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PLD 1991 Azad J & K 66

Mst. NASIM AKHTAR vs MUHAMMAD SABEEL and another

CitationPLD 1991 Azad J & K 66
CourtHigh Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Case No.Civil Revision No.59 of 1990
Date1991-05-23
Judge(s)Khawaja Muhammad Saeed
ResultRevision dismissed

ORDER

' This revision petition is directed against the order of learned Sub-Judge Mirpur passed on 4th of December, 1990.

2. Muhammad Sabeel s/o Ghulam Rasool brought a declaratory suit seeking declaration to the effect that land comprising survey No. 141 measuring 1 kanal and 1 marla along with a house situate in village Islamgarh (Akalgarh) Tehsil and District Mirpur was purchased by Ghulam Rasool deceased, husband of Mst. Nasim Akhtar on his behalf as he had paid him Rs. 6 Lac for this purpose. Therefore, he may be declared the owner of the suit property. He also challenged the legality of the compromise decree passed in favour of defendant-petitioner, Mst. Nasim Akhtar on 9th October, 1986 with regard to the suit land. As a consequential relief, he also claimed decree for possession of the suit land. Paid no court-fee on this amount as in Azad Kashmir no court-fee is payable in any case of civil nature where the value of the subject-matter or relief claimed therein does not exceed Rs.25,000. A preliminary objection was raised in the written statement by the defendant-petitioner that the suit has not been properly valued by the plaintiff-respondent. It was contended that as the defendant-petitioner has himself pleaded in his plaint that he had paid Rs.6 lac to Ghulam Rasool deceased in order to purchase the suit land along with a house for him, moreover, as the value of the house was about 5 lac rupees, therefore, in the circumstances, the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Sub-Judge. The learned Sub-Judge vide order impugned through this revision petition held that as the plaintiff-respondent has brought a declaratory suit with consequential relief as possession which was covered by section 7 (4)(c) of the Court Fees Act, therefore, he had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the relevant record of the case minutely.

5. The learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner submitted that the market value of the suit land and house being more than Rs.6 lac, it was in the circumstances, beyond the jurisdictional competence of the learned trial Judge to entertain the same. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-defendant relied on the pleadings of the plaintiff-respondents and maintained that in fact the suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent was for possession, as such the value for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction, in the suit, shall be the market value of the property. He, therefore, was of the view that the suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent was covered by section 7(5)(d) of the Court Fees Act.

6. Controverting the arguments submitted by the learned counsel representing the petitioner, the learned counsel for the respondents emphasized that the suit of the plaintiff-respondent has properly been valued as it was not a suit for mere possession rather it was a suit for declaration with consequential relief as possession. In this respect, he placed reliance on cases reported in AIR 1943 Patna 103 and PLD 1985 (Azad J&K) SC 1.

7. In 'Muhammad Sulaiman and others v. Javed Iqbal and others' PLD 1985 (Azad J&K), SC 1, an identical question was resolved and it was observed at page 28:-- "Under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the first step, therefore, in all cases is to ascertain the valuation for the purposes of court-fee. But such value can only be ascertained under section 7(iv)

(c) of the Court Fees Act according to which the plaintiff had to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff states the amount the value for the purposes of court-fee cannot be fixed and if it is not done the value for the purposes of jurisdiction can also not be determined because it is made by law to depend upon the former."

8. Again, after a critical survey of case-law on the subject, it was held at page 3th-- "Here the suit was brought for declaration with the consequential relief only. The amount of court- fee would be deemed to be correct because under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where the consequential relief is also claimed, the amount of fee payable shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint."

9. Keeping in view the authority of our own .Supreme Court, there is no need to discuss the case reported in AIR 1943 Patna 103. Even otherwise too, a very simple proposition is involved in the case under consideration. From bare reading of sections 7(4)(c) and 7(5)(d), it becomes crystal clear that where the plaintiff cannot ask main relief, for example, 'possession' without asking for a declaration, the suit would be one for declaration with consequential relief for possession. In such like cases, the suit shall be covered by section 7(4)(c) and not by section 7(5)(d) of the Court Fees Act. But where it is proved that without seeking declaration, the plaintiff was entitled to seek relief of possession, then the suit shall be covered by section 7(5)(d) of the aforesaid Act.

' From the nature of the suit, if consequential relief can be allowed only when the plaintiff through declaration from a competent Court succeeds in removing any other obstacle then in such like cases the declaration shall be the legal necessity for obtaining the real relief from the Court.

10. In the present case, the plaintiff firstly has to prove that he had paid Rs.6 lac to his father deceased, Ghulam Rasool to purchase the suit land along with house for the plaintiff. He has also to prove that decree allowed in favour of Mst. Nasim Akhtar on October 9, 1986 with regard to the suit land on the admission of Ghulam Rasool deceased, was void, ineffective and inoperative against his rights. Without removing these obstacles, the decree for possession cannot be allowed in his favour. As held in the earlier part of this order, the entire plaint has to be scrutinized in order to ascertain the real nature of the suit. In the instant case, the relief of possession is implicit in the relief of declaration. Therefore, under section 7(4)(c) where two reliefs; one for declaration and the other as consequential relief for possession, have been sought for, it would bring the case with the ambit of section 7 (4) (c) of the aforesaid Act.

11. In the light of what has been stated above, finding no error in the order of the learned Sub-Judge Mirpur, the revision petition stands dismissed with costs.

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