' The facts in this First Rent Appeal are somewhat complex. Shop premises Nos.3 and 4, situated on plot bearing No, V/C/13/3, Nazimabad, Karachi, in the tenancy of the respondent, are the subject of dispute in these proceedings. Rent case No, 1002/76 was filed by the appellant-landlady against the respondent-tenant, on 27-2-1976, on the two-fold grounds of personal need of her son, who had qualified as a Mechanical Engineer and to whom she wished to set up "in allied business of Engineering etc." and of damage to shutters and resultant material impairment to the value or utility of the rented premises. In such application notice from the landlady dated 24-1-1976 was relied upon. It has come on record that the appellant-landlady, simultaneously, had also filed another rent case in respect of two other adjoining shops bearing Nos. 1 and 2, then in possession of one Mehmood Ali, another tenant, on the ground of personal requirement of herself and her son and such rent case came to be numbered at the next serial No, namely, as Rent Case No, 1003/76.
There was, however, no cross reference of one such case, in the other. It is in evidence that, in the year 1979, the last mentioned rent case was compromised and the landlady obtained possession of one of the two shops in the tenancy of the said other tenant viz. Mehmood Ali, apparently, being content in leaving that tenant in possession of the remaining shop in his tenancy.
2. During the course of proceedings in Rent Case No,1002/76, from which this appeal arises, the landlady examined herself and the son, for whom the requirement was projected whereas the tenant, Dr. Asif Majeed, relied upon his own evidence and that of his witnesses, Syed Aftab Ahmed Naqvi and Syed Altaf Hussain. On hearing, the landlady did not press the ground of impairment of the value of utility of the premises and limited her case to that of personal requirement of her son alone. In the final analysis, the Controller dismissed the application per order dated 8-5-1980. Such order was impugned in an earlier appeal brought to this Court, which was numbered as F.R.A. No, 372 of 1980. This appeal was allowed vide an order dated 4-10-1982. Finding of the Controller that the vacation of one of the shops covered by Rent Case No, 1003/76, on compromise between the parties to that case, satisfied the requirement of the landlady's son in Rent Case No, 1002/76 was repelled by this Court on the ground that "this shop was admittedly not utilized by the landlady for establishing her son in the business but was utilized for the purpose of providing a passage to the school which is run just behind the disputed shops". This Court also found that while the landlady did not so admit in her evidence, it was established on record that the referred school, running behind the said shops, was so run and managed by the landlady and her daughter. It was further said that the grounds in the two rent cases bearing Nos. 1002/76 and 1003/76 were not identical as the ground urged in Rent Case 1002/76 pertained to the personal requirement of the landlady's son while Rent Case 1003/76 related to both the landlady herself and her son. The case, however, was remanded as, during the pendency of the appeal, the remaining shop in the tenancy of tenant Mehmood Ali also fell vacant and whereas the tenant's contention was that all the requirements of the cases stood fulfilled the landlady submitted that such other shop was being used and utilized by her as an office for the school under reference. On remand, the question for determination before the Controller was whether the second shop so vacated by Mehmood Ali, aforesaid, was being used by the landlady as office for the school or by her son as a workshop, as alleged by the tenant. On resumption of proceedings before the Controller, Ibne Hassan, landlady's son, examined himself, while three other witnesses namely, Haji Abdul Sattar, Darvesh Mohiuddin and Saadatullah were also examined by the landlady. The tenant reexamined himself and also produced Mehmood Ali, the other tenant and one Mehboob Hussain as his further evidence in the case. On re- examination of the matter the Controller dismissed the rent case, through order dated 18-4-1985, whereupon this appeal has been preferred, which shall have to be decided in terms of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, VI of 1959, that held the field when the proceedings were first launched, for such proceedings shall, subject to minor exceptions, not applicable here, carry their own law until brought to due conclusion.
