' ABDUL HAMID KHAN (MEMBER).---The appellant while posted as A.S.I. In Multan District was proceeded against under Rule 6.3 of the Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975 on charges of corruption and misconduct. It was alleged that white posted at P.S. Qadirpur he accepted a sum of Rs,1,500 as illegal gratification during his visit to Khanewal Arms House from Akhtar Ali Kamboh. He accepted this amount through coercion by threatening Akhtar Ali Kamboh of dire consequences. The appellant was served with a show-cause notice for major penalty to which he submitted a written reply and was also heard in person. The A.S.I. Requested that the proceedings may be kept pending till the decision of the Court in the case which had been registered against him under section 161, P.P.C. And 5(2)47 of PCA. The authority i,e, the S.S.P., Multan (respondent No, 1), however, did not find any force in the plea as according to him the case had already been enquired into by an officer of the rank of S.P. And because a case had been registered and duly investigated by the S.H.O.
Khanewal supervised by the D.S.P. Khanewal. He, therefore, found the officer guilty and ordered his dismissal from service with immediate effect.
2. The Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Multan who tried the aforesaid case convicted the appellant but on appeal the High Court Multan Bench set aside the conviction. On acquittal the appellant filed an appeal before the D.I.-G., Multan Range (respondent No, 2) which was dismissed by the latter. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a revision petition to the Additional I.-G.P. (respondent No, 3) who accepted the appeal and ordered that "de novo proceedings shall be considered by the Authority'. The Additional I.-G.P. Observed that instructions contained in IGP's circular No, 2632- 88/Legal, dated 28-7-1985 which required that in a corruption case it was mandatory to hold formal enquiry and yet this was not done in this case. It was further directed by respondent No, 3 that the period spent out of service shall be treated as leave of the kind due. The instant appeal is directed against the aforesaid order of the Additional I.-G.P. The appellant has prayed that the said order to the extent that it relates to the holding of de novo proceedings and the direction that the period spent out of service be treated as leave of the kind due, be set aside and it be directed that the appellant shall be 7 paid salary from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement alongwith seniority and other back benefits.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the appellant had been acquitted on appeal by the High Court, de novo proceedings could not, therefore, be initiated against the appellant under the E&D Rules. In this behalf he has placed reliance on 1983 SCM R 1062, 1987 PLC 175 and 1986 PLC 419. From these judgments the learned counsel has concluded that if the proceedings under the E&D Rules are entirely based on the allegations filed in Court and if the accused is acquitted in the criminal case then proceedings under the E & D Rules cannot be initiated and if these have been initiated, will come to an end.
4. The learned D.A. Strongly rebutted the arguments of the learned counsel of appellant and stated that the proceedings conducted by the department were strictly in accordance with the law and procedure. He did not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that acquittal in a criminal case should necessarily result in rendering the departmental proceedings unnecessary.
5. We have carefully perused the three judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and find that the judgment quoted first i,e, 1983 SCM R 1062 has absolutely no relevance to the point at issue. There appears to be a typographical mistake as the judgment which he in fact intended to quote must be 1985 SCM R 1062. This too, however, does not help him in any way as, unlike the appeal before this Tribunal, in the reported case the show-cause notice and resultantly the order of punishment were entirely based on rule 9 of the E&D Rules which empowers the authority to remove or dismiss an accused civil servant, without following the prescribed procedure, who has been convicted by a Court of law The relevant portion of this judgment reads as under: "..... Rule 9 then authorises the competent authority to dismiss or remove an accused civil servant, without following the procedure laid down in the (E&D) rules in cases the ground for his removal is the conduct "which has led to a sentence of fine or of imprisonment". Admittedly in the present case the order of removal, as the show-cause notice clearly reveals, proceeds upon the basis of rule 9 of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. However, it does not require any elaborate argument to show that in case the sentence is set aside and the accused officer is acquitted, the very basis on which such order of removal from service stands, would disappear. The result of such an event would be that the order of removal itself will be rendered ineffective and liable to be set aside."
