1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.---This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 20th December, 1989 of the Peshawar High Court; whereby, the appellants'
2. Constitutional . (Writ) Petition arising out of an urban settlement case, was dismissed.
3. It was stated by the learned counsel that Haji Muhammad Yousaf respondent No.4 was the auction-purchaser of the shop in dispute in the auction held in 1960. He made initial deposit. The balance of Rs.2,300 was paid in the form of submission of compensation book through association.
4. The associates turned out to be people from Karachi and Hyderabad. These books turned out to be the results of fraud as it happened in many other cases. The transferee/auction-purchaser was allowed two months time in 1982 to make the deposit with a threat of resumption if the balance was not paid. Learned counsel further stated that the amount not having been deposited within the said period of two months, the time to deposit was subsequently extended from time to time and the deposit was ultimately made within the extended period on 24-5-1983. The appellants' claim was that they through their predecessor-in-interest were in. Possession of the shop and that efforts having been made by them for transfer thereof having failed, they were aggrieved persons and thus in that capacity filed the Constitutional (Writ) Petition in the High Court which has been dismissed. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the validity of the auction by the Settlement Authorities and acceptance of the deposit from the auction-purchaser at a late stage despite having earlier passed orders for presumptive resumption.
5. The learned Judge in the High Court noted the conduct of the appellants' side in order to see whether, it was a fit case for exercise of discretion in Writ jurisdiction. It was observed as follows:-- "During all these proceedings it transpires from the record that Mst. Akbar Jan petitioner has never attempted by any judicial recourse to get the shop excluded from the list of auction nor made any appeal in time against the order of suspension of auction proceeding rather she kept quiet and made no serious effort (despite) knowing that the shop has been transferred to the respondent by various Settlement Authorities. A valuable right had accrued to the respondent by time lag and also by depositing the purchase money twice. In these circumstances the Settlement Authorities showed their incompetence to interfere in the order of transfer in the name of the respondent because according to them that order was lawful and with authority: "I have gone through the record of the case and have seen the various orders made by the lower forums and I am of the view that the orders passed by the Settlement Authorities could not be upset because they are legal. The only question that time for depositing of money was extended by the Settlement Authorities in favour of respondent does not seem to be illegal as in the circumstances of the case they were duly empowered to extend the time for depositing the amount."
6. We questioned the learned counsel on both the aforenoted aspects of the case. The appellants' side, it seems, was not interested in the transfer of the property for a long time. Its auction to the respondent No.4, subsequent extension of time for deposit of the remaining amount and even the issuance of the P.T.D. To the auction-purchaser notwithstanding, considerable inactivity was shown from the appellants' side. Be that as it may, the refusal of the High Court in a settlement matter to exercise Writ jurisdiction in the circumstances like those in the present case is not such so as to justify interference by this Court in a discretionary field. In so far as the argument of the learned counsel that the first extension of time for deposit was not unconditional. If the deposit was not made, it was visualised in the extension order, the property would stand resumed. Prima . Facie, it seemed that the argument of the learned counsel on this technical question had force but when questioned as to whether, in case of unavoidable circumstances also such a condition would be operative, the learned counsel answered in the negative. The entire circumstances have not been placed by him before us to say that it was not such an exceptional case. That being so, we do not find any justification for interference in this appeal. It is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.