been sent to the Chairman, N.B.P., who dismissed it on 12-9-1985. The appeal that could extend the period of limitation would be the appeal preferred under the rules. Prima facie even the first appeal was beyond the period of limitation provided under the rules. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, however submits, that cause of action arose to the respondent for filing appeal after he was acquitted by the High Court in the criminal case on 4-12- 1983.
6. The departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are two separate proceedings.
Apparently in the instant case the departmental proceedings were taken against the respondent independent of criminal proceeding and he was dismissed from service on the ground that the misconduct was proved against him in the departmental proceedings. He was dismissed on 19-4- 1977, whereas he was convicted by the trial Court on 19-4-1978 viz. One year after the dismissal.
Had the dismissal order been based on conviction by the trial Court, he was entitled to be reinstated after decision of the High Court. However, the dismissal order was based on independent proceedings, which would not be affected by the result of the criminal proceeding.
The acquittal by High Court would not extend the period of limitation or give fresh cause of action to the respondent to move the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969. Thus the first appeal which was hopelessly time-barred and the second appeal which was not under any rule would not give any fresh cause of action to the respondent or extend the period of limitation.
7. It is submitted by Mr. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, that because these appeals were entertained and decided therefore fresh cause of action accrued to the respondent from the dates of the decisions of these appeals and the period of limitation fixed under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 would run from such dates. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the proposition, because in that case the period of limitation fixed under section 25-A would become redundent. Every workman, at his pleasure can at any time move appeal or representation which would naturally be replied. This could not be the intentionally of legislature to empower the party to extend the period of limitation by resorting the such procedure and thereby nullify the limitation imposed under the law.
8. The learned Labour Court has relied upon the case of M/s National Bank of Pakistan v. Itrat Hussain Abdi Appeal No, KAR-325 of 1987, decided by this Tribunal on 22-2-1988. This Tribunal had upheld the order of the learned Labour Court but had not discussed in detail the point of limitation which was discussed by the learned Labour Court. In that case the dismissal order was passed on 16-10-1982 whereafter the workman filed an appeal before the authority on 17-10-1982, which remained unreplied. Thereafter he gave a reminder on 17-12-1984 which also remained unreplied and thereafter the grievance notice on 5-2-1985. The learned Labour Court has condoned this period of three years which workman waited for decision of appeal. I had already pointed this question of limitation was not considered by this Tribunal while upholding the order of Labour Court. The decision of this Tribunal has attained finality and I need not further discuss it.
9. However in the instant case, as pointed above, even first appeal was filed after 7 years as against 90 days provided under the Rules. Again the grievance notice was given only after the appeal to Banking Council was rejected by the President of the National Bank of Pakistan. This appeal was decided on 12-9-1985 which is said to have been received by the respondent on 24-9- 1985, though there is no such proof. Similarly, Mr. Noor Muhammad submitted that in his Memo of Appeal it is asserted that the grievance notice though dated 22-5-1985, was received on 28-5- 1985. Be that as it may, the grievance notice as well as grievance petition have been filed after inordinate delay of about 9 years which has not been satisfactorily explained. As such, the grievance notice as well as grievance petition/application were time-barred.
' I need not discuss other issues as I am of the opinion that the grievance petition was not maintainable as it was time-barred. I, therefore, allow this appeal E and set aside the order of the learned Labour Court and restore the original order of dismissal of the respondent.