' For a proper appreciation of the points involved in this appeal filed under section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restrictions Act, 1963, it is necessary to refer to the relevant facts in some detail.
2. Begum Hamida Nizam, the respondent is the owner/landlady of twin bungalow bearing No. 4-A, 10th South Street, Phase I, Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority, Karachi, which was rented out to appellant for a period of three years commencing from 1-11-1983 at a monthly rent of Rs.8,500 under an agreement of tenancy. One portion of the bungalow is used as a residential unit, while in the other portion a private school is being run. It is alleged by the respondent that the appellant defaulted in payment of rent with effect from 1-10-1985, who also did not pay water charges to Cantonment authorities and was consequently a defaulter. The respondent also required the said premises for her personal bona fide use and, therefore, on 30-7-1986 she filed an application under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, in the Court of Additional Controller of Rent Clifton Cantonment, Karachi, seeking the ejectment of the appellant on the aforesaid grounds.
3. The appellant resisted her eviction on various grounds. She has disputed the default by stating that the respondent was in the habit of collecting the rent in lump sum at her own convenience.
The appellant has also pleaded that since the respondent had failed to deposit property tax amounting to Rs.79,439.28, a notice was served upon her under section 65(3) of the Cantonments Act, 1924, on 26-5-1985, calling upon her to remit the monthly rent due to the office of Cantonment Board for adjustment towards taxes, which she deposited on the following dates:--
(i) Rs.8,500 on 9-12-1985
(ii) Rs.17,000 on 2- 7-1986
(iii) Rs.52,295 on 4- 8-1986 ' In short it is the case of the appellant that she was in arrears of only Rs.15,705 when the application was filed and it was due to the fact that the respondent did not come to collect the same. The bona fide need of the respondent to occupy the disputed premises was also challenged by the appellant.
4. The parties went to trial on the following issues:--
(i) Whether the applicant requires the disputed premises in good faith for her personal bona fide use?
(ii) Whether the opponent has defaulted :n the payment of rent?
(iii) Relief?
' The parties tendered their evidence through their respective affidavits-inevidence. They also produced the relevant documentary evidence. On the assessment of evidence available on record the learned Additional Controller of Rent decided issue No.1 in favour of the appellant. The issue No.2 was, however, decided against the appellant and she was directed to vacate the demised premises within two months. This order dated 13-12-1987 is the subject-matter of the present appeal,
6. I have heard Mr. Manohar Lal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Abdul Saeed Khan Ghori, learned counsel for the respondent. I have also gone through the record of this case carefully.
7. Admittedly the tenancy is regulated by an agreement, which is on record (ExA.W/1). Clause 10 of this agreement provides the mode of payment in the following manner:- "that the rent for the second year will be paid in advance every month by 10th of each month."
The tenancy agreement was existing when the default in payment of rent occurred and also when the application for ejectment was filed . The appellant was, therefore, bound to make payment within fifteen days of the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy for payment . On the face of the record the appellant committed default within the meanings of clause (i) of subsection
(2) of section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963.
8. Under the existing law it is the duty of the tenant to tender rent to the landlady and if the respondent had not come to collect the same from the appellant she could have tendered the rent to her either personally or through money order.
9 Admittedly the appellant did not pay or tender rent with effect from 1-10-1985 (although the respondent has now alleged default from 1-9-1985 as against her own pleadings and statement of account, which she cannot be permitted to raise). The appellant has claimed adjustment for a sum Rs.77,795 deposited by her in the office of Cantonment Board towards the taxes outstanding against the respondent. The notice (Ex.O/2) received by the appellant is dated 23-5-1985. The first deposit of Rs.8,500 in compliance with this notice was made by the appellant on 9-12-1985 when a sum of Rs.25,500 was due against her towards the rent. The appellant again waited for seven months and deposited a sum of Rs.17,000 on 2-7-1986, when the rent of nine months was due against her. It may be added that this amount was deposited only 28 days prior to the institution of eviction proceedings against her. The last amount of Rs.52,295 was admittedly deposited by the appellant on 4-8-1986, five days after the filing of application for ejectment against her. Section 12 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, the tenant shall be bound to pay the taxes due in respect of the building to the Cantonment Board, as required by section 65 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (II of 1924), by making deductions from the rent payable by him. At nowhere this provision of law authorised the tenant to pay the taxes outstanding against the owner of the property at her own convenience. The words "by making deductions from the rent payable by him" used in section 12 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, are self-explanatory and require no interpretation. In order to claim benefit under this section the tenant has to make payment in the office of Cantonment Board, as and when the rent for the months for which the amount was paid become due. No doubt the respondent had authorised the appellant to make payment of rent in the office of Cantonment Board every month till the taxes outstanding against her are cleared, but this permission will not absolve the tenant from the liability of making payment in accordance with the terms of tenancy agreement. The tenant shall be deemed to have tendered rent of respective months on dates when respective deposits were made and if the deposits were made after due dates, the tenant has to face the consequences. The default once made could not be washed away by the deposit of balance after the D institution of ejectment proceedings.
10. Under clause 4 of tenancy agreement (Ex.A.W/1) the appellant had to pay electricity, gas and water charges directly to the concerned authorities. It is alleged that the appellant has failed to pay water charges. The appellant while disputing this allegation has pleaded that the water supply, was discontinued due to non payment of taxes by the respondent and consequently she has to arrange for water after spending huge amount. She has, however, failed to produce any oral or documentary evidence to substantiate this allegation. The following admission made by the appellant makes the entire position clear:- "I say that under the agreement of lease I am responsible for payment of water charges for the period of my occupation of the disputed premises ............I have no proof that water supply has been disconnected by the Defence Housing Authority but Mr. Humayun Butt of D.H.S. Verbally told us that supply of water through bouzers cannot be restored until the payment of dues of Defence Housing Authority."
' It may be noted that Mr. Humayun Butt, referred to above was also not examined in support of this plea. The appellant has, therefore, contravened clause 4 of the tenancy agreement.
11. In dealing with cases of this nature the law is faced with the dilemma, if the eviction is made too easy it may increase the sufferings of those who are not in a position to have their own premises, either residential or commercial, if it is made too difficult, it may discourage the persons who invest huge money on construction of properties. However, in construing the Rent Restriction Ordinances we must keep in mind the principle that those seeking benefits under the Ordinance must bring themselves in the strictest terms within its provisions. One of such provisions among others is that the benefit of the Ordinance can only be given to a person who discharges his own obligation as a tenant, namely, by payment of rents to the landlord in due time or by depositing the same with the Rent Controller in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance (See Abdul Hafez - Abdul Nabi v.
M. Daud Ali reported in PLD 1961 Dacca 34).
12. For all the above reasons, I see no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no costs. Three months' time is, however, allowed to appellant to vacate the demised premises.