DECISION This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court, No. 1, Karachi, dated July 14, 1973, whereby' the learned Labour Court dismissed tbe application of the appellant filed under section 34, read with section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The facts giving rise to the appeal briefly put are these. , 2.
The appellant was employed as a Designer-Process Artist in the respondent concern. His services were terminated on 31st May 1971, on payment of one month's salary. The appellant approached the Martial Law Authorities, who directed the Labour Directorate to dispose of his case. The Labour Directorate on 18th February 1972, ordered that the' appellant should be re-instated, Tbe appellant was, however, not re-instated.' He thereafter made an application on 19th April 1972, to the S. D. M., S.I.T.E, for bis re-instatement, which resulted, according to the appellant, in the' settlement dated 15th May 1972. The appellant claims 'that under the' said settlement he was entitled to re- instatement. The settlement, was also not honoured by the respondent. The appellant, therefore, was obliged' to give a grievance notice on 27th July 1972. He made the application* giving rise to the impugned order on 30th September 1972. This observation was made while examining the provisions of Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. It was held by the Bench that the provision was mandatory. 5.
3. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the application was very belated ; that the appellant had accepted the Notice Pay and that the section in which the appellant was working had been closed. On these findings, the learned Labour Court dismissed the application of the appellant.
4. Mr. S. M. Yaqoob, the learned Representative for the respondent, contended that the application was not maintainable, inasmuch as, when the cause of action arose to the appellant, the law applicable to redress of grievances was Standing Order 18 of the West Pakistan Indstrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance). Under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, the appellant should have given a notice in writing stating his grievance within 15 days of the occurrence of the cause of his grievance. In otter words, the appellant should have given a notice within 15 days of his termination of service dated 31st May 1971. This was admittedly not done. It has been held in $aleemsons' case (1) that : "Where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations, formalities or conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred, and it is therefore probable that such was the intention of the Legislatute." Mr. M. Shibh, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, however, contended that the appellant being ignorant of law was diligently and honestly pursuing his remedy before other authorities in the hope that he will get redress from those authorities. It is true that the appellant had approached the Marital Law Authorities, the Governor and the Labour Directorate. This, however, does not minimise the effect of the mandatory provisions of Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders ^ Ordinance. I would hold that the appellant having not followed the procedure prescribed under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, his application in respect of the cause of action, which arose on 31st May 1971, was barred.
6. Mr. Shibli, the learned Advocate for the appellant, however, rightly contended that even if the application in respect of the cause of action which arose on 31st May 1971, was not maintainable, the application under section 25-A of the Ordinance was maintainable in respect of the cause of action which arose on the 15th of May 1972, when a settlement between one of the Directors of the Mill and the Workers was arrived at. There is no doubt that an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance could be maintainable, provided the settlement dated 15th May 1972, covered the case of the appellant. Mr. Yaqoob, the leamed Respresentative for the respondent, raised two-fold contentions in this respect. He contended, in the first place, that the so-called settlement dated 15th May 1972, was not a settlement within the meaning of the definition given under the Ordinance. In the second place, the learned Representative, contended that ieven if it was a settlement, the said settlement did not cover the case of the appellant. In that view the appellant was not entitled to get any redress on ,tbe ground that the same had been violated. (1) PLD 1973 Kar. 1 7. So far as the first question is concerned as to whether the said settlement dated 15th May 1972, was a settlement or not, I find that the settlement has been signed by Mr. Haji Dyer on behalf of the Dyer Texile and Printing Mills and by Workers' Representative. The settlement was also signed by the Assistant Director, Labour Welfare, Government of Sind. In the present case, in these circumstances, I am not inclined to take a very technical view that the settlement does not conform to the prescribed rule for arriving at a settlement. , I find that the settlement substantially conforms with the rule prescribed.
8. So far as the next point is concerned, Mr. Shibh contended relying on paragraph 5 of the Settlement, which runs as under, that it did cover the case of the appellant :-- "The workers of general shift would resume duty from 19-9-1972 at 8 a.m."
9. Mr. Shibh contended that the appellant belonged to the 'General Shift* and, therefore, his case was covered by the settlement dated 15th May 1972. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of an instrument that it must be read as a whole. A party is not allowed to take out one clause of the settlement which favours him and ignore the others. It would appear from the lst paragraph of the Settlement, which reads as under, that it was to apply to Weaving Section of 'B' Shift :-- "The Management has agreed to take back the Workers of 'B* Shift preparatory to Weaving Section consisting of Winding, Warping, Sizing and Drawing Sections on 19-5-1972 from 3 p.m."
10. Similarly, there is paragraph 3 of the Settlement, which relates to 'C* Shift, but for Weaving Section. My conclusion is, reading the instrument of settlement arrived at between the parties, that it applies to a particular section of workers and not to every worker. Besides, 'B' and 'C' Shifts of the Weaving Section, it appears to me, that there is a General ' ection also. The General Section, it appears to me, that the parties agreed to apply it only to Weaving Section and not to Engraving Section. I would, therefore, hold that the Settlement dated 15th May 1972, did not apply to the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.