' The petitioner has assailed the order of Financial Commissioner, passed on November 16, 1988, whereby the orders of subordinate Revenue officers were upheld.
2. The petition has arisen out of a dispute relating to entries of Khasra Girdawari for the year 1983, whereby the entries relating to actual possession of the land in question, were made in favour of respondents against the petitioner, on April 18, 1983. Muhammad Akram, petitioner brought a suit in respect of land measuring 115 kanals comprising survey Nos.1517-min, and 1517-min, situate in village Panjeri, Tehsil Bhimber. The suit was decreed in his favour on May 4, 1978. It was held that the petitioner was in possession of the land in his own right. On January 26, 1982, Muhammad Afzal Khan, Muhammad Ashraf Khan and Abdul Rehman brought a suit for perpetual injunction in respect of land comprising survey Nos.1517-min (25 kanals), 1517-min (30 kanals), 1517-min (10 kanals) and 1517-min (22 kanals). On September 22, 1982, the petitioner also brought a counter-suit against the aforesaid persons. During the pendency of the civil suits of the parties, on February 23, 1983, Muhammad Afzal and others, moved an application before the Settlement Officer for correction of the entries of the Khasra Girdawari. In that application, it was stated that Muhammad Akram, their opponent, secured a collusive decree on the basis of which mutation was attested in his favour. They prayed that the subordinate officers may be directed to visit the spot and make entries of possession in the light of actual position. The application was sent to the Naib-Tehsildar (Settlement) who vide his proceedings dated February 27, 1983, corrected the entries in the Khasra Girdawari by showing the respondents in possession of land comprising Survey No,1517. The order of Naib-Tehsildar was challenged before the Settlement Officer without success. The Revenue Commissioner dismissed the revision petition of the petitioner as, in his view, in presence of the civil proceedings pending before the Civil Court, the revision petition was unwarranted and premature.
The order of Revenue Commissioner of August 11, 1986 was challenged before the Financial Commissioner. The learned Financial Commissioner dismissed the petition on November 16, 1988, for want of limitation and having no substance on merits. In the present petition, the petitioner has assailed both the orders of the Revenue Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner. The order of the Revenue Commissioner is challenged on the ground that it was announced more than one year after the hearing of arguments as it was violative of the dictum of the Supreme Court whereby the order was desired to be announced within 3 months after the hearing of the arguments. The order of the Financial Commissioner is challenged on 2 counts:-
(i) That the restriction of limitation applicable to revision petition was wrongly applied to the case; and
(ii) that the effect of decree passed by Civil Court was wrongly ignored.
' Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, the learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the learned Financial Commissioner disposed of the petition primarily on the ground of limitation as, in his view, the period of limitation against an order of the Revenue Commissioner was 90 days under Section 164, Land Revenue Act, 1967. It was suggested that the Land Revenue Act of 1967 was adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir on June 9, 1988, whereas the revision petition was preferred on July 29, 1987. Thus, the limitation introduced under Section 164 of the Present Act was not enforceable in the present case. It was emphasised that the decision of the Financial Commissioner was against the norms of justice, as such, it was challengeable by invoking jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his contention, reference was made to the decision of this Court recorded in Ch.Abdul Majid's case PLD 1985 AJ&K 83, approved by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, reported in PLD 1986 SC AJ&K 120. Mr.Riaz Akhtar, the learned Counsel for the opposite side, argued that the question of correction of Khasra Girdawari being a question of fact, was not enquirable in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
' The learned Counsel relied on Abdul Karim's case 1986 CLC 2403(2).
