' In this case some very interesting and important questions of law arise for consideration, and therefore, it is necessary to set out accurately the facts as they are either admitted or proved, before entering into a discussion of the several points to be decided between the parties.
2. The respondent is the landlady of a shop situated in premises No, 14/C-881, Orangi Township, Karachi. On 30-10-1984, the son of appellant was inducted as tenant in respect of one of the two shops carved out of the residential premises, where the respondent, her three sons, out of whom one is married and a father of child, and one daughter resided. In the year 1986 the appellant obtained both the shops on lease at a monthly rent of Rs,300. The parties entered into fresh agreement of tenancy in the year 1987 and this time the rent for both these shops was fixed at Rs,325 p.m. There was shortage of residential accommodation and consequently Muhammad Alam, the son of respondent, who was managing the property on behalf of his purdah-observing mother, requested the appellant to vacate one of the two shops which was done by mutual consent and consequently the rent of the shop in dispute was reduced to Rs,175 p.m. The shop so obtained was merged into residential portion. However, the respondent wanted the possession of the shop in dispute also as her another son, who is of marriageable age wanted to marry. The appellant, who has got two other shops in possession in the same vicinity was approached to vacate the disputed shop for its conversion into a room for residential purpose. The refusal of the appellant to vacate the said shop led the parties into this litigation.
3. The appellant resisted his eviction on various grounds. He disputed the tenancy and claimed to be a tenant of Muhammad Alam, son and attorney of the respondent. His defence in main is that the plea of personal need raised by the respondent is nothing but a smoke-screen designed purposely as a sort of intimidation with a view to compel him to accede to the unreasonable demands in the matter of increase of rent.
4. The parties went to trial on the following issues:--(1) Whether the application is filed by a competent person?
(ii) Whether the property is required for personal bona fide use of the applicant?
(iii) Whether the opponent has committed default in payment of rent?
(iv) What should the order be?
5. The respondent examined Muhammad Alam, her son and attorney (P.W.1), and Muhammad Ghulam Rabbani (P.W.2), while the appellant examined himself (D.W.1), and then closed the side.
6. On the assessm ent of evidence available on record, both oral as well as documentary, the learned Rent Controller decided issue No, 3, against the respondent, while rest of the issues were decided against the appellant. This order dated 8-11-1989 is assailed by the appellant in this appeal filed under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.
7. I have heard Mr. Salcem Iqbal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Afsar, learned counsel for the respondent. I have also gone through the record of this case carefully.
8. The landlord as defined by section 2(f) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, means the owner of the premises and includes a person, who is for the time being authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises. Muhammad Alam (P.W.1) is admittedly a son of respondent, who is a purdah-observing lady. He was authorised to receive rent on behalf of this mother and consequently he is covered by the above definition of landlord. The appellant has also not disputed this role of Muhammad Alam. After giving this authority to her son, the respondent had gone into background and it was in this context that Muhammad Alam executed tenancy agreements with the appellant claiming himself as landlord. There is, however, nothing on record to show that the respondent had parted with her right of ownership. As an owner of the disputed premises, she was fully competent to file application for eviction of her tenant. The case of Muhammad Abdul Aleem v. Syed Wajahat Ali, reported in 1988 MLD 1942, lends support to this view.
9. I now address myself to the question of personal requirement. The evidence which has come on record shows that the premises is basically a residential unit constructed on a plot of 80 sq.Yards. It appears that due to financial stringency the respondent had constructed two shops, out of which one was merged into the residential unit and the second one, viz. The disputed shop was also required for the said purpose to house her second son, who was going to be married. Besides Muhammad Alam (P.W.1), Muhammad Ghulam Rabbani (P.W.2), also speaks of paucity of accommodation. In fact the evidence of appellant Mohiuddin Ahmed (D.W.1) appears to lend some colour to the bona fide need of the respondent, who has admitted in clear terms that the shop earlier vacated by him was converted into a room and merged into the residential unit. About the factum of proposed marriage of the son of respondent, the appellant made the following statement:-- "It is incorrect that marriage of son of applicant, Akram is detained for want of premises. For last seven years, I am hearing it. Even his younger brother is married earlier."
' When this admission is read in juxtaposition to the evidence of Muhammad Alam (P.W.1) to the effect that the disputed shop is required for residential purpose then the latter, version rings true.
10. The demand of higher rent by itself dnes not cast any doubt about the bona fide requirement of premises for personal use, if the same is needed in good faith and the need is independently proved. The evidence which has come on record proves beyond any shadow of doubt that the respondent honestly requires the disputed shop for its conversion into a residential unit for the purpose of a comparatively better living. The learned Rent Controller has dealt exhaustively with the evidence and I see no reason to differ from the assessment made by him.
11. Lastly an attempt was made to urge that a commercial premises cannot legally be converted into a residential unit. This contention is feeble and thus lacked the vigour as well. In the case of Nasiruddin Khan v. Abdul Majid reported in 1987 CLC 2029, it was observed that where only a small portion of building was being used for non-residential purpose, the entire building as well as such small portion thereof could not be treated as non-residential building. In fact the conversion of the shop into a residential room, would give the premises its original position. I have also examined all the relevant provisions of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and failed to discover any legal bar in this behalf.
' For all the above reasons, I see no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with no costs. The appellant is, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the demised premises. C.M.A.
No, 1253 of 1990 moved on behalf of respondent for the withdrawal of rent deposited in Nazarat is allowed.