' This revision application is filed under section 115, C.P.C. By petitioner Mst. Ambrin Begum wife of Islamuddin. Admittedly Islamuddin was tenant of respondent Dr. Dev Kishan in the suit property viz. Quarter No,8 of building bearing C.S.No,783/2 Ward 'G', Phuleli Road, Hyderabad. On 12-5-1970 respondent agreed to sell the suit property to the petitioner for a sum of Its.3,637, out of which Rs,1,000 were paid as earnest money. The conditions of the sale agreement were, that balance of consideration Rs,2,637 was to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent at the time of registration of the sale-deed and the respondent was to obtain income tax certificate and the Mukhtiarkar's certificate and he was to call upon the petitioner, after a period of six months, for execution of the sale-deed and its, registration. If the petitioner failed to pay the balance price and obtain execution of the sale-deed in her favour within 15 days of receipt of notice by registered post A/D, then the sale agreement was to be treated as cancelled and the earnest money of Rs,1,000 was to be treated as forfeited in favour of the respondent. Another term of the sale agreement was that respondent was to withdraw the application for ejectment which he had filed against husband of the petitioner who was his tenant. If the respondent failed to obtain necessary certificates and if he was unable to execute the sale-deed within the specified period of six months, then the time was to be extended for another six months. Rent of the suit property was to be received by the respondent who was to continue receiving rent from the petitioner, till registration of the sale-deed.
If the respondent failed to obtain the required certificates within 12 months of the date of the agreement, then he was to return the earnest money to the petitioner.
2. It appears that the sale-deed could not be executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner and the ejectment case filed by the respondent against husband of the petitioner was not withdrawn. Ultimately the ejectment case was decided against husband of the petitioner and the petitioner filed Suit No,54/85 against the respondent with following prayers:--
(a) Defendant to obtain the necessary certificates and other relevant documents for the purpose of executing and registration of sale-deed in respect of quarter/tenement No,8 of building bearing C.S.No,783/3 Ward 'G', Hyderabad in favour of plaintiff lady and do receive the outstanding amount Rs,2,637 and get the sale-deed registered in the office of Sub-Registrar Office Hyderabad, and in case of failure of defendant to do so, the Nazir of the Court be directed to do the same at the cost of the defendant.
(b) Or in alternative it be declared that the plaintiff for the last more than 12 years of the filing of this suit is in continuous hostile and adverse possession of the suit property i.e, the Quarter No,8 of the building C.S. No,783/2 Ward 'G' Hyderabad, hence the right title or interest of defendant in the suit property is extinguished and hereinafter the plaintiff becomes the owner of the suit property.
(c) Permanent injunction be granted against the defendant restraining him from interfering with the adverse possession of plaintiff over the suit property in any manner by himself or through his agents, servants, administrators, successors and assignees.
(d) Cost of the suit be ordered against the defendant.
(e) Any other relief, just and proper which deems fit by this Honourable Court in favour of the plaintiff."
3. The suit was contested by the respondent who took plea that the sale agreement was signed by Islamuddin husband of the petitioner, who was party to the same and who wanted to purchase the suit property in name of the petitioner, as he was a Government servant. Respondent took plea that neither Islamuddin nor the petitioner came forward to get the sale-deed executed and consequently the sale agreement was cancelled under a notice dated 20-1-1971 sent to the petitioner. It was next averred that possession of the suit property was with the petitioner, because her husband had obtained possession of the same as a tenant. Respondent took plea that petitioner filed the suit, when ejectment of her husband was ordered from the suit property, with a view to avoid the ejectment. The trial Court framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the defendant entered into a sale agreement with the plaintiff lady on 12-5-1970 for his Quarter No,8 for consideration of Rs,3,637 and that agreement was benami as alleged?
(2) Who gave Rs,1,000 towards the earnest money?
(3) Whether the possession of plaintiff was acknowleged in the sale agreement? If so,to what effect?
(4) Whether the plaintiff was put into possession of the suit property in pursuance of such agreement?
(5) Whether the defendant cancelled the sale agreement on his own accord, if so, what is its effect?
