' This civil revision assails correctness of the judgment/decree dated 12-1-1980 of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, whereby the petitioner-defendant's appeal against an ex parte decree dated 30-4-1979 passed by the trial Court, was dismissed on the grounds firstly that he was duly served through the proclamation published in the weekly `Jahan Numa' and secondly that it was barred by time.
2. The sole question urged in support of the Revision was that the petitioner was not duly served with the summons inasmuch as the name of his village, Lambray, was wrongly shown as Lantrav in the plaint, summonses and the proclamation published in the newspaper, and hence service effected on a wrong address was no service in the eye of law. Reliance was placed on Order VII, rule 1(c), C.P.C. Which makes it incumbent upon the plaintiff to furnish correct address of the defendant in the plaint. It was claimed that giving wrong address was indeed a travesty of the said rule, and that service effected on such an address did not meet the requirements of law, nor did it suffice to proceed ex parte against the defendant. Secondly, it was asserted that in no attempt service of the process was effected personally on the petitioner, nor was the receipt A/D.
Accompanying the registered postal envelope received back, nor was there any report by the process-server indicating that the petitioner was keeping himself out of the way. The objection raised in this behalf was that in the absence of the above indicia, substituted service and that too through a non-descript weekly like `Japan Numa' was not adequate to the extent the ex parte proceedings could have been founded thereon. Lastly, limitation applied to the appeal was seriously challenged. According to the lower appellate Court, Article 164 of the Limitation Act applied giving thirty days period commencing from the date of decree. The petitioner, however, submitted that in a case where the defendant was not personally served, the period of thirty days would commence from the date of knowledge of the decree. He placed reliance on Sultan Muhammad v. Mst. Hamida Begum and 18 others (1970 SCMR 466) to substantiate his contention.
3. The respondent-plaintiff denied if he had furnished wrong address of the petitioner. He pointed out that it was the same address which the petitioner had lastly given in his memo. Of appeal filed before the lower appellate Court as also recorded in the Jamabandi Exh.P.8 and that there was no deliberateness in the matter at all. He relied upon Mst. Afzal Begum and others v. Y.M.CA. Through its General Secretary (PLD 1979 SC 18), Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Saeed (1985 CLC 2123) and National Bank of Pakistan v. Shamsur Rehman and 2 others (1985 MLD 231) which were the cases where ex parte proceedings were upheld on the ground that the substituted service was sufficient.
4. The crucial point was to see what address of the petitioner-defendant was given in the. Plaint.
The original plaint reveals that the name of his village was recorded as Lantray {{URDU TEXT}} in place of Lambray {{URDU TEXT}}. A careful look on the urdu character of the word showed that difference was created by the presence or absence of the dot of Bay {URDU TEXT}. If the dot is placed underneath the middle part of the word, it would read Lambray {{URDU TEXT}} and if this dot is absent, it would read Lantray {{URED TEXT}}. It may be due to slight oversight, but the dot of Bay {{URDU TEXT}} was absent in the plaint and the word was written and read as Lantray.
Counsel's contention was that there was no village in the entire District Sheikhupura with the name of Lantray and that it was here that the mistake cropped up in the petitioner's address which prevented service of the process on him personally or otherwise.
5. Although Mr. Muhammad Rafiq Chohan, Advocate for the respondent relied upon the memo. Of appeal preferred before the learned Additional District Judge in support of his contention that the word `Lantray' was written by the petitioner himself in his appeal, yet it could not justify writing incorrect name of his village in the main plaint. The provisions of Order VII, rule 1(c), C.P.C. Cited above impinge upon plaintiff to always give correct address of the defendant so that service may not be hindered. The purport of the provision was that all particulars of the defendant, including the place of his residence, may be accurately given in order to identify him for the purpose of service and save time by avoiding unnecessary adjournments which may be caused due to any inaccuracy in those particulars. Thus compliance with this requirement was emphasized in Hafiz Muhammad Ikram v. Muhammad Mushtaq (PLD 1978 Lah. 996) and Muhammad Aslam v.
Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others (1979 SCMR 85). The respondent-plaintiff could not be absolved of his obligation of giving the correct place of the residence of the defendant in the plaint. The record does not show if the petitioner was served personally, nor was the postal receipt A/D. Received back to establish that the registered envelope sent to the petitioner on the wrong address, was received by him. The proclamation published in the weekly by way of substituted service as well wrongly mentioned the name of the petitioner's village. Reliance placed upon the cases of Mst. Afzal Begum, Muhammad Akram and National Bank of Pakistan was quite misplaced inasmuch as there the address of the defendant had been correctly recorded. It is thus apparent that the petitioner was not served because of the inaccuracy in regard to the name of the place of his residence. The ex parte proceedings taken against him could not be sustained.
6. The next reason for dismissal of the petitioner's appeal was that it was barred by time. Since it turned out to be a case where the petitioner was not served personally, according to the rule laid down in Sultan Muhammad's case the limitation would start running against him from the date of his knowledge. He swore an affidavit and the same was not controverted. Also in Maulvi Ali Akbar v.
Khatoon Nessa alias Khatoon Bibi (1974 SCMR 331) it was held that where the proceedings were taken behind the back of a party, the limitation may not be applied with undue severity resulting in heavy and permanent loss to the petitioner. Consequently this was a case where limitation was to be computed as from the date of knowledge of the decree rather than under Article 164 of the Limitation Act from the date when it was passed. The view taken by the learned Additional District Judge on the point was erroneous and cannot be sustained.
7. No other point was urged. The revision petition is allowed, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside, and the case is remanded to the Civil Judge Ist Class, Ferozewala for fresh decision on merits. Parties shall appear before him on 3-3-1991. The record be sent to him without delay.
Revision .