DECISION This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, dated March 8, 1973, whereby the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to the circumstances of the present case and, therefore, the applications before him were not maintainable and they were accordingly dismissed. The facts giving rise to the appeal are these.
2. Twenty-two workmen made applications under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), for re-instatement with full back benefits on the ground that the respondent, Messrs Cafe Millat (hereinafter called the respondent) had turned out 28 workers, including these 22 workers without any cause, notice or order in writing. The applicants made the applications giving rise to the present appeal on 26th December 1970. The learned Labour Court, as the point involved in all the applications was common, disposed them of by one award, giving rise to the present appeal.
3. It would be useful to reproduce in the words of the applicants themselves as to what was their case as set out in their applications under section 34 of the Ordinance. Paragraph 3 runs as under:-- "That on 19-12-1969 the respondents all of a sudden and without assigning any reason and without giving anything in writing turned out 28 workmen including the applicant. Paragraph 4.-- That the Karachi Hotel Workers' Union, Karachi, had made an application under section 45 of the I.
R. O., 1969, being No. 2/1970 in this Honourable Court for prohibiting the lock-out. Paragraph 5.--That this Honourable Court vide order dated 20-4-1970 had dismissed the said application on the ground that unless the legal objection in the connected main Application No. 73/69 was decided, no order could be passed. Paragraph 7.--That in view of the fact that about a year has passed that the applicant is out of employment, he is making this application for enforcement of his right as he had been thrown out of employment without any reason or ryhme and without giving anything in writing."
4. The Karachi Hotel Workers' Union made an application on 26th January 1971, against the respondent for lifting the lock-out. It is noteworthy that in the case filed by the Union all the workers, who filed their affidavits, stated as under:-- "That annoyed and displeased the Management did not take me on work from 19th December 1969 though I was entitled to be taken on my duty. That I have been victimized and the lock-out inflicted is illegal and bad as it is without notice or any cause."
5. Two things are noteworthy from the affidavits filed by the workers with the application made by the Union, namely, (1) that the cause of action arose on 19th December 1969, and (2) that they were victimized and locked out. The ground made out by the workers in the affidavit filed in the case by the Union was similar to the present one. In the present application also the cause of action is alleged to have arisen on 19th December 1969.
6. The learned Labour Court considered all the arguments addressed by Mr. Ali Arnjad, the learned Advocate for the appellant and came to the conclusion that the 22 applicants were barred by the principle of res judicata.
7. In the appeal before me, Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the appellants, reiterated the points, which he had raised before the learned Labour Court and took a new point which I would presently dispose of. Mr. Ali Amjad contended that the provision of section 11 of the C. P. C. was not applicable and, therefore, the learned Labour Court has erred in law in applying the same. In this connection, the learned Advocate relied on the well-known case of Saleemsons Limited (l). In that case, my Lord Tufail Ali A. Rehman, Chief Justice, after considering the provision of section 36 of the Ordinance and in particular subsection (2), came to the following conclusion:-- "I am, therefore, of the view that subsection (2) does not confer upon a Labour Court, while adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute, all the powers of a civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code but only such of them as may be described as procedural, i.e. such as are required "for the purpose" of adjudication and determination. Now, it is clearly not necessary in order to be able to adjudicate or determine a dispute, that pending the adjudication or determination, a party be restrained from giving effect to the kind of the order of which x respondent No. 2 complained to the Labour Court."
8. Section 11 of the C. P. C. is clearly not similar to the provision contained in Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. lt will be useful to reproduce section 11 together with Explanation IV thereto. It runs as under:-- "11. No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties, under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation IV.--Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit."
9. Section 11 of the C.
P. C. embodies the universal principle of law. A Court while adjudicating 1he matter cannot overlook the fact that the matter had already been debated upon between the parties and a finding had been arrived at by a competent Court. In this connection, Mr. Ali Amjad had also contended that the former application was not between the same parties, but between the Union and the respondent. There is no force in this contention. If the Union had made the application on behalf of the workers, under section 34 of the Ordinance, the workers were bound by the result of the said application. In this connection. Mr. Ali Amjad also contended that (1) PLD 1973 Kar. 1 the Union had not specifically raised the issue of lock-out in its application under section 34 of the Ordinance.
There is not much force in this contention. Explanation IV, already reproduced above, is sufficient answer to the contention of Mr. Ali Arajad. At any rate, I am of the view that the matter was raised by the Union. It had raised the question of lock-out by making an application under section 45 of the Ordinance and in the second place, all the workers who filed their affidavits in support of the claim of the Union, did not state anything in support of the application filed by the Union, but only stated that they had been victimized by being locked out. The learned Labour Court also held in that case that the workmen had been locked out and ordered their re-instatement. The parties cannot be allowed to have a second innings.
10. At any rate, even if the provision of section 11 of the C. P. C., which is of general application, was not applicable, I am of the view that the Court's jurisdiction is not barred to hold that the workers cannot be allowed to agitate the same issue, which had already been agitated earlier. A Labour Court, while adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute cannot forget the general principle of law that the persons should not be harassed twice in respect of the same cause of action. The Labour Court's power under section 35 of the Ordinance while adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute is not qualified so as to deprive it to apply the general principle of law that the person should not be harassed in respect of the same cause of action twice. The Labour Courts are not bound to strictly follow the rules of evidence. A Labour Court, even in order to maintain industrial peace, can change the contract of the parties. In order to maintain industrial peace a Labour Court must see that an employer does not harass a workman twice for the same cause of action. Similarly, the workmen cannot be allowed to prosecute the employer for the same cause of action twice.
11. I would, for the reasons given above, maintain the award of the learned Labour Court, and dismiss the appeal.