3. At the out-set, in consonance with the Supreme Court dictum in Saira Bai v. Anis-ur-Rehman (1989 SCM R 1366), it is to be observed that whereas technicalities in pleadings in the context of rent cases based on personal requirement, are not to be brooked and, as far as may be, such cases are to go to trial on the substance of the dispute, covering the essentials of cause of action, rather than on the basis of meticulous details yet, it would not detract from the ratio in that case to say that, where necessary, essential/vital disclosures are still to be made. Thus, while there is no bar for a landlord to seek eviction of more tenants than one in satisfaction of personal requirement, even so, where he, for personal occupation, seeks eviction in respect of more tenements than one in the tenancy of different persons or, similarly, on the ground of personal use seeks eviction of more tenants than one in respect of different commercial premises, albeit the same be adjoining and the rent cases are, simultaneously, filed it would not only be in order but expected of him to give some details of the requirement showing as to why one tenement in the tenancy of one tenant alone would not be sufficient to meet that requirement. If, for some reason, may it even be an inadvertant omission, such vital facts are not disclosed, it could still be open for the landlord to detail such requirement when the evidence in the case unfolds, a course approved by Naimuddin J. In re: Saira Bai ibid. Short of this the requirement may come to be restricted, even if proved, to one tenement alone, A for it would not be in consonance with the policy of law to dislocate and dislodge more than one tenants to satisfy the unspecified requirements of a landlord unless the landlord has successfully shown that the accommodation in a single tentament would not be sufficient to satisfy the projected requirement and more would be needed to meet the same. In such latter case also a further question always could be as to how much more would be so needed. This arises for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the aim and object of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (and other legislations on the subject) is to provide protections and continuity to tenancies save as excepted and such law is to be so interpreted as to cause only as much dislocation to tenancies, as be reasonable or otherwise well founded and no more. Secondly, whereas section 2 (a) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, defines a building to mean "any building or part thereof' and describes a premises in its section 2 (g) to be "a building or land " there had been more or less similar concepts in the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 as well. Such clauses when read with the provision of eviction, being independent and distinct against each tenant, denote a separate right against each tenant which in relation to personal use of occupation has to be independently and distinctly pressed. In point of fact, in so far as the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is concerned once a landlord obtains possession, whether through the Controller or otherwise, of a premises of the same class in the same urban area he, under section 13 (3) thereof is precluded from continuing with an earlier instituted Rent proceeding based on personal requirement unless he is able to show that the vacated premises are not suitable for his need. Reverting to a landlord's simultaneously or one after the other applying for more premises than one, it may well be that looking to the status in society of the landlord or to the character of the requirement or the details of the projected use or occupation more than one premises in possession of more than one tenants be actually an I genuinely required. If so, then too such particulars would be vital.
4. Applying the above principle to the instant case and construing the requirement of the landlady in the most liberal manner permissible, one cannot fail to see that her requirement in Rent Case No, 1003/71 both for herself and her son extended to two shops in the possession of tenant Mehmood Ali. Since the details of such requirement were not duly amplified, the highest-level at which the case could be placed may have been that she intended to use one of such two shops for herself and the other could be required by her for her son. The subsequent compromise in those proceedings, where under the landlady was satisfied in securing one shop only from tenant Mehrnood Ali would, on similar liberal interpretation, show that at least her own requirement, conceivably, stood satisfied on such acquisition. Subsequently, therefore, when the other shop from the tenancy of Mehmood Ali was also obtained, it would live been expected that such shop was handed over to the landlady's son for whose use, as well, Rent Case No, 1003/76 was filed. Indeed, in case the landlady's son was found in such occupation the only question on remand, pursuant to the observations of this Court, would have been whether or not such shop fully satisfied the requirement of the landlady's son. At any event, as from the date of re-opening of the case it again fell for the landlady to show and to detail her own requirement and that of her son. It is in this perspective that the evidence in the case has to be examined, for in such cases, re-activated on remand, a Court of law, as far as relevant, is required to look into the totality of evidence and has to come to a finding on the basis of the entire record, since in no other way can full justice be done in the case. Reference on this aspect of the matter may be made to Rasheed Hussain v. Hussain Haji Ahmed (PLD 1973 Note 138 p. 209) and Mohammad Lateef v. Mahmood Ali (1981 SCMR 221).