3. The writ jurisdiction has been conferred upon this Court by virtue of Constitution. It can be invoked when either of the conditions listed under Section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 is satisfied. The scope of invoking writ jurisdiction against an action performed without lawful authority was construed in Abdul Majid's case PLD 1985 AJK 83. The relevant observation is reproduced:- "The jurisdiction of the Court is attracted only if it is satisfied that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority. The words 'without lawful authority' ordinarily signify an act in excess of lawful authority or in derogation, contravention or departure from an accepted norm of law. The words 'lawful authority' connote that the subordinate tribunal was constituted under law and that its actions and functions were strictly confined within the four walls of the law relevant to the proposition under consideration. In case of any deviation, slip, derogation or departure from the law exposed the action of the tribunal to indulgence of this Court. In other words, a legally constituted tribunal is supposed to run on law rails and the moment it is derailed, it is enjoined upon this Court to put it on the rails of law. This is so, as the paramount jurisdiction conferred on this Court, strictly speaking, is to ensure that subordinate tribunals act in lawful manner. The supervisory duty entrusted to the High Court gains more importance in the present day functioning of the Government, particularly when the statutory rights of the citizens are controlled, restricted and abridged by every day's suitable legislation. Mr. M. Munir, in his famous treatise "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", at page 413 (Second Edition, 1976) emphasised that a proceeding can be quashed and an act declared void, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, if it is in excess of lawful authority of the person taking or doing it. The question what is lawful authority of a person and whether the act questioned was beyond such authority will depend upon the terms of the statute under which he purported to act."
' The aforesaid view of this Court was squarely assailed in appeal before the Supreme Court. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court dismissed the objection. The relevant observation of the Supreme Court is reproduced:-- "We have given our due consideration to the question as to under what circumstances the finding given by a Tribunal of special jurisdiction can be assailed by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is correct that there is marked difference between the appellate and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction should not assume the role of a Court of appeal but all the same findings of the Tribunal of special jurisdiction are open to challenge in writ jurisdiction if the fmdings are patently wrong or based on inadmissible evidence or there is gross non-reading or misreading of evidence. In such cases the error would be 'error of law' and the same can be rectified in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The view that a Tribunal which has the jurisdiction to decide a matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly would hold good only in case which involves deep scrutiny of the evidence or requires an extensive and deep probe into a statutory provision of law for its interpretation. None of the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant supports the proposition that the findings of fact based on inadmissible evidence or gross misreading or non-reading of the evidence are immune from challenge in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the contention that as the Chief Election Commissioner was the sole authority to decide the matter in controversy, the writ was not competent, is not tenable because the findings of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction can be disturbed if the same suffer from any of the infirmities mentioned above."
4. The consensus is that a Tribunal constituted under a valid law, was enjoined to function strictly within four walls of law relevant to the proposition under consideration. When it was found that an action or omission of the Tribunal was made in deviation, slip, derogation or departure from the law, such action or omission was exposed to the indulgence of this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In the present case, it was rightly pointed out that the learned Financial Commissioner misdirected himself by applying the provisions of limitation as contemplated under section 164 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967. The limitation was not enforceable against an action which preceded the adaptation of the law. It was clearly an action in departure to the provisions of law which occupied the field at the time of institution of revision petition wherein no limitation was provided to control the revision petition against an order of the Revenue Commissioner. The operative part of the order of the Financial Commissioner clearly indicates that the petition was disposed of primarily on consideration of point of limitation. Moreover, the order though touched merits of the proposition, but on deep appreciation of the same, it reflects that the learned Financial Commissioner failed to take into account the grounds on which the Revenue Commissioner disposed of the revision petition. It was purely a mechanical and orthodox approach for the disposal of the moot points raised before the Court. In such situation, it is permissible to set at naught the order and send the case back for its fresh decision on merits.
5. It is true that the Supreme Court has adopted a consistent view that a case should be disposed of within 3 months from the date of hearing of the arguments. Whenever a period of even a day exceeded three months, the Supreme Court without exception, set aside the decision and remanded the case for fresh decision. Keeping in view the dictum of the Supreme Court, the order of the Revenue Commissioner which, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, was announced more than a year after hearing the arguments, was unsustainable.
6. Mr.Riaz Akhtar, the learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the question of entry of Khasra Girdawari being a question of fact, could not be settled in exercise of writ jurisdiction. I fully agree with the learned Counsel for the respondents that the question of actual physical possession was purely a question of fact. Thus, it was to be settled by a Revenue Officer or a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Here, in this case I do not propose to lay my hands on the aforesaid question of fact. I, therefore, concur with the aforesaid proposal and do not enter the horizon of state of facts relating to entries of Khasra Girdawari or actual physical possession of the land in dispute. This aspect of proposition is left for its settlement by the Revenue Officers or the Civil Court, as the case may be.
' In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the writ petition is accepted. The orders of the Financial Commissioner and Revenue Commissioner are set aside and the case is sent back to the Revenue Commissioner for its fresh decision on merits. No order as to costs.