' Mir Alam Khan, the plaintiff-petitioner herein, instituted a suit on 8-5-1979 for possession of suit land measuring 40 Kanals 15-1/2 Marlas situate in Moaza Ihsanpur, Tehsil Lakki, District Bannu, in exercise of his right of preemption, against respondents 1 to 3, in the Court of Civil Judge, Lakki.
2. The suit was contested and finding the parties at variance, the learned trial Court formulated the following issues:-
(1) Whether the suit is within time?
(2) Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action?
(3) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties?
(4) Whether the plaintiff has got superior right of pre-emption?
(5) Whether the sum of Rs,6,800 has been fixed and paid in good faith as sale consideration?
(6) Market value?
(7) Whether the suit is competent in its present form?
(8) Whether the plaintiff has superior right of pre-emption against defendant Badshah khan?
(9) Whether the transfer of the suit land in favour of defendant Badshah Khan is within the period of limitation? If so its effect?
(10) Relif.
3. After recording such evidence as was produced by the parties in support of their respective pleadings, the learned Civil Judge, Lakki, while deciding issue No,1 in favour of the petitioner holding his superior right of pre-emption qua the suit land, dismissed the suit on the point of limitation by giving a negative finding on issue No,2, vide his judgment dated 23-11-1981.
4. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid judgment and the learned Additional District Judge Bannu at Lakki, while allowing the appeal, decreed the suit vide his judgment dated 10-11-1982.
5. The respondents called into question appellate judgment by way of Revision Petition (No,66-D of 1982) which came up for hearing before my learned brother Nazir Ahmad Bhatti, J. And vide his order dated 13-11-1984, while he accepted the revision petition, set aside the findings of both the lower Courts on issues 1, 5 and 6 and remanded the case to the learned Civil Judge, Lakki for deciding all these three issues afresh after recording additional evidence and appointing a local Commissioner. It will be pertinent to note, at this very stage, that issue No,1 pertained to the question of limitation whereas issues 5 and 6 related to the value of the suit land.
6. The learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Lakki, on remand, recorded the statements of Mr. Yaqub Ali Shah, Clerk of Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Bannu, and arrived at a conclusion that the suit was barred by time and thus decided issue No,1 against the petitioner. Regarding issues 5 and 6, relying on the report of Muhammad Faqir Khan, Advocate, Local Commissioner, the learned trial Court assessed the sale price of the suit land as Rs,6,800. The ultimate result of his findings has been that he dimissed the suit vide his judgment dated 6-10-1987.
7. Aggrieved from the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Bannu at Lakki and this time it met the same fate resulting in the dismissal of his appeal vide judgment of the learned District Judge dated 11-12-1988. Hence the instant petition.
8. I have heard S. Zafar Abbas Zaidi, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Saadullah Khan Miankhel, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents at length and also perused the record of the case with considerable degree of care.
9. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that on coming into force of the N.-W.F.P. Preemption Act, 1987, and repealing of the earlier Pre-emption Act No,XIV of 1950, as per section 35 of the latest legislation, since no decree in the instant case was in existence on 30-'7-1986, the instant case lapsed and the suit of the petitioner stood dismissed. In this regard, he relied on Sultan and another v. Habib Alunad and others PLD 1990 SC 897.
10. Repelling the preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that factually speaking the rule laid down in the above-cited decision of the Supreme Court does not cover the instant suit inasmuch as the decree granted in favour of the petitioner by the learned District Judge, Bannu on 10-11-1982 was much before the 31st of July, 1986 and the order of remand in the revision petition against it dated 31-10-1984 is conspicuously silent over annulling the decree and is confined to setting aside the findings of the lower Courts on the issues pertaining to the point of limitation (Issue No,1) and the market value of the suit land (Issues 5 and 6) meaning thereby that his right of pre-emption having been upheld, the decree was intact and it was simply subject to the question of limitation which needed further inquiry.