5. Now, as dilated upon above, the landlady examined herself only once on 14-4-1979, on remand her son and Attorney Ibne Hassan, deputising for her on the ground of her sickness, remaining content to examine himself alone. In the course of the first round of proceedings the landlady had stated that Ibne Hassan, her eldest son, was a Mechanical Engineer from Sweden and required the disputed shops to run the "Motor Mechanic Business" therein; he due to want of accommodation being then forced to work "on the road-side". In cross-examination she denied that the shop, which she was able to get vacated from tenant Mehmood All in Rent Case No, 1003/76 was so got vacated for the use of her son. She denied that her son owned two buses but termed it as incorrect that such son was not repairing the buses. While admitting that counter cases under section 107, Cr.P.C. Were pending between the parties, the landlady denied that the rent case under reference was filed mala fide due to disputes pertaining to water connection. Landlady's son Ibne Hassan, at that stage of the proceedings, had stated that he intended to open a "Mechanical Workshop of engines of automobiles which I am already doing (sic) on street". In cross-examination such witness admitted that after compromise with tenant Mehmood Ali and after obtaining possession of one of the shops in his tenancy the rent case against him was withdrawn. He maintained that their house was behind the shops and they were running a school in such house. There was also a coaching centre on the first floor. He denied that he was running the school with his sisters. As to the respondent-tenant's case that he was running the business of Buses he said, "I have no buses".
On remand of the case, in his affidavit-in-evidence dated 19-12-1982 regarding the second shop from the tenancy of Mehmood Ali having fallen vacant during the course of pendency of F.R.A. No, 372/80, aforesaid, he denied that he had carried on any business in such shop, possession whereof was obtained on 14-5-1980 and which ever since was being used as "office of Brilliant Career School". According to him, since he had never used such vacated shop the question of its relevancy or sufficiency as regards his requirement did not arise. On being cross-examined, he admitted that he owned "a bus since 1976" but did not remember whether he had stated in his earlier deposition (recorded on 15-5-1979) that he "did not own any bus". He admitted that the respondent was in possession as tenant since prior to 1970, when his mother purchased the disputed premises. He had first stated that when the building was purchased the back portion was residential but again said that the residential portion was constructed by his mother later, as initially such was an open plot. This portion the applicant, in 1978, started using as a coaching centre and then commenced running a school therein in 1979. He maintained that he did not use the second shop vacated by Mehmood Ali because his mother was in greater need of the same.
One of such shops from Mehmood Ali was being used as school office and the other as a passage, as previously there was a narrow passage abutting with shop No,1 and in such former passage school almirahs and other articles were then lying. The sizes of all the shops, according to him, were similar namely. 9' x 13'. He averred that he had not started any workshop till then but would run the business of engine repairing in the disputed premises, when obtained. He admitted that his mother was the Chairman of the Education Society, which was running the school, Landlay's witness Saadullah stated, on remand, that he was visiting the school as his brother's daughter was a student in such school. He denied that the office premises of the school was being utilized for any business. This witness, in cross-examination, maintained that the school administration was being run by the sister of Ibne Hassan and the latter had no concern with such administration. While he stated that Ibne Hassan owned a bus. He denied having seen him doing anything on the road-side.
Another witness examined by the landlady, following upon remand, was Haji. Abdul Sattar, a Councillor of the area. Such witness stated that he had seen the school office since August, 1980.
He, however, in cross-examination admitted that Ibne Hassan looked after the administration of the school and sat in its office. Darvesh Mohiuddin was last witness examined by the landlady on remand stated that the passage of the school since 1979 had remained the same. The witness also know Ibne Hassan, who owned one bus.
