SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--- Leave to appeal was granted to the landlord to examine the following questions of law arising in the case:--
(a) Whether having come to know of the order of ejectment against Rehamt Ali which became final on 5-10-1973 it was open to Fazal Muhammad to wait for a period of three years before filing an appeal against that order?
(b) the mere fact that it was being alleged that the order of eviction was a nullity was enough to override the provisions of the law of limitation?
(c) whether not being a party to the proceedings in the ejectment application he could at all file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Authority?
2. The appellate (Mistri Allah Din) instituted against Rehmat Ali (respondent No,2) an application in 1969, seeking his eviction on the ground that he had defaulted in the payment of rent since 1963 when he executed a rent note in favour of the appellant and for having sub-let the premises to Fazal Muhammad the respondent No,l. The case of Rehmat Ali was that he was indeed a tenant of the property for a short while but had vacated it and delivered possession of the same to the appellant and thereafter had no concern with the shop. He denied having sub-let it to Fazal Muhammad. The trial Court framed the following issue for trial:-- "Whether the respondent is in possession of premises in question? O.P.A.
' During the course of the proceedings before the Rent Controller an application was made by Rehmat Ali (respondent No,2) for impleading Fazal Muhammad as a proper party to the proceedings, he claiming to be in possession of it in his own right. This was refused by the Rent Controller on the ground that no relationship of landlord and tenant was either claimed or existed between the appellant and Fazal Muhammad. Fazal Muhammad appeared as a witness in the case. The Rent Controller by his order dated 21-2-1973 held that Rehmat Ali, the tenant, was no longer in possession of the property, hence no order of his ejectment was required. The eviction application was dismissed by the Rent Controller.
3. An appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge who recorded that the respondent Rehmat Ali had no objection that the appeal be accepted and an order of ejectment be passed against him. It was so done on 5-10-1973. In execution of the ejectment order when the possession of Fazal Muhammad was threatened he filed an objection petition under Order XXI Rule 99 read with section 151, C.P.C. And section 103, C.P.C. Contesting the execution of the ejectment order against him. The Executing Court recorded the following operative order on 9-2-1976:-- "The direct inference is that the petitioner was inducted to the property in dispute by the judgment- debtor. Under the law, a sub-tenant is to go with the tenant. The objection petition is not maintainable as it has no force in it. The objection petition as well as the petition for grant of temporary injunction is hereby dismissed."
4. On appeal by respondent No,1, the Additional District Judge examined at great length the history of the case and observed as hereunder while dismissing the claim of the respondent No,1:-- "The objection petition was maintainable under the law but it is devoid of any force. The decision of the trial Court is just, proper and well-reasoned. There is hardly any justification for allowing the objector any opportunity to produce evidence when his objection petition is vague and the nature of his alleged independent right has not been disclosed. The impugned order calls for no interference."
5. The respondent No,1 filed a suit challenging the ejectment order and sought declaration and permanent injunction. However, an application was made for withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh suit which was refused by the trial Court on 21-6-1976. That suit stood withdrawn and plaint rejected without granting permission to the respondent. It was then on 26-6- 1976 that he filed second appeal in the High Court against the appellate judgment in rent control proceedings given by the Additional District Judge dated 5-10-1973. The said second appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 4-2-1977, who set aside the order of ejectment passed in favour of the appellant against respondent No,2. It is in this background that the questions noted in the leave granting order have come up for examination.
6. Syed Munir Hussain, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Muhammad Mobin Siddiqui v. Mst. Shahzadi Begum and 2 others 1982 SCM R 233 and Haji Syed Ainullah v. Abdul Rashid 1985 SCM R 1991 and also section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to contend that on the facts and circumstances of the case the respondent had no right of second appeal to the High Court and in any case his appeal against the order dated 5-10-1973 was hopelessly time- barred and there was no question of or reason given for condoning the limitation. Besides, the act of the respondent himself namely, the inconsistent pleas taken by him, the non-prosecution of the suit by him and seeking no relief against the rejection of his objection to the eviction, all preclude any challenge by him to the orders finally passed disposing of the controversy by the appellate authority on 5-10-1973.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the respondent has throughout claimed to be in possession of the property independently of the so-called tenant Rehmat Ali and in view of that fact finding strength from the record justified the challenge by him to the order passed apparently collusively on the basis of agreement between the appellant and Rehmat Ali, the so-called tenant.