11. As regards section 35 of N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that while an appeal is continuation of a suit, the revision petition is not so and a decree of pre-emption granted in favour of the petitioner by the Appellate Court attained finality. He further contends that even in the revisional order of this Court, the decree so granted was not disturbed and as such all further proceedings relating to the case under subsection (2) of section 35, are required to be governed in accordance with the provisions of the old law i.e, N.-W.F.P. Pre- emption Act, 1950.
12. On merits, while assailing the impugned judgments and decrees of both the learned lower Courts dated 23-11-1981 and 10-11-1982 respectively, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the direction of this Court, as contained in the order of this Court made in the revision has not been followed in its true letter and spirit. Consequently their finding on issue No,1, is not sustainable inasmuch as in view of the closure of the Court, on account of its Presiding Officer on leave, and in the absence of any other arrangements having been made for the reception of plaints in accordance with section 23 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 read with Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders Chapter I, Part-B; the petitioner could not help but to present his plaint under Order 4, Rule 1, C.P.C. On the return of the learned Civil Judge from leave on 8-5-1979, a day after the period of limitation lapsed and under section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 he could validly do so. He relied on a case Nur Muhammad v. Ghulaman and others AIR 1934 Lah.
622 and that of Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Nazir Begum and others 1989 CLC 1984 as also Abdus Sattar and others v. Nawab Din and others 1989 SCMR 1204.
13. The learned counsel thus asserted that the findings of both the learned lower Courts on issue No,1 are in defiance of the specific direction made by this Court in that the same are neither in conformity with the outcome of the inquiry conducted, nor in accordance with the law cited and as such are rendered as untenable. This being so, the learned counsel added, when the right of preemption of the petitioner has already been held as superior to that of the respondents- vendees, his suit merits to be decreed. He, therefore, prayed that this revision petition may be allowed in the aforesaid terms.
14. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents maintained that section 4 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as the expression 'when the Court is closed' denotes only a declared or a gazetted holiday and not simply absence of the Presiding Officer of the Court on leave or, as the case may be, for some other reason. He placed reliance on a case of Indian jurisdiction reported as AIR 1941 Nagpur 216.
15. Similarly, he distinguished Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, Chapter 1, Part B and submitted that in such an eventuality, the petitioner could present his plaint to the Additional District Judge, Lakki or even to the District Judge, Bannu in order to avoid the effect of limitation.
Regarding section 23 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, according to the learned counsel, firstly it was directory and not mandatory with the District Judge to empower any other Civil Judge of the District to perform the duties of the Judge of the vacated Civil Court. And secondly, the temporary absence in section 23, in fact, should be construed with the contingency of death or suspension of any Civil Judge described thereunder. Since such an eventuality was not obtaining in the instant case, there was no necessity of taking any action as contemplated under the aforesaid provisions of law and the petitioner, in the circumstances, should have presented the plaint to the District Judge. He relied on PLD 1978 Lah 1049. The learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, considered the failure in this regard on the part of the petitioner as a fatal consequence of his own act and while supporting the impugned judgments of both the learned lower Courts, he called the dismissal of the suit as lawful.
16. I have given my serious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective pleas.
17. In disposing of the preliminary objection, I would like first to refer to the basic pronouncement on the subject which is made in the case of Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360. It was, however, later in Sardar Ali's case PLD 1988 SC 287 that, as per para. 5 of the judgment, certain questions regarding the applicability of the previous laws of pre-emption in cases instituted earlier to 31-7- 1986 were posed and this included the situation which we are presently confronted with in the instant case as well, namely, whether the plaintiff, having failed in the trial Court, had in appeal or other proceedings in higher forum, succeded in obtaining a decree before 31st of July, 1986, can be non-suited in the still higher forum including the Supreme Court on the ground that the relevant law had ceased to have effect on 31st July, 1986. The answer to this was provided in para. 64 of the judgment and was given in the negative, meaning thereby that a pre-emption suit, having been dismissed in the trial Court but succeeded in obtaining a decree before 31-7-1986 in the Appellate Court, cannot be non-suited in still higher forum including the Supreme Court on the ground that earlier law had ceased to have an effect on 31-7-1986 and obviously be governed under the relevant provisions of the old law i.e, N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The view taken in the above case, finally stood reiterated and affirmed in the suo motu Constitutional Petition No,1-R of 1989 PLD 1990 SC 865.