6. In evidence, the version of the tenant is that as a doctor he has built up a sizeable practice at the disputed premises. At the end of the year 1975 and beginning of the year 1976 the landlady stopped and disconnected his water-supply. It is on record that aggrieved, he addressed notice dated 10-1- 1976 to which the landlady replied through her own dated 244-1976 and while repudiating his allegations required the premises to be vacated on personal need of her son. According to the tenant it was in these circumstances that he was forced to file a Rent Case for restoration of amenities, which annoyed the landlady to file the ejectment proceedings against him, after exchange of hot words with the landlady's son, Ibne Hassan. He has averred that the second shop vacated by Mahmood Ali was initially used by Ibne Hassan for keeping machinery parts and accessories of the buses owned by him but when one of the buses had overrun a school child he sold such bus and abandoned the use of the shop and the school office, which was then situated at the back of the shop, was shifted to the same. Landlady's son, according to him, was one of the administrators running the school and consumed his time managing such affairs without any intention to start any business. According to him, landlady's son Ibne Hassan owned two buses which were used for transporting the school children as also for picnic and marriage parties. There was bad blood between the parties, which had resulted in counter cases under section 107/117 Cr.P.C. And Misc. Rent Case for restoration of water. Landlady's son had gone to the extent of lodging a complaint with the police that the respondent-tenant was attempting to kidnap school children. The previous tenant, Mehmood Ali, also appeared as his witness after remand. His version is that he vacated the first shop on the assertion of the landlady that she was in dire need of the same for being used by her son but, instead, the school passage was routed through the same and Ibne Hassan started keeping parts and accessaries in the earlier passage used for the school.
Subsequently, the landlady again started pressurising Mehmood Ali, but since he desisted, his water supply was disconnected striking a death blow to his business of Aquarium fish and plants, for which water was a necessity. In these circumstances, he vacated the second shop as well. At first, according to Mehmood Ali, such shop was used for keeping machineries, parts and other accessaries of the buses belonging to Ibne Hassan but later that use was discontinued and the school office was shifted therein. Mehmood Ali also supported the respondent-tenant about the running over of a school child by a bus belonging to Ibne Hassan and the latter's selling one such bus and retaining the other. In cross-examination, he denied that the shop was not got vacated from him for the use of Ibne Hassan. He also termed it as incorrect that Ibne Hassan never used such shop as a workshop but only did some work in the shop in connection with his buses. Tenant's witness Mehboob Hussain Mirza has also supported him but such evidence is somewhat suspect as he is a patient of Dr. Asif Majeed, the tenant.
7. On the basis of the above evidence, if what the landlady has asserted is accepted in conjunction with the averments of her son that such son was constrained to run his business on the road-side, it defies comprehension as to why at least one of the vacated shops was not utilized by son Ibne Hassan for his business, such as it was, for if the same was not sufficient for his needs the landlady could have pursued the proceedings against tenant Dr. Asif Majeed, which indeed is, in effect, what was observed at the time when my learned brother Saeed-uz-zaman Siddiqui, J. Remanded the case back to the Controller. As said elsewhere, since the landlady in Rent Case No, 1003/76 had claimed possession of the two shops in the tenancy of Mehmood Ali, aforesaid, without specifying as to which portion of the same she would use for herself and which would be allocated to the use of her son, the requirement of mother and son in the case remained joint. Thus, when the first such shop was vacated and the ejectment proceedings were compounded with tenant Mehmood Ali, letting the other shop to remain with him and continuing the proceedings in the present case, which was exclusively for the benefit of Ibne Hassan, the landlady's son, the first shop so vacated having been put by the landlady for her own use, she, plainly, rested content with the outcome of those proceedings both as regards herself and her son, for the latter of whom, of course, the present lis was continuing. However, such situation got substantially altered when the landlady, during the course of the earlier appeal in these proceedings, obtained also the remaining shop from the other tenant Mehmood Ali. It then stood to reason that if the need and requirement of son Ibne Hassan was there at all in the context of the premises in the tenancy of Mehmood Ali, as averred in proceedings relevant thereto, such shop having been vacated, should have been made over to the use of the said son. Even if evidence on record from the side of the tenant that such shop was actually so made over, is rejected and the applicant's version is accepted, such version itself' would reflect on the genuineness of the son's requirement in these proceedings for a similar projected requirement was not allowed to materialize or satisfied either wholly or in part in spite of availability of accommodation categorically claimed for that purpose. In the event the tenant's version of the matter is accepted that the second shop so vacated by Mehmood Ali was actually put to the use of Ibne Hassan and later relinquished by him for the enjoyment of the landlady, the result should be still more disastrous as, on such facts, the requirement of son Ibne Hassan would stand satisfied, since for even such one shop there would be a failure to retain and the son's requirement for that reason alone would not extend to the premises in these proceedings.
