DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,IV at Karachi, dated 18-2-1990, whereby grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed on temporary basis as welder on 1-10-1986 initially for three months which period was further extended by three months and then further extended by two months. His services were terminated on 1-6-1987 which order of termination was served upon him by registered post on 26-5-1987. He served grievance notice upon the respondent and failing to get any redress he filed grievance petition which was resisted by the respondents on the ground that the appointment of the appellant was temporary and the work for which he was employed was finished and therefore his services were terminated.
3. I have heard Mr. Abdul Majeed, learned representative for the appellant and Mr. A. Hafiz, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The order of appointment which is Ex. A/1 shows that the appellant was appointed on the work of purely temporary nature viz. 'welding work for Building Extension' and it was to last for 3 months.
Second page of this order which is produced by the respondents alongwith their written statement shows that he was appointed in Engineering Department. He was issued a Temporary/Badli `Identity Card' vide Ex. A/3. Ex. A/4 shows that the 'work load' in Engineering Department for Building Extension still persisted and might last for another three months and therefore services were extended upto 31-3-1987. By letter Ex. A/5 his services were further extended upto 31-5-1987. By order, dated 26-5-1987, which is Ex.A/6, his services were terminated on the close of work on 1-6- 1987. The contention of the appellant is that after three months service he had acquired the status of permanent workman and he was employed on a job of permanent nature and that he was given such assurance by his Officer by name Rafiq. However apart from the word of the appellant there is no evidence in support of his contention. The appellant had worked with the respondent for 8 months and one day.
5. A workman is classified under Standing Order I of the West Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the 'Ordinance'). A 'permanent workman' is defined therein as a workman who has been engaged on work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months in the same or another occupation.' A 'temporary workman' is defined as a workman who has been engaged for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months.'
6. With regard to work on which the appellant was employed Mr. Fasihuzzaman has stated as under:- "That I say that the welding work which the applicant did in Engineering Department only was in connection with the extension of PVA Hall/Glue manufacturing plant only which also involved his working in Central Stores (Racks) and the stage being built for PVA extension and that all such work was of purely temporary nature and it lasted upto the end of May, 1987. In fact the work of extension of PVA Hall was done in phases and it started in the beginning of 1986 and the initial work of welding in connection therewith requiring different levels of skills was completed before the employment of the Applicant in October, 1986."
From his evidence it would be clear that work of the extension of PVA Hall lasted from beginning of 1986 to May, 1987 viz. For more than nine months. However their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sindh Labour Court No,5 and others PLD 1980 Supreme Court 323 have held that word 'likely' used in the Standing Order I would not necessarily mean that only that work would be temporary which is completed within nine months. Therefore if the appellant had been appointed only for doing work in PVA Extension Hall and it actually finished in May, then he would be temporary workman irrespective of the fact that he had put in more than three months services. However the letter of termination does not expressly show that his services had been terminated because the work for which he had been employed had been completed.
The order of termination may be reproduced as under:- "We refer to your letter of temporary employment dated 1st October, 1986 and have to advise you that your employment in the company will come to an end/shall stand terminated on the close of work on 1st June, 1987.'
' Please collect all your legal dues from the Staff Payment Cell of the Company."
' This letter would show that his services were terminated because employment of company was of temporary nature which came to an end. It does not specifically show that his services were terminated because the work for which he was employed had been completed. The appellant had put in more than three months' service and; therefore, his services could not be terminated even if he had been employed to do the work of temporary nature unless that work itself had been completed.
7. Mr. A. Hafiz contended that reference is made to his temporary employment letter dated 1-10- 1986 and therefore it could be inferred that his services were terminated because of completion of work. Standing Order 12(3) requires that the order of termination shall be in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. The reason in termination letter cannot be inferred by reference to some other letter but had to be explicitly stated. Word `explicit' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean "not obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or reservation. 'Clear in understanding". The words 'close of work on 1st June, 1987' used in termination order do not refer to the closure of work for which the appellant was employed but only refer to 'close of daily work' viz. 'and of working day'. Even Mr. A. Hafiz did not argue that the words 'close of work' pointed out the close of work for which the appellant was employed.
8. No doubt the last order, Ex. A/5 shows that the services of the appellant were extended upto 31- 5-1987 but his services were being extended from time to time because the workload still persisted and even the case of the respondent is that the appellant was appointed so long the work of building continued. As such even because his appointment was upto 31st May, his services could not have been terminated on that ground after he had put in his work for 1st June, 1987 also. This view further gets support from the fact that his first appointment order was for three months viz. From 1-10-1986 to 31-12-1986. However he continued to work even without further order as work load persisted. His services were further extended for another three months vide order dated 7-1-1987 viz. After 'working for seven days without fresh written order'. Therefore the only reason for which the services of the appellant could have been terminated could be that the work for which he was employed was completed and that reason should have been explicitly shown in the order of termination of services.
9. In the case of M/s. Dawood Hosiery Mills, Karachi v. Hazrat Muhammad Yousuf and others 1975 PLC 48 the learned Single Judge of Sindh High Court at Karachi held that it would appear from Standing Order 12(3) that termination order has to be in writing and it must disclose cause of the termination. In the case of Aitzaz Ahsan and others v. Chief Election Commission, Lahore reported in PLD 1989 Lah. 1 a Division Bench of Lahore High Court held that every word of statute had to be given effect. Standing Order 12(3) is penal in nature as it terminates the services of an employee therefore every word of Standing Order 12(3) has to be strictly construed and has to be given effect.
10. The services of the appellant even according to the respondent were terminated because work for which he was employed had been completed. This reason however has not been explicitly stated in the termination order. Therefore this termination is not strictly in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) and is therefore not sustainable.
11. I, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order of learned Labour Court and order reinstatement of the appellant with hack benefits.
12. The order to be implemented within one month.