(6) Whether the suit is collusive and is filed to delay and defeat the ejectment as per order in F.RA.
No,5 of 1984?
(7) Whether Islamuddin is necessary party and the suit is bad for non-joinder?
(8) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(9) Whether the plaintiff has become owner of the suit property by adverse possession?
(10) Whether the defendant intimated the plaintiff about securing of Income Tax Certificate under registered A/D post, if not to what effect?
(11) What should the decree be?"
4. After recording evidence of the parties, the trial Court under the judgment dated 21-12-1988 dismissed the suit after holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief which he was seeking.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment and the decree of the trial Court, the petitioner filed Civil Appeal No,29 of 1989 in the District Court Hyderabad, where the same was dismissed on 29-11-1989 by learned IVth Additional District Judge under his judgment and decree. Hence this revision application.
6. Mr. Hamid Hussain learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as para 4 of the sale agreement, the respondent was to obtain income tax certificate and Mukhtiarkar's certificates within six months of execution of the sale agreement and then he had to call upon the petitioner for execution and registration of the sale-deed and had to send such intimation to the petitioner by registered post A/D and thereafter if the petitioner failed within 15 days of receiving the notice to pay the balance of the purchase price, then only the agreement was to be deemed to have been cancelled. It was added that no notice in terms of para 4 of the said agreement was sent by the respondent to the petitioner at any time. It was next argued that the two Courts below had failed to appreciate the fact that possession of the suit property was given to the petitioner in pursuance of the sale agreement and that this aspect of the case was not discussed in the impugned judgments, although said point was covered by issue No,3. Learned counsel for the petitioner controverted the contention that suit of the petitioner was barred by Article 113 of the Limitation Act on the ground that the notice contemplated by para 4 of the sale agreement was not given to the petitioner. In the alternative he argued that the petitioner in her plaint had sought declaration and issue of injunction, and hence even if her prayer for specific performance of the agreement was time-barred, the two other prayers were not barred by time and that suit cannot be thrown away if one of the prayers was time-barred. Learned counsel for the petitioner criticised the appellate judgment for not discussing each issue separately and cited the case of Ali Mohammad v.
Muhammad Hayat and others 1982 SCM R 816 On limitation point learned counsel for the petitioner cited the case of Mir Muhammad alias Miran v. Ghulam Hussain PLD 1985 Kar.
674.
7. Mr. Kishan Chand learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner was issued notice dated 16-1-1971 copy Ex. 58 wherein respondent informed her that the sale agreement was cancelled. Said notice was acknowledged by the petitioner in her reply dated 20-1-1971 copy Ex.
59. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the basis of said facts argued that cause of action accrued to the petitioner to file the suit when she received notice copy Ex. 58 which was replied on 20-1-1971 and consequently in view of Article 113 of the Limitation Act the petitioner should have filed her suit by 20-1-1974 and not on 21-2-1985. It was further argued that the proposed purchase of suit property was 'benami' in the name of the petitioner, by her husband, who was tenant of the respondent. It was lastly argued that the suit was not maintainable as it was filed after ejectment was ordered against the husband of the petitioner.
8. Article 113 of the Limitation Act states that a suit for Specific Performance of a contract shall be filed within three years from the date fixed for fhe purpose or if no such date is fixed, then from the date when the plaintiff has notice that the purchase is refused. In the case of Mir Muhammad alias Miran v. Ghulam Hussain PLD 1985 Kar. 674 the view taken was that Article 113 of Limitation Act visualises two situations, one when the date for performance is fixed in the contract itself and the other when no such date is fixed and that in the latter case, the limitation would remain suspended and the period would start to run only when the promisor/defendant refuses to perform his part and such refusal is notified to the promisee/plaintiff. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it becomes crystal clear that the period of limitation specified by Article 113 of the Limitaiton Act started running against the petitioner from 20-1-1971 when after having received the notice Ex.
58 he submitted reply Ex.