Interestingly, as aptly pointed out by Mr. Khurshed Anwar, in the earlier round of litigation the landlady had in her F.R.A. Controverted the observation of the Controller that the requirement of the son stood demolished by him not occupying the first shop vacated by tenant Mehmood Ali, by relying on the depositions of the witnesses for the tenant here to the effect that such shop was in fact used by him, for a time and then given up. (see para.10 of Facts and Ground (iii) (c) in the memo. Of the F.R.A. Ex. 10/c). Normally, a party is not bound by the evidence of the other side but when express reliance is made on such evidence by the former, it must be deemed to have admitted that evidence unless the reliance is without prejudice or subject to reservations, which is not how it transpired in these proceedings. It could, therefore, follow as an admitted position that the landlady's son, to start with, occupied the first shop vacated by Mehmood Ali and then passed it over to the landlady negativing his own requirement, if any.
8. On the other hand, it stands proved on record that the landlady's son was engaged in the business of running buses but that he went to the extent, at one stage, of altogether denying that he owned any buses or what followed from it namely, that he was carrying on any business of running buses. It has, also, stultifying the essential stand of the landlady, emerged from the evidence produced by the landlady herself that, in fact, such son of hers did not run any motor mechanic business on the street or otherwise though he did use, at one time or the other, some part of the building for storing parts and accessories of buses belonging to him. It is further in evidence from the side of the landlady herself that this son had also been participating in the running of the school. There may even be some truth in the evidence adduced from the side of the tenant that the landlady's son had no intention to commence any such business as professed, for, if that were so, such business could have been commenced or continued in one of the shops vacated by Mehmood Ali or even in the narrow passage given up by the school, since, surely, that passage would have been better than running business on the road-side, as alleged by him and his mother, the landlady. Not only mere caprice, whim or fancy but even a pious wish on the part of the landlord is not the equivalent of bona fide personal requirement, which must be established on the basis of substantial and cogent evidence. It is settled law that it is not the bare desire of a landlord to possess a rented premises, which entitles him to seek eviction but such desire has to be coupled with a genuine personal requirement to qualify him for an order of eviction. The finer distinction between a mere desire and genuine requirement has been emphasised by observing that the law on the subject is designed to cater to the needy as distinguished from the greedy.
Reference on the point may usefully be made to the dicta in Khushi Mohammad v. Kh. Mohammad Rashid Wain (1968 SCMR 1158 (2), Mst. Hajra Bai Suleiman v. Aisha Bai (1982 CLC 1444), Anis- urRehman v. Sara Bai (PLD 1985 Kar. 714) and National Bank v. Wadhumal (1985 C L C1053).
9. Above all, the landlady's own requirement has emerged to be one of a doubtful nature. In their own evidence it has come about that in 1978 a tuition center
10. Was opened at the back portion of the shop, which prior to that was a residential premises and that a school started running there in 1979. Such need of the landlady, as it was in 1976 for the filing of Rent Case No, 1003/76 (against tenant Mehmood Ali), had thus stood completely eliminated, as the school was being run by an Educational Society of which, admittedly, the landlady was the Chairman. Thus as correctly found by the Controller another entity had appeared on the scene and utilization of the two shops by such an institution, in my view, would not be equivalent of the satisfaction of the landlady's requirement as projected in the rent case. Such view is supported on the dicta in Dr. Miss I. Ali Mohammad v. Mohammad Shafiq (PLD 1971 SC 494), and Siraj Din v. Suba (1984 SCM R 722). If this be so, then the premises covered in Rent Case No, 1003/76 became available, one after the other, to satisfy the requirement, if any, of the landlady's son. In that the same were not made over (or having been made over were given up) for the fulfilment of such requirement but, instead, were passed on to a third party viz, the Educational Society, aforesaid, would offend against the rule covered by the 2nd proviso to and section 13 (3) (ii) (c) of the then Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance VI of 1959, which is what would apply to these proceedings, as at the time when such proceedings were instituted that legislation held the field. As dilated upon elsewhere a pending proceeding under section 13 (3) (ii) (c) must collapse once the landlord, during its pendency, is able to secure, either through the Controller or otherwise another premises of the same class and in the same urban area, suitable for his needs or, later, without "sufficient cause, vacates the same. Such view is strengthened on the opinions expressed in Ghulam Farooq v. Fazal Ghani (1980 CLC 1082) and Farooq Beg v. Mohammed Arif (PLD 1981 Kar. 67). Even on general principles applicable under the current Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the referred two shops, being available, would have been sufficient, in all appearances, to satisfy the need of the landlady's son, if any, and, therefore, such need could not have extended to the present case and the present premises.
