' ABDUL HAM I D KHAN (MEMBER).---The following adverse remarks were recorded in the ACR of Muhammad M unawar, Police Inspector for the year 1985 during which period he was posted as S.H.O., Police Station, Lodhran: Investigation of crime against property: "Below average"
Rating as an S.H.O., if so appointed: Below average Relation with public: "Bad"
Integrity: Corrupt Class of report "Unfit for further promotion, has reached his ceiling."
"Unfit for retention after 25 years service."
"A thoroughly dishonest and corrupt official whose performance has been of a poor standard. His behaviour with the public was rude and there were numerous complaints of high handedness. Is unfit to hold the present rank."
2. While the reporting officer i,e, Sr. Superintendent of Police, Bahawalnagar had given him a good report, the countersigning officer/D.I.-G., Bahawalpur Range/Respondent No, 2 had recorded the above_ adverse remarks. The appellant's representation against these remarks was also rejected by respondent No, 4 i,e, the I.-G. Police, Punjab vide his order dated 3-5-1988. The instant appeal has been filed against the impugned order dated 3-5-1988 of respondent No, 1 rejecting the above mentioned representation of the appellant.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted before the Tribunal that the impugned order dated 3-5-1988 was not sustainable on the following grounds:
(i) The appellant's record since he joined service in 1968 is unblemished except for this solitary report. The impugned adverse remarks cannot, therefore, ,reasonably be considered as an objective assessm ent.
(ii) Copy of the full A.C.R. Was not supplied to him which has seriously prejudiced the appellant in properly representing against the adverse remarks.
(iii) The initiation/countersigning of the report was delayed by over one year with the result that some subsequent events have influenced the assessment made by the countersigning officer.
(iv) The countersigning officer's remarks against the appellant's integrity are vague and unsubstantiated.
(v) Some of the remarks such as those against the appellant's alleged misbehaviour are against facts.
(vi) The contrast between the remarks of the reporting officer and the countersigning officer is too conspicuous which is due to the personal bias on the part of the countersigning officer.
4. The learned District Attorney did not accept the position taken by the learned counsel for the appellant and insisted that the impugned remarks were based on the conduct and performance of the appellant as actually observed by the countersigning officer who had ample opportunities to so observe the behaviour and working of the appellant from close quarters. He further submitted that the appellant was visibly trying to take shelter behind technical niceties but the fact remained that the learned counsel for the appellant had been unable to controvert the adverse remarks on factual plane. He, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 5-3-1988 may be maintained.
5. We have gone through the synopsis of the Character Roll of the appellant from 1968 to 1985 and find that except for the impugned report for the year 1985 there is no other adverse entry in his CR Dossier. The assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned remarks cannot reasonably be considered as an objective assessment of the work and conduct of the appellant is unassailable. In 1986 PLC (C.S.) 117; Muhammad Khalid Pervaiz Uppal v. Chairman, Central Board of Revenue and 2 others the learned Federal Service Tribunal had observed in a case of almost similar nature as under:- " We have given our anxious thought to the submissions made by the parties and carefully examined the relevant record. Significantly, except the impugned report in all the reports available on the file, those written prior and subsequent, the appellant was assessed to be honest. Indeed, the impugned adverse remarks do not find support either from the record or any incident which should satisfy us that the appellant was dishonest. The impugned adverse remarks cannot, therefore, be reasonably considered as an objective assessment, more particularly, because when as said above, the appellant was assessed to be honest in all the prior and subsequent reports, one fails to understand what happened during this short period which changed so drastically the opinion of the Reporting Officer about the appellant's integrity. Thus, the respondents utterly failed to substantiate the impugned adverse remarks. The irresistible conclusion would, therefore, be that the impugned adverse remarks are not only unfounded and uncalled for but biased too."
6. The case of the appellant in the instant appeal is in essence no different than the two cases cited above and, therefore, deserve the same treatment.
7. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that he was not supplied a complete copy of the report containing the adverse remarks, which has not been controverted by the learned District Attorney, is also corroborated by the record placed before us. In 1988 PLC (C.S.)
424; Naseer Ahmad v. Sr. Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi and two others this Tribunal had held as under:-- "This appeal was liable to be accepted on a short ground alone that the appellant was not supplied with complete copy of report in which adverse remarks were included. This practice itself violated the principles of natural justice.
' The copy of the complete A.C.R. Should be made available to the concerned Police Officers because in the absence of the complete report, not only they are handicapped to take proper legal grounds but Tribunal is also not in a position to fully appreciate the report. We have to send for dossiers in all such matters. The practice of not supplying the complete report is not only against principles of natural justice but also not conducive to proper administration of justice.
' The respondent No, 3 should take steps to modify appendix VIII and also issue necessary instructions for supplying complete copy of the report to official concerned."
8. The failure of the competent authority to supply a complete copy of the impugned ACR has thus violated the principles of natural justice in the instant I case.
