' This is a revision petition against the order of Additional District Judge, Peshawar dated 14-1-1991, whereby the plaintiff-petitioner's appeal against the judgment and order of Civil Judge, Peshawar dated 20-12-1990, refusing grant of temporary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff, was dismissed.
2. Admittedly plaintiff-petitioner was appointed as Senior Administrative Officer under the Civil Aviation Authority on contract for a period of three years with effect from 14th April, 1987. On expiry of the period it was further extended for a further period of two years i.e. Up to 13th April, 1992.
Subsequently the petitioner's services were terminated by order dated 31-10-1990 allegedly conveyed to him on 4-11-1990. Aggrieved by the order of termination of his services the petitioner approached the Civil Court in a suit for declaration to the effect that the order of termination of services was illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect and that the plaintiff be allowed to continue in service till he completes the contract period. It was alleged in the plaint that there was complaint of misuse of official position on which enquiry was initiated but without carrying on those proceedings to its logical end the enquiry was dropped and in turn he was terminated from service. With the plaint an application was moved for temporary injunction which though granted to him on 6-11-1990, was vacated on 20-12-1990 by the learned Civil Judge. The plaintiff's appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Peshawar was also dismissed on 14-1-1991, hence the present revision petition.
3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that rule 5.02(3) of the Civil Aviation Rules, applicable to the petitioner's case, provides that whenever it is found necessary to terminate the services of an employee during the period of his agreement, specific intimation of the grounds on which such termination becomes necessary shall be furnished to the employee in writing. As the grounds have not been given in the order of termination served on him the petitioner has got a prima facie case and entitled to the grant of injunction. The learned counsel placed reliance on Mian Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan through the Deputy Commissioner, Khairpur and another PLD 1970 SC page 180, Muhammad Yakoob v. Health Officer, Municipal Committee, Hyderabad and another 1973 SCMR page 184 and Sui Gas Transmission Company v. Sui Gas Employees' Union and others 1977 SCMR page 220.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that there were reasons for terminating services of the petitioner but those have not been mentioned in the order as that would have damaged future career of the petitioner. It was further argued that rule 1.07 read with the terms and conditions of service provides that the rules referred to above would be subject to the terms and conditions of service provided in the agreement, if any, executed between the parties. According to the learned counsel in case of termination of service of the petitioner the Department was either to serve one month notice or to order one month pay to the petitioner in lieu thereof. The Department has in exercise of its option agreed to pay him one month pay while terminating his services with immediate effect. The learned counsel further argued that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. No question of irreparable loss and balance of convenience would arise in case as if the plaintiff succeeds he will get his emoluments and other benefits of the contract period if found entitled to it. Lastly that both the Courts below having refused to exercise their discretion in favour of the petitioner no interference is required. By this Court in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction. Reliance, in support of his argument, is placed on Shahzada Muhammad Umar Baig v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC page 139, Mst. Sughra Bai v. Mst. Rabia 1982 CLC page 344, Province of West Pakistan through the Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad and another v. Malik Asghar Khan 1971 SCMR page 569 and Messrs Usman Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi and another v. Board of Directors, Usman Textile Mills Ltd. And 6 others PLD 1976 Kar.
10.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, perusal of the record and going through the law cited at the Bar I find no merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The letter of termination of service of the petitioner authorising him to draw one month pay in lieu of notice period in terms of para. 2(b) of his appointment letter dated 14-4-1987, reads as follows:- "This contract may be terminated by one month's notice from either side. If the Authority terminates the appointment without notice,, the Authority will pay to you one month's pay in lieu thereof. In case you desire to terminate the contract, without prescribed notice, you shall deposit with the Authority your pay for one month which you will be drawing at the time of termination of contract, but you will remain on duty until :the competent Authority accepts your request for termination of the contract."
6. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are quite distinguishable on facts of the present case. In Mian Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan through the Deputy Commissioner, Khairpur and another temporary injunction prayed for was refused by the Courts below merely on the ground that section 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, is a bar, to the suit filed by the appellant in the Court of Ist Class Sub-Judge, Khairpur and it was in that context that their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterating the legal proposition that ordinarily a party in revenue matters should exhaust all his remedies by way of appeal before invoking aid of the Civil Court but at the same time observed that there are different considerations in a case where the allegation of a party is that the impugned order is nullity in the eye of law. It was after that finding that the order of temporary injunction issued by the trial Court, which had been set aside by the High Court on the ground mentioned above, was restored.
7. In Muhammad Yakoob v. Health Officer, Municipal Committee, Hyderabad and another, the law laid down does not favour the petitioner; rather it supports the view taken by the Courts below. In this case the order of cancellation of licence was challenged in civil suit and in that application for temporary injunction was made. When the matter came before their Lordships it was held that if the petitioner succeeds in his suit, he will be entitled to recover all damages suffered in consequence of cancellation order and that the plaintiff would also be entitled to the renewal of his licence. It was further held that no irreparable injury will thus be suffered by him which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Similarly in "Sui Gas Transmission Company v. Sui Gas Employees Union and others" it was held that when prayer for temporary injunction is considered there must be a prima facie case raising serious question of fact or law and on that shall rest the balance of convenience and inconvenience to the parties if interim relief is granted or refused coupled with irreparable injury.
7-A. The present case, is however, fully covered by the precedent case "Shahzada Muhammad Umar Baig v. Sultan Mahmood Khan", wherein after considering the aforementioned three ingredients for grant of temporary injunction it was held that unless it is found that the discretion exercised by the Courts below was fanciful or arbitrary there is no scope for interference in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was the view taken in "Mst. Sughra Bai v. Mst. Rabia" reported in 1982 CLC page 344.
' For the reasons stated above when both the Courts below have refused to grant the injunction prayed for in exercise of their disCretion and the orders are based on sound judicial principles on facts of the present case no case has been made out for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. This revision petition, therefore, fails which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.