10. At any event, one of the essentials in a case of personal requirement is the existence of good faith. Even where a requirement is proved unless good faith is also simultaneously established an order of eviction on the ground of personal need cannot be passed. In the first place, as the landlady and her son, contrary to their specific avowals, have failed to establish that the latter was doing business on the road-side and have been contradicted by their own witnesses, by whose evidence they are bound, such fact should reflect on their good faith. Similar would be the position when a mis-statement is proved, and of a serious nature at that, against the landlady or from one for whom the requirement is projected. This circumstance is provided by Ibne Hassan, initially, testifying that he did not have any buses when their own witnesses Saadullah and Darvesh Mohiuddin, averred to the contrary, what to say of the evidence in defence. Indeed, Ibne Hassan himself, while he, conveniently, did not remember what he had stated in his deposition, in the first round of litigation, in his second such deposition admitted that he owned a bus "since 1976". If concealment of a material fact, as held in Fazlur Rehman v. Muhammad Siddiq (1983 SCM R 1189) and Qamruddin v. Hakim Mahmood (PLD 1983 Kar. 570), can reflect on personal requirement in good faith, there can be little doubt that mis-statements should have similar, if not worse impact on such a professed claim. Lack of good faith would also be reflected on account of disconnection of water-supply of tenant Mehmood Ali, which is not repudiated in cross-examination and the alleged similar disconnection of supply of the tenant in these proceedings, which prompted him to address, in terms of time, the first notice in the case between the parties on 10-1-1976 and going to Court for restoration. The landlady's notice dated 24-1-1976, projecting personal requirement, was only in reply and subsequent. Another aspect touching good faith would consist in Ibne Hassan, according to landlady's own version, not utilising any of the shops vacated by tenant Mehmood Ali, even though the rent case against such tenant was filed for the requirement both of the landlady and such son.
11. The element of good faith is common, as regards the requirement of a rented premises for personal use of occupation by a landlord, both under the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, and the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance of 1979. None of these statutes, however, define "good faith". In such a statutory situation, it would be open to a Court of law to make recourse either to the ordinary dictionary meaning of that expression or to draw upon judicial precedents in which such words may have earlier been interpreted or to refer to other statutory provisions in which the same, in similar circumstances, may be found to have been employed. It has, however, always to be kept in mind that where the legislature uses specific words but refrains from defining them the legislative intent, unless there be something to the contrary in the context, usually is to use the words in a board sense. Upon this analysis, in the dictionary sense F and according to the dictionary version, the phrase "in good faith" means and connotes "with honesty and sincerity". As to the second and third modes of construction namely, recourse to precedents or statutory definitions appearing in other legislations, both such concepts are, incidentally, together available in the Supreme Court case of Saira Bai v. Anisur Rehman (1989 SCMR 1366) and no better citation in this behalf can be made than that case itself. In re: Saira Bai, Naimuddin J. Speaking for a full Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, noting that the expression "good faith" had not been defined in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, observed that the same stood so defined in section 2 (27) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 in the following terms: "A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not".
It was on such reasoning held that in cases of personal requirement of a premises by a landlord an element of honesty was essential. Examining the instant case, one cannot help concluding that in these proceedings the landlady has failed to show that the application for ejectment was founded upon honesty or sincerity, as is obligatory under the statute.
' For all the foregoing reasons, the order of the Controller does not merit re-call and this appeal must fail. It is, accordingly, dismissed.