' M. MAHBOOB AHMAD, C.J.--This Letters Patent Appeal calls in question judgment dated 27-11-1968 of the learned Chief Justice of this Court passed in W.P. No,1309-R of 1964.
2. The facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal, briefly stated, are that Property No,66, Ward No,6, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) consisted of two portions one of which was in occupation of the appellant's husband namely Muhammad Taj Begum v. Abdul Haq Ashraf and the other in occupation of one Muhammad Tufail. The portion in possession of Muhammad Ashraf, husband of the appellant stood allotted to him vide order dated 10-10-1947. The said Muhammad Ashraf on 24- 7-1959 on the commencement of settlement operations applied for transfer of the portion in his possession through L.H. Form. This Form was not disposed of. The portion in occupation of Muhammad Tufail was transferred to him on 30-11-1959 whilst the portion in occupation of the husband of the appellant was put in the earmarking scheme and then transferred to respondent No,1. Muhammad Ashraf the husband of the appellant filed an appeal against the aforementioned transfer in favour of respondent No,1. This appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner on 4-4-1960. The revision taken by the appellant before the Settlement Commissioner against the appellate order aforementioned was also dismissed on 28-4-1964 as barred by time. The appellant thereupon filed Writ Petition No,1309-R of 1964 which was dismissed by the learned Chief Justice on 27-11-1968. Hence the present appeal.
3. The writ petition aforementioned was dismissed mainly on the ground that the revision had been dismissed as barred by time and that while determining entitlement of a local (in the present case the husband of the appellant) the price of the entire house had to be made the basis of such determination.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following two main contentions:--
(i) that the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the provisions governing the transfer of houses to locals and has also not taken into consideration the precedent case-law on the subject. It was urged by him that para. 22-A of Settlement Scheme No,I provides the basis for determination of the value of the property for the purposes of determining the eligibility of a local to the transfer of properly out of the compensation pool. He also referred to Gulzar Muhammad v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan and another reported as PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 488, in support of the contention that if two valuations can be arrived at on account of different assessm ents of rental value the lower of the two values shall be the basis for determination of the entitlement of a local;
(ii) that the orders of the settlement hierarchy being void, the bar of limitation cannot be asserted against the appellant while questioning the validity of the void order. Additionally it was argued that no limitation is otherwise prescribed for filing a revision before the Settlement Commissioner.
5. Contrarily the learned counsel for the contesting-respondent contended that by virtue of section 2(9) of the Displaced Persons (Compesation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), the value of an evacuee property is to be determined by multiplying the annual rental value with forty. The learned counsel in this context pointed out that the annual rental value of the property as ssessed All Pakistan Legal Decisions by the Excise and Taxation Department being Rs,270, the house in question taken in its totality has been rightly valued at Rs,10,800.
6. The next contention of the learned counsel for the contesting-respondent was that determination of the value of the property being a question of fact has rightly been not gone into by the learned Single Judge.
7. Lastly the learned counsel contended that even if no period of limitation is prescribed for filing a revision before the Settlement Commissioner, the principle of laches is attracted to the case in hand.
8. Having given consideration to the controversy we are of the view that the case of the appellant has not been properly dealt with by the Settlement hierarchy. The material on the record shows that there were two rental values assessed in respect of the property in dispute; one by the Excise and Taxation Department which is Rs,270 per annum and the other by the Municipal Committee of Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) which assessed the annual rental value of the property at Rs,200 per annum. The certified copy of the assessment carried out by the Municipal Committee is Annexure 'D' to the writ petition.
9. Section 2(9)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 provides that the value of an evacuee property shall be determined by multiplying the annual rental value with forty. Para 22-A of Settlement Scheme No,I lays down that where the assessment made by the Government for 1946 under any of the immovable property tax laws and that made by the local body concerned for the same year is different the lesser of the two assessments shall be adopted for determination of amounts payable by the transferee.
10. A local is entitled to transfer of an evacuee property on payment of market value of the same.
The market value is the value determined on the basis hereinabove given, i.e,, forty times the annual rental value plus fifteen per cent. Thereof.
11. Applying the above provision of law, the market value of the house in dispute based on the annual rental value as assessed by the Municipal Committee, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad), a local body, would come to Rs,200 x 40 = Rs,8,000 plus 15% thereof i.e, Rs,1,200 which makes a total of Rs,9,200 which is less than Rs,10,000. The criteria laid for seeking transfer by a local having been fulfilled in the present case, i.e, the value of whole of the house being less than Rs,10,000 the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was entitled to have the property transferred to him. The above basis for determination of value also came under consideration in the case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant wherein it was held that the lesser of the two assessments has to be made the basis of computation of the market value. The settlement hierarchy did not consider the matter in the light of the provisions of law governing the subject as given hereinabove, and therefore, the orders having been passed in complete disregard of the said provisions cannot be clothed as having been passed with lawful authority. This aspect of the matter also appears to have not been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge.
12. As regards the revision being barred by time, we suffice by observing that there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing such revision and in any case the delay that had occurred due to the death of the husband of the appellant who being purdanashin lady not otherwise literate and having minor children to look after, the rigors of the principle of laches will also not be attracted to the case in hand and a lenient attitude was called for in order to promote the ends of justice. It may pertinently be observed here that the appellant has all along been in possession of the house and being a poor widow her dislocation at this juncture of her life will operate harshly to her and such a situation cannot be countenanced especially when the contesting respondents will not suffer any such difficulty and can be compensated by the Settlement Department otherwise. The view as taken above by us has also been taken by the Supreme Court in Pakistan Post Office v.
Settlement Commissioner and others reported as 1987 SCM R 1119.
' In view of the foregoing discussion, we would allow this appeal and setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and also all the orders of the settlement hierarchy direct that the portion in occupation of the appellant in pursuance of possession of her busband be transferred to her as required by law. There will however be no order as to costs.