1. ' I propose to decide the above two F.R.A's by this Judgment as two ejectment matters were consolidated, and identical questions of fact and law are involved. Moreover, the matters are between the same parties and were decided by a single order. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant filed ejectment application under Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963, seeking ejectment of respondent Sultan Ahmed Tahir on the ground of default in respect of two shops situated on Plot No,25-C/A Commercial Area Defence Housing Authority (Clifton Cantonment) Karachi. The opponent was served with notice and he filed the written statement inter alia stating therein that the application was not maintainable and was barred under the principle of res judicata, the same was premature, and the applicant has no cause of action. That the applications were mala fide and were not maintainable. The allegations regarding default were denied. It was further stated in Rent Case No,19 of 1980 that the son of the opponent who also looks after the affairs of his father as per established practice issued a cheque for Rs,2,400 on 13-4-1978 drawn on United Bank Limited, Commercial Area, Defence Housing Authority (Clifton Cantonment) Karachi, covering the period from 1-2-1978 upto 30-4-1978. The above cheque was dishonoured and this fact came to the knowledge of the Opponent after he received a copy of the ejectment application filed by the applicant in the Court. On inquiry it transpired that the said cheque was dishonoured by mistake. The Opponent maintains three accounts with the said bank, one in his personal name, second in the name of his son Sulleman Ahmed Tahir, and 3rd in his business name "Property Links" The Opponent had instructed the bank that in the event of any deficiency in one account such cheque may be cleared from the other account. That the said cheque had bounced on or about 21-4-1978 i,e. Before expiry of the period prescribed under the law for default, the applicant ought to have notified this fact to the opponent so that he could rectify the mistake but he rushed to the Court with mala fide intention. That the default if any was not wilful. That initially the rent for the premises was Rs,500. The applicant is a habitual litigant and has been harassing the opponent in order to obtain enhanced rent from him.
2. He had previously filed Ejectment Application No,4463 of 1976 before 3rd Rent Controller Karachi, and later on compromised on 1-3-1977 when the rent was enhanced to Rs,800 per month. That the applicant again filed two ejectment applications being Rent Case No,2778 of 1978 and 5268 of 1978 and the same were withdrawn on 17-2-1980.
3. ' The learned Additional Rent Controller consolidated the above ejectment applications on 20th November, 1990.
4. ' On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:-"(1) Whether the Opponent has committed default in payment of rent?
(2) Whether the application is not maintainable and is barred under the principle of res judicata.
(3) Whether the application is pre-mature and there was no cause of action?
(4) Whether the application has been made with mala fide intention?"
5. ' The parties led their evidence in support of their respective contentions, and the learned Additional Rent Controller after taking into consideration the evidence produced by the parties decided Issue No,1 against the applicant, Issue No,2 against the Opponent, while Issues Nos.3 and 4 were decided against the applicant and consequently ejectment applications were dismissed. The present appeals have been filed against the above order of dismissing the ejectment applications.
6. ' I have heard Mr. Mubarak Ahmed learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Mr. S. All Ahmad Tariq learned counsel appearing for the respondent and have gone through the R & P of the case.
7. ' At the outset Mr. S. Ali Ahmed Tariq learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeals were time-barred, and therefore, the same should be dismissed. It was contended by him that the time limit for filing appeal was 15 days and after deducting the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the order of the appeal was clearly time-barred.
8. ' Mr. Mubarak Ahmed learned counsel for appearing for the appellant, first conceded to the above position but after the short orders were dictated, he contended that there was amendment in the Limitation Act in the year 1985; according to which the time limit for filing appeal was thirty days, and, therefore, the appeals were in time.
9. ' I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel, and have gone through the R & P of the case. The above ejectment applications were dismissed on 29-2-1984, and it is admitted by both the learned counsel that the time limit for filing appeal in the year 1984 when the ejectment applications were dismissed was fifteen days. The appellant applied for copies on 3-3-1984 and the copy was prepared on 16-10-1985, while the copy was obtained/received by the appellant on 12-11-1985; and the appeal was filed in the Court on 28-11-1985. That appellant applied for copies after three days, and even if the time consumed in obtaining the copy is considered to be 12-11- 1985, yet the appeal had to be filed by the appellant within fifteen days as envisaged by section 24(2) of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The appellant had applied for copies after three days of the judgment and, therefore, he was entitled to file appeals within twelve days from the date of receipt of the copy i,e. 12-11-1985; but the appeal was filed on 28-11-1985, and thus the appeal was barred by four days. Of course, section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, was amended on 31st January, 1985, by Ordinance IX of 1985. By virtue of Section 8 of the amending Ordinance, the appeal could be filed before the High Court within thirty days under section 24(1) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1962, as amended, but the amendment could not extend the time for filing appeals, as the time had already started and the amendment could not be considered as retrospective. Thus it is clear that the above appeals filed by the appellant were time-barred and section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Act. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed being time-barred.
10. ' I had decided the above appeals on 23-10-1990 by a short order and these are the reasons for the same.