59. In this view of the matter the suit of the petitioner, filed on 21-2-1985 was hopelessly time- barred and no exception can be taken to such finding recorded by the appellate Court. Besides the prayer for specific performance of the sale agreement, the petitioner in her suit prayed for a declaration that she was in adverse possession of the suit property and that the respondent be restrained from interfering with her adverse possession. There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner was "benami" purchaser, of the suit property and such finding by the appellate Court is neither abritrary nor fanciful. The sale agreement was signed by Islamuddin husband of the petitioner as a witness. Learned counsel for the respondent argued without being contradicted by the other side, that all correspondence of the petitioner with the respondent was carried on through her husband. There is nothing in the sale agreement to indicate that possession of the suit property was handed over to the petitioner in pursuance of the agreement. It has been mentioned in the agreement that suit property was in possession of the vendee, who was tenant of the vendor and shall remain so till registration of the sale-deed. The petitioner and her husband were signatories to this sale agreement and they are bound by contents of the same. In this situation neither the petitioner nor her husband can be considered to be in adverse possession of the suit property. Obviously the petitioner was in possession of the suit property as wife of tenant of the respondent. In the sale agreement Islamuddin, who was tenant, has been mentioned as vendee, presumably because he and the petitioner were the same party. In the circumstances the petitioner had no case to seek a declaration that she was in adverse possession of the suit property. The relief of injunction was dependent on the relief of declaration. If the petitioner is not entitled to declaration she cannot be entitled to injunction. The prayer for injunction appears to have been made to sabotage the ejec:tment order, said to have been passed against husband of the petitioner.
9. In the case of Ali Muhammad v. Muhammad Hayat 1982 SCM R 816 the trial Judge disposed of five issues by simply observing that those issues had no substantive force in view of the finding given under issue No, 6, and hence judgment of the trial Judge was set aside and the matter was remanded. In the instant case the trial Court discussed issues Nos. 1 and 2 together while issues Nos. 3 and 4 were also discussed together and each of the issues Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 was discussed separately and each of these issues was given a separate finding. There is no law debarring a Civil Court from discussing two issues together for the sake of convenience. Issue No, 2 relates to payment of Rs,1,000 as earnest money and this was connected with the fact whether the sale agreement was benami and hence issues Nos. 1 and 2 could be discussed together. Issues Nos. 3 and 4 relate to possession over the suit property and they could be discussed together. No exception can be taken to judgment of the appellate Court if it chose to discuss issues Nos. 1, 2 and 4 together and issues Nos. 5 and 6 together. According to Order 20, rule 4 (2).Of C.P.C. The judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. In judgment of a civil Court the issues become the points for determination. There is nothing in law that the Court cannot discuss together two or more issues although every issue is to be given a separate finding with reasons thereon unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit, as per Order 20, rule 5 of C.P.C. In the light of these provisions no fault is found with any of the impugned judgments.
10. Powers of this Court in dealing with Revision applications under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code are well-defined. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mehmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 observed that a revision under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code was meant primarily for correcting errors made by the subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, and not those which are made in their jurisdiction, unless the discretion is found to have been exercised arbitarily or fancifully. Said case was followed in the case of Kanwal Mian and others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53 where it was observed that ordinarily erroneous decisions of fact are not revisable except in cases where the decision is based on no evidence or on inadmissible evidence or is so perverse that grave injustice could result therefrom.
11. In the instant case there is no non-exercise of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction or exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity or error of procedure. Moreover, the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below are not result of ignoring of any material evidence or outcome of misreading of such evidence or based on extraneous considerations. The findings by the two Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity and there is plethora of case-law on the point that concurrent findigns of Courts below are not be interfered with, in revision, unless such findings are based on no evidence or are fanciful or arbitrary. Similar observations were made in the case of Habib Khan v. Hafiza Bibi and others 1987 SCM R 1149, Khurshid v. Muhammad Rafique 1987 SCM R 1545 and Manzooran v.
Muhmmad Afzal 1988 SCM R 1500.
12. As a result of above discussion, there is no substance in this revision petition, which is dismissed in limine. These are reasons for the short order dated 10-5-1990 under which I dismissed this petition in limine.