8. Going through the record of the case from the beginning, and it had a beginning in 1969 when the ejectment application was filed, one finds that respondent No,1 has taken four positions in respect of the property and his interest therein and the positions were inconsistent and contradictory. One of the pleas taken up by him in the grounds of second appeal was that the property in respect of which the ejectment order had been obtained was different from the one which was in his possession. This he stated by submitting as hereunder in ground (viii) of his memorandum of appeal:-- "That the description of the property in the ejectment petition (Annexure `A') from which the ejectment of the respondent 2 by respondent No,1 was sought, is given as under:-- ' Property No,F/1186, situated at Multani Mohallah Chuna Mandi, Lahore and the present respondent is a tenant under him in shop 9 previously numbered as 139 out of said property since 31-3-1969."
' While the shop in possession of the appellant is situated and marked as under:-- ' Shop former No,F/1187 present No,139, Karachi Block, Azam Cloth Market, Lahore.
' From the above, it is crystal clear that respondent 1 got a decree for a shop of Multani Mohallah and was trying to get possession of a shop in Azam Cloth Market, Lahore."
' At another stage he claimed that the property had been acquired by the Lahore Improvement Trust and he had obtained and was in possession of it as a tenant under the Lahore Improvement Trust. This was the thrust of his evidence recorded in rent control proceedings on 29-7-1973. From the statement it also appeared that he claimed himself to be the owner of the property. Finally, in his so-called written statement filed in the Supreme Court he has taken up the following position:- "That the respondent No,1 is paying all the taxes of the premises in dispute and also applied for the transfer of the shop in dispute to the settlement Scheme No,VIII. It may be mentioned here that all the properties of Mohalla Sarin Scheme after acquisition and demolition were re-erected as shops and then handed over to the settlement authorities for allotment to deserving refugees. The respondent No,1 Fazal Muhammad is also a refugee and his case is pending with the said authority and it is quite possible that the same may be transferred to him. He has also paid rent from 1953 to 31-12-1979 copy enclosed as Annexure T."
9. Apart from this inconsistent stand taken by respondent No,1 the question still remains whether he could file a second appeal in the High Court against an order passed on 15-10-1973. Section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance permits a party alone to file an appeal. A 'party' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as hereunder:- Tarty', is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance; it refers to those by or against whom a legal suit is brought, whether in law or in equity, the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one or more individuals and whether natural or legal persons; all others who may be affected by the suit, indirectly or consequently, are persons interested but not parties.
10. This restrictive conferment of right of appeal has a basis in the limited, exclusive and designated jurisdiction of the Rent Controller unlike plenary jurisdiction enjoyed by the Courts. The Rent Controller can only entertain disputes between the landlord and tenant excluding all others in the matter. It is only the parties before the Rent Controller, the landlord and the tenant, who can bring the matter before the higher Appellate Authority designated under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The respondent having appeared as a witness in the proceedings and being aware of all the orders that were passed and having not himself sought to be impleaded at any stage or to have prosecuted against the ejectment order in proper time could not have done so three years after the judgment. Without disclosing the reasons for such an inordinate delay, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Appellate Authority on compromise between the tenant and the landlord was such a nullity as could have justified appeal by the respondent, not a party to those proceedings, before the High Court, under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. That appeal was incompetent in view of the decisions given by this Court in the cases referred to.
11. The appeal is accepted with costs. The judgment of the High Court, impugned before us is set aside and the appeal filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed as incompetent and not maintainable.