6. So far as the other two judgments are concerned the learned counsel for the appellant has again not been quite fastidious in the choice of the case-law cited by him and in any event he has obviously made wrong deductions. The fact is that these judgments fully support the contention of the learned District Attorney. In the second judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant i,e, 1987 PLC 175, handed down by the learned Service Tribunal Sindh it has been laid down in unequivocal terms that acquittal in a criminal case in respect of the same occurrence cannot be construed to have washed off the departmental proceedings. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:- "His mere acquittal in the criminal case in respect of the same occurrence would not help him.
Such acquittal cannot be construed to have washed off the findings of the Enquiry Officer. If the departmental action was grounded on the case filed in the Criminal Court, then of course it would follow the result of the Court case and on his acquittal in the criminal case, the accused would automatically be discharged from the liability incurred by him in the departmental enquiry. That is, however, not the case here. The disciplinary action in the instant case was initiated against the appellant independently of the criminal case. Consequently, his acquittal in that case would not automatically relieve him of the charge he is found guilty in the departmental enquiry.
3. Apart from above, the departmental enquiry and the criminal case started against a civil servant in respect of same matter either simultaneously or one after the other would not necessarily lead to the same result. This is because not only the nature of the charges brought out in the two proceedings are different but also the standard of evidence required to prove these charges is not same. Obviously stronger evidence is needed to establish the case in the Court of law because if the case is proved against the accused civil servant, he would be liable to be sent to jail. But in the departmental proceedings he would at the most lose his job. Therefore, in deciding the above two proceedings totally different considerations are kept in view by the punishing authorities. For the purpose of convicting the accused civil servant, the case may not be proved in the Court, still the departmental authorities may find him guilty for awarding any of the prescribed penalties."
' In this connection, the learned Tribunal also referred to the case of Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore and others v. Anis-ur-Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134, in which both criminal case and departmental enquiry were instituted against the accused police officials. Pending the decision of the criminal case, the accused were found guilty in departmental enquiry and were awarded penalty of dismissal. The accused approached the Service Tribunal who allowed their appeal mainly on the ground that the result of the criminal case should have been awaited before awarding the penalty of dismissal in the departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under:- "The Tribunal, it appears, with respect, was clearly in error in assuming that the two charges were co-extensive and inter-connected that the judicial trial was proper alternative and once having been resorted to, the departmental inquiry should not have been held and the trial should have served as a substitute for departmental inquiry."
' It was further held by Honourable Supreme Court:-- "In the case before the Tribunal the judgment in the criminal case could be relevant only for reascertaining whether it was a judgment of conviction or acquittal and whether it was an honourable acquittal. The other opinions or findings, apart from these two, recorded or expressed in the judgment could not be utilised for upsetting the other proceedings ".The scope and the law applicable to the criminal trial was different from that applicable to the departmental inquiry. The charges in the two were not identical nor substantially the same. The competent authority was not, therefore, duty bound under any provision or principle of law to await and fellow the judicial verdict in the case."
' In the other case: 1986 PLC 419 filed before this Tribunal, the appellant has been falsely implicated in criminal cases in which he was acquitted. He, therefore, contended that he could not be tried both judicially and departmentally on the same charges. Held that there was no bar against an official being tried both judicially and departmentally on the same charges.
The controversy, if there was any, has been brought to an end by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case 1989 SCMR 316: Muhammad Tufail v. Assistant Commissioner/Collector, wherein it has been clearly laid down that the proceedings in criminal cases and departmental proceedings are quite different in substance and results and that despite acquittal in the criminal proceedings there should be no bar to award punishment under the E&D Rules provided there is sufficient material to justify it. We are, therefore, not persuaded to accept the plea of the appellant that the order for de novo proceedings should A be set aside merely because the appellant has been acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with the result that the department is free to proceed against the appellant de novo provided it has sufficient material to back up the proposed punishment under the E&D Rules. The matter relating to the treatment of the period spent out of service shall be decided and will depend upon the outcome of the de novo proceedings, if held. There are no orders as to costs. Judgment be communicated to the parties.