' Muhammad Khurshid petitioner was employed as a driver with the Punjab Road Transport Corporation and after suspension of his driving licence for two years, by the Licensing Authority, on account of his involvement in a road accident, his services were terminated by the respondent- Corporation on 30-12-1987.
2. He served a grievance notice on his said employer, where after he approached the learned Labour Court, Lahore, under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969 seeking annulment of the termination of his services.
3. Through his decision dated 12-7-1988, the Presiding Officer of the said learned Court accepted the said petition and set aside his removal from service and directed his reinstatement but without back benefits.
4. This decision was challenged by Khurshid petitioner before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal to the extent of refusal of back benefits and by the Employer-Corporation, regarding the reversal of the employee's removal from service and his consequent reinstatement.
5. Both these appeals were heard, and through a consolidated judgment dated 20-12-1988, the learned Tribunal accepted the appeal of the respondent-Corporation and setting aside the decision of the Labour Court, maintained the present petitioner's removal from service which also meant dismissal of the present petitioner's appeal claiming back benefits as a result of his reinstatement.
6. This appellate judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal is being impugned through this Constitutional petition.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondent-Corporation's appeal before the Tribunal was hit by limitation. He elaborated that the decision of the learned Labour Court was dated 12-7-1988; a certified copy of this decision was applied for on 4-8-1988 and was supplied to the respondent-Corporation on 16-8-1988.
8. The learned counsel thus submitted that 30 days' limitation for filing the appeal in question expired on 24-8-1988 but the appeal had been filed one day thereafter i,e, on 25-8-1988.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation replied that 23rd and 24th of August in the year 1988 were declared as National Holidays on account of MOHARRAM and the last day of limitation being a holiday, the appeal which was filed on the succeeding day, was within limitation.
10. After checking up the record, I find that the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation is factually correct and the last day of limitation being a holiday, it is held that the appeal before the learned Tribunal was within time.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that it was an established practice of the respondent-Corporation that whenever a driving licence of a driver was suspended, he was provided with an alternative job till such time that his licence was revived, but the petitioner had been discriminated, as this custom had not been followed in his case.
12. The learned counsel has not been able to cite any rule of law in support of this contention. He has no doubt, relied upon a few instances where the respondent-Corporation had absorbed such- like drivers on other jobs but it cannot be declared that in all cases where the driving licences of the persons employed as drivers by the respondent-Corporation were suspended, they must be provided alternative jobs.
13. If in certain cases, the respondent-employer had certain alternative jobs available for absorption of such-like employees and if they had obliged some such drivers, then the same would not create any right for the others to be treated in the same manner as the alternative jobs may or may not be available at the relevant time.
14. Needless to say that employment as a driver requires a special skill and the condition precedent for seeking or retaining such an employment, is a valid driving licence. In the circumstances, if a person becomes incapable of driving vehicles on account of the suspension of his driving licence, then he ceases to be possessed of the qualification required for the said job and would thus lose entitlement to continue in such an employment.
15. It would be inappropriate to declare it as a law that in such an eventuality, a person who loses his employment must be provided some other job by the respondent-Corporation. Such an alternative job may or may not be available with the employer and in the absence of any law, rule or any term or condition of the petitioner's service, the employer-Corporation cannot be burdened with the obligation of offering some other assignment to the petitioner nor can the employer be directed to wait for two years till the revival of such an employees's driving licence and to keep the post vacant for such a long time because if the employer fills this vacancy and employs another person to work for two years, then it might not be possible or adviseable for the employer to terminate the services of such an employed person on the return of an employee, like the petitioner.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner finally relied upon Standing Order No,12 (1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance of 1968 and argued that the termination of the petitioner's services was bad in law on account of absence of notice.
17. This contention can be ignored on the short ground that the same was never urged before the two learned Tribunals whose decisions are under challenge and such a contention cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
18. In any case, an employee who holds an employment requiring a special skill and when he undoubtedly stands divested of the qualification to perform the skilled job, the provisions of Standing Order No, 12(1) would not be attracted.
19. In view of what has been discussed above and also in view of the fact that the petitioner has not been able to point out any jurisdictional defect in the impugned judgments, I find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.
20. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.