NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J: --By judgment dated 20-2-1985 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, writ petition riled by the private respondents was allowed and the orders of the three Revenue Tribunals, all in favour of the appellant, were set aside. Leave was granted to consider whether the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction could not upset the concurrent findings and substituted them by its own findings.
2. Agricultural land in question comprising Khasra Nos.750 and 573 was purchased by the respondents from Mst. Amina Bibi, owner of the land through a registered deed dated 11-12-1980.
The appellant claiming to be the tenant of the said land, filed a pre-emption suit on 8-12-1981 which was contested by the vendees, respondents in this appeal. The suit was triable by the Collector as a Revenue Court under para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR-115). The suit was decreed on 30-5-1983 by the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Chakwal. The respondents went in appeal but the same was dismissed by order dated 3-1-1984 of the Additional Commissioner Revenue, Rawalpindi. Revision Application filed by the respondent before the Board of Revenue was also dismissed on 11-1-1984. Respondents challenged the three orders of the Revenue Tribunals by a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court, which was allowed by the impugned order dated 20-2-1985. We have heard Maulvi Sirajul Haq, learned counsel for the appellant and Ch. Ghulam Dastgir, Advocate-on-Record on behalf of the private respondents.
3. Admittedly, the land in question was cultivated by Noor Zaman, brother of appellant Mir Zaman, till his death in 1971. According to the appellant, since the death of his elder brother, he has remained throughout in cultivating possession of the land. Reliance had been placed by the appellant on the entries in the Revenue Records as well as oral evidence of witnesses. On the other hand, according to the respondents, after the death of Noor Zaman, the suit land was lying vacant till the time of its sale to the respondents in December, 1980, who took over possession of the suit land then. They relied upon a report in Roznamcha Waqiati (Ex. 133) and copy of Khasra Girdawari (Ex.D4) which showed that the respondents were in self-cultivation in Kharif 1981 and Rabi 1982.
The version of the respondents that from the date of death of Noor Zaman in 1971 till the purchase of suit land in December, 1980, the land was lying vacant was found to be false. According to the entries in the Revenue Records the land had been cultivated during this period. Even after his death, Noor Zaman was shown in cultivating possession of the suit land but in Rabi 1975 the name of the appellant appears in the cultivation column. In Kharif 1976, the name of deceased Noor Zaman again appeared in the cultivation column and this entry continued upto Rabi 1980. Again in Kharif 1980, the name of the appellant appears in the cultivation column and this entry remains upto Rabi 1981. According to the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant, since the death of his brother the appellant remained in cultivating possession of the land.
There is only one entry each for Kharif 1981 and Rabi 1982 showing respondents in self-cultivation and this change had been made in accordance with the report in the Roznarncha Waqiati (Ex. D.3).
The three Tribunals doubted the genuineness of this entry in favour of the respondents. The judgment of the High Court upsetting the concurrent findings depended entirely on the aforesaid entry relating to Kharif 1981 and Rabi 1982 in favour of the respondents. From the judgment it is apparent that the High Court had to extend itself for demonstrating the genuineness of the said entry. With respect, it may be observed that the High Court could not ignore all the other documentary and oral evidence brought on record which was relied upon by the three Tribunals and which evidence was in favour of the appellant being in cultivating possession of the land. It has also been noticed that, according to the respondents, the suit land was lying vacant since 1971 till December, 19:10, when they took over its possession on its purchase. This version had been found to be false but no mention about it is made in the judgment of the High Court.
4. Reliance had been placed on behalf of the respondents on Tulley Khan v. Ahmad Hassan Khan (1981 SCM R 1075) where it was observed a pre-emptor, in order to succeed in his suit must possess and retain a preferential right at three stages viz. Date of sale, date of suit and date of decree. In view of overwhelming documentary and oral evidence on record, possession of the appellant at the first and second stages was not seriously questioned but relying on 1981 SCM R 1075 it was submitted that at the third stage, i.e. When the decree was passed (30-5-1983), the appellant was not in possession. There is a finding by the Additional Commissioner that during the pendency of the suit the appellant had been forcibly dispossessed by the respondents and such forcible dispossession, in the circumstances, could not affect the status of the appellant as cultivating tenant in possession of the land. The finding was confirmed by the Board of Revenue.
It is no doubt a well-settled principle of the law of pre-emption that a pre-emptor, in order to succeed in his suit, must possess and retain a preferential right at three stages i.e. The date of sale, the date of the institution of his suit and the date of decree, but the plaintiff cannot be non-suited by the vendees forcibly dispossessing him during the pendency of the suit. In such a case the plaintiff shall be deemed to remain in de jure possession of the land for the purposes of his claim. If it were held otherwise, it would lead to absurd and unjust results. For example, a plaintiff/pre- emptor may have been in possession throughout but the day before the judgment is announced, he could be forcibly dispossessed by the defendant who could then claim that as the plaintiff was not in possession till the third stage i.e. The date of the decree, the plaintiff should be non-suited.
This was not the intent of the rule.
5. In this case there were concurrent findings of the three Revenue Tribunals in favour of the appellant supported by documentary as well as oral evidence brought on record. The respondents' version about the land lying vacant for about ten years and the claim of the respondents about their lawful possession having been found to be false by the Tribunals on the basis of evidence, in our view the High Court fell into error by upsetting the concurrent findings under its I constitutional jurisdiction.
6. On behalf of the respondents reliance had been placed on Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1987 SC 447) where it was held as follows:-- "It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it "rightly or wrongly" because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with the law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly, when the tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside its jurisdiction and therefore, a determination of the Tribunal shown to be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction.
It needs hardly be said that under Article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it is the right of every individual to be dealt with m accordance with law. Where the law has not been correctly or properly observed a case for interference by the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is made out."
The aforesaid dicta of this Court, however, does not help the respondents. In this case, the Tribunals had not gone wrong in law to invite interference by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction.
7. This appeal accordingly is allowed and the judgment of the High Court dated 20-2-1985 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.