' NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---This judgment will dispose of Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1220 and 1221 of 1989 filed by Nasir Hameed Siddiqui and Azfar Waheed. In both these petitions, respondent No, 1 is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and respondent No, 2 is the House Building Finance Corporation.
We have heard Mr. Siddique Mirza, learned counsel for the petitioners, in these petitions and Mr. Mehmood Iqbal who has appeared for the respondents.
2. The petitioners were offered jobs of Trainee Officers at a monthly stipend of Rs,1,500 by letters dated 26-4-1987 addressed to the petitioners. It was stated in the letters offering the said jobs that the posts will be purely temporary for one year and that the services of the petitioners were liable to be terminated on one month's notice without assigning any reason. Another term mentioned in the letters dated 26-4-1987 was that after the completion of the training and passing of the departmental examination successfully, the petitioners will be offered the post of Grade-III Officers as fresh appointment. The offers were accepted by the petitioners. Thereafter, on 3-9-1988, an office order was issued by the House Building Finance Corporation in which, after referring to the letters dated 26-4-1987 and that the petitioners had successfully completed the training, it was mentioned that the petitioners had been appointed temporarily as Grade-III Officers on the terms as specified in the House Building Finance Corporation Service Regulations of 1957 with effect from 1-9-1988 and until further orders. However, by another office order dated 1-11-1988, the petitioners were informed that their services as Grade-III Officers would stand terminated after a month from date of the said office order but they were offered the post of Training Officers again at a monthly stipend of Rs,2,000 on same terms and conditions as mentioned in the letter dated 26-4-1987.
Apparently this offer was accepted but then by the impugned memorandum dated 30-11-1989 of the House Building Finance Corporation it was decided that the stipend of Rs,2,000 per month on which the petitioners were working with the Corporation should be stopped and the petitioners were offered the posts of Assistant in Grade-IV. It was further mentioned in the memorandum dated 30-11-1989 that in case the above offer was not accepted, the stipend being given to the petitioners shall automatically cease to be paid with effect from 1-1-1990 and the petitioners will cease to be on the rolls of House Building Finance Corporation and in such a case the period from 1-12-1989 to 30-12-1989 shall be treated as one month's motion.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has attacked not only the impugned order dated 30-11- 1989 but also the earlier office order dated 1-11-1988. However, we find that the earlier office order dated 1-11-1988 has not been challenged by the petitioners and no prayer has been made in that regard in these petitions by the petitioners. As observed earlier, apparently the petitioners had accepted the office order dated 1-11-1988 and as a consequence they became trainee officers on same terms and conditions but the monthly stipend had been increased from Rs,1,500 to Rs,2,000.
Relevant terms in the letter dated 26-4-1%7 have been mentioned earlier. As noticed earlier, according to the petitioners were temporary for one year and the services of the petitioners were liable to termination on one month's notice without assigning any reason. In view of the office order dated 1-11-1988, which had been accepted by the petitioners, the services of the petitioners remained temporary and in view of the terms mentioned in the letter dated 26-4-1987, services of the petitioners could be terminated by one month's notice. Additionally it may be mentioned that according to the Regulation No, 11 of the House Building Finance Corporation Services Regulations, 1957, the services of the petitioners could be terminated by giving one month's notice without assigning any reason. The said Regulation reads as follows:- "Services of temporary employees may be terminated on one month's previous 'notice in writing without assigning any reason or on payment of one month's pay in lieu thereof."
' In the memorandum dated 30-11-1989 it is clearly mentioned that in case the offer of the post of Assistant was not accepted by the petitioners, the period from 1-12-1989 to 30-12-1989 be treated as one month's notice.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has challenged the memorandum dated 30-11- 1989 on the ground that it violates certain other Regulations of the Corporation. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners had been regularly absorbed in the Corporation Service. The submission cannot be accepted as no orders of the Corporation has been shown according to which the services of the petitioners had been regularised. Then no service Regulation has been pointed out according to which the services of the petitioners could have been deemed to be regularised. Reference has been made to the terms mentioned in the letter dated 26-4-1987 of the Corporation and the office order dated 1-11-1988 and from these two documents it is apparent that the services of the petitioners remained temporary and they had not acquired any rights as permanent or confirmed employees of the Corporation.
5. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that according to the comments, action has been taken against the petitioners for some illegalities or irregularities committed by the petitioners and other Trainee Officers in the departmental examinations. Some reference has been made in the Comments filed on behalf of the Corporation about certain irregularities but we find that the Corporation, instead of taking any disciplinary action, decided to absorb the petitioners by offering them posts in Grade-IV in the Corporation. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the termination of the petitioner's Services as Trainee Officers by giving them one month's notice was neither illegal nor in violation of the Service Regulations, the services of the petitioners being temporary.
6. Learned counsel had relied upon 1983 SCMR 1275, 1990 SCMR 999 and 1990 SCMR 1524. None of these three decisions of the Supreme Court is of any assistance to the petitioners. As observed by us earlier, the petitioners were only holding temporary assignments with the House Building Finance Corporation and termination of their services as Trainee Officers was neither illegal nor it violates any Service Regulations of the Corporation.
7. In the circumstances we find no merit in these petitions. Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1220 and 1221 of 1989 are accordingly dismissed but with no order as to costs.
8. We may add here that the petitioners have remained in the Service of Corporation since April 1987 and it would be proper for the Corporation to extend the last date for acceptance by the petitioners of the offer made by the Corporation in their memorandum dated 30-11-1989 for posts of Assistants in Grade-IV so that the petitioners have another opportunity of accepting the said offer.