' The dispute in this petition arises out of a suit for recovery of dower filed by Mst. Mubin Khanam petitioner against Javed Ahmad Khan, respondent No,2, which was dismissed for non-prosecution by the Family Court on 18th June, 1989. On an aplication filed by the petitioner, this suit was restored and was later on decreed ex parte against the respondent No,2 on 5th November, 1989. Thereafter, on 13th November, 1989, an application was presented by respondent No,2 for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground that after the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution on 18th June, 1989, he was not served with any process and had no knowledge of the restoration of the suit or the ex parte proceedings ordered against him. The application was contested by the petitioner and was dismissed by the Family Court on 27th February, 1990. Aggrieved by this order, the respondent No, 2 filed an appeal which was accepted by the Additional District Judge, Lahore, on 9th December, 1990 and the ex parte decree was set aside.
2. Sh. Khalil-ur-Rehman, Advocate, has raised the following contentions:-
(i) That the order passed by the Family Court dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not final but was interlocutory in nature and was, therefore, not appealable under section 14 of the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964.
(ii) That there was no justification for the Additional District Judge to have set aside the ex parte decree.
Both these contentions are devoid of any force. Under Section 14 of the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964, an appeal lies not only against the decree, but also against the decision of the Family Court.
Though it is correct, as has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on Syed Muhammad Raza Shah v. Sayeda Salma Gilani and another PLD 1976 Lah. 1015 that the word decision has 'to be construed ejusdem generic, and has reference to only final decisions but 'this argument does not in any way advance the case of the petitioner. In the present case the order passed by the Family Court dismissing application for setting aside the ex parte decree was final and not interim in nature. By decisions of the application and refusing to set aside the ex parte decree, the Family Court had disposed of the entire matter pending before it and there was nothing further left to be decided by it. It is thus idle on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner to treat such an order to be interim or interlocutory in nature. Similar view was taken by this Court in Babu v. District Judge, Sahiwal and another PLD 1978 Lahore 85, which I respectfully follow.
3. The other case relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his objection as to the maintainability of the appeal was Mst. Rushda Zareen v. Muhammad Salch PLD 1976 Lah.
1327. This case is, however, distinguishable as the question involved was as to whether the decision, in the final decree regarding determination of Zare Khula can be appealed against in view of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964.
4. A reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mian Manzar Bashir and others v. MA. Asghar & Co. PLD 1978 SC 185, where in a case arising out of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, it was held that an order setting aside the ex parte order of ejectment was not appealable as it was not definitive, but the order rejecting the application for setting aside ex parte ejectment order was appealable as such an order was definitive having a direct bearing on the whole subject of controversy concluded by an earlier order. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel that the order of rejection of the application for setting aside an ex parte decree was not appealable, cannot be accepted.
' Reverting to the second contention of the learned counsel, it is to be noticed that the Additional District Judge has recorded findings of fact on the basis of the record that after the restoration of the suit, no notice of process was issued to respondent No,3. There is nothing on the record to rebut this factual finding. If indeed, the decree was passed without any notice to respondent No,3 after the restoration of the suit, it could not but be set aside.
5. For the reasons aforesaid, this petition has no force and is dismissed in limine.