9. The report covers the period 1-1-1985 to 15-12-1985 but was initiated on 5-2-1987 and countersigned on 5-5-1987. In para. 5 of the Inspector-General's Revised Order No, 32 it is laid down as under:-- "5. Responsibility of final authority to ensure prompt writing of confidential reports -- Generally, the writing of confidential reports gets delayed, which affects the disposal of cases in which it is necessary to consult character rolls. The final authority about the writing of confidential reports will be responsible, for obtaining confidential reports for the preceding calendar year within the month of January each year. It would then furnish a certificate to the Inspector-General of Police on 1st February each year that all the confidential reports which were due to be completed have actually been completed and either placed on the Character Rolls or forwarded to the Inspector-General of Police. The defaulting authorities shall be brought to the notice of Government for appropriate disciplinary action."
10. The reason for prescribing this schedule is to ensure that the remarks are based on the performance of Government servant during the calendar year to which they relate. Otherwise, consciously or unconsciously subsequent events can contribute towards the formation of opinion in respect of the past year. It thus becomes obligatory on the Reporting and Countersigning Officers to complete the reports within the month of January each year. In the instant appeal no justification has been offered for the late initiation and countersigning of the report in question. It is thus evident that this report has not been recorded in accordance with the procedure laid down in the aforesaid Standing Order No,
32. We are reinforced in our opinion by a similar view taken by this Tribunal in the case reported as 1984 PLC (C.S.) 1169: Abdul Wahab Khan v. Government of I the Punjab and two others.
11. In the specific columns the appellant has been adjudged as corrupt and in the general remarks he has been rated as thoroughly dishonest and corrupt official. These remarks have not been substantiated or justified in any way. The learned District Attorney, however, invited our attention to the written objections submitted by the respondents wherein it is stated that there were public complaints of dishonesty and corruption against the appellant who registered a false case F.I.R. No, 316, dated 25-5-1985 for corrupt and ulterior motives and an adverse note was, therefore, recorded by respondent No, 2 in the concluding para. Of the relevant Inspection Report. No such public complaint of dishonesty and corruption was produced before the Tribunal to substantiate the allegations of corruption. In 1990 PLC (C.S.) 489 it has been held in no ambiguous terms that the charge of integrity cannot be sustained without fully substantiating it. We are also cognizant of the fact that the officer's integrity has never been doubted before and this is the only report in which he has been rated as corrupt. During the long period of 14 years, 1968 to 1984, his integrity was never brought into question. We are not prepared to believe that a person who was rated as honest throughout his career suddenly became corrupt overnight. In this connection reference may again be made to the case discussed in para. 5 above. It will, therefore, be safe to conclude that the impugned adverse remarks are unfounded and uncalled for.
12. As far as the charge of misbehaviour is concerned, it is on record that not one but two enquiries were held on this specific charge in which the appellant was exonerated by two different enquiry officers. There are some Inspection Reports also relating to this period wherein the work and conduct of the appellant has been appreciated by his superiors. This remark, therefore, does not stick.
13. The Countersigning Officer has considered him unfit for further promotion as also for retention after 25 years of service. A civil servant's prospects of promotion cannot be jeopardised on the basis of a single report which also suffers from multiple defects. It is not imaginable that a person who was doing so well during the last 14 years of his service and whose work and conduct as also his integrity was appreciated throughout has now suddenly become unfit for promotion or for retention after 25 years of service. In any case, the latter remark is irrelevant and premature as in 1987 the officer had completed only 16 years of service.
14. All this leads us to the only possible conclusion, as alleged by the appellant, that the remarks have been recorded due to the personal disliking or bias of the countersigning officer. The contrast between the remarks of the reporting officer and the countersigning officer is simply unbelievable.
Whereas the Reporting Officer has given the appellant the top rating of 'outstanding' as a crime control officer and as S.H.O., the countersigning officer has relegated him to the lowest grade i,e, 'below average'. Similarly, his rating of 'outstanding' as leader of men was changed to 'average'; relations with public downgraded from `good' to `bad'; integrity from outright 'honest' to an equally definitive rating `corrupt' and class of report from the highest grade of 'A-r to the lowest depths of 'C'. The S.S.P. Considered the appellant fit for promotion and for retention after 25 years service but the D.I.-G. Found him unfit. Under the General Remarks too the S.S.P. Used superlatives to highlight the positive traits of character and conduct of the appellant whereas the D.I.-G. Has painted a completely different picture of the official. Unless the appellant is acting Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, the allegation of bias against the D.I.-G. Is the only irresistible conclusion.
15. We do not consider it necessary to further examine the other remarks as the impugned report is liable to be expunged on any one of the short grounds mentioned above. The result is that we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 3-5-1988 of respondent No, 1, so far as it concerns the instant appeal, and direct that the adverse remarks in the appellant's ACR for the year 1985 be expunged. There are no orders as to costs.