18. But the situation meanwhile took yet another turn when the Pre-emption Act, 1950 was repealed and replaced by N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, the saving clause whereof is section 35 which reads as follows:-- "(1) The North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950 (N.-W.F.P. Act XIV of 1950), is hereby repealed.
(2) In the cases and appeals filed under the law referred to in subsection (1) in which judgments and decrees passed by the Courts have become final further proceedings if any relating to such cases and appeals, shall notwithstanding the repeal of such law be governed and continued in accordance with the provisions thereof.
(3) All other cases and appeals not covered under subsection (2) and instituted under the law, referred to in subsection (1) and which immediately before the commencement of this Act were pending before a Court shall lapse and suits of the pre-emptors shall stand dismissed, except those in which right of pre-emption is claimed under the provisions of this Act."
' A bare reading Of the aforequoted provisions of law, would indicate that further proceedings relating to such judgments and decrees passed by the Courts as had become `final'to be governed and continued in accordance with the provisions of the repealed law. The cases not falling under the first category, however, were to lapse and all pre-emption suits shall stand dismissed except the ones wherein pre-emption was claimed under the provisions of the later Act.
19. In the context of these legal and legislative developments, the situation that emerges is that on the one hand is the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sardar Ali's case PLD 1988 SC 287 as well as by the Appellate Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court in suo motu Constitutional Petition No,1-R of 1989 PLD 1990 SC 865 and on the other hand, the newly-enacted N.-W.F.P. Preemption Act, 1987 enforced on 28-4-1987 with its saving clause as embodied in section 35.
20. An analytic study of both, however, reveals that these are rather complementary to each other in that both laws found a pre-emption suit, without making requisite `Talabas' a pre-condition, as untenable and such suits were liable to be dismissed save the one, wherein a decree was granted before 31-7-1986, or the suit in which right of pre-emption is claimed in conformity with the principle of Talabs duly exercised by the pre-emptor.
21. The only ostensible hurdle that was felt qua the saving clause of Preemption Act of 1987, as contained in section 35, has been the true import of its C subsection (2) quoted above. It, however, came under judicial examination before this Court as well as the Supreme Court.##TE ##
22. The first case of its kind Mst. Lobia Jan v. Roghan Shah PLD 1989 Pesh. 174 alongwith 12 other revision petitions with reference to section 35 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emtion Act, 1987, seems to have come up for consideration before this Court and Mr. Justice Fazal Elahi Khan, as he then was, while delivering the judgment held:-: "Admittedly section 35 of the Act deals with the pending cases and appeals filed under the repealed law, however, it has drawn a distinction in cases in which decrees have been passed before the enforcement of the new law, or for the purpose of the present controversy before 31-7- 1986 and those cases which were pending before the trial Court on 31-7-1986 and in which decrees were not yet passed. In the former cases further proceedings were to be taken under the repealed law while the latter cases are to lapse and suits of the pre-emptors are to be dismissed except those in which right of pre-emption is claimed under the provisions of this Act."
' The same question came up for hearing in Civil Appeal No,103 of 1984 decided on 10-3-1990 in the case of Jehan Dad v. Raza Muhammad Khan and 6 others and the rule laid down in Mst. Lobia Jan's case was upheld. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Syed Ghalib Intisar Gillani v.
Zahoorud Din and 8 others (Civil Petitions Nos.6-R and 7-R of 1990) decided on 31-10-1990 and it was observed.
"The Talabs are conditions precedent for enforcement of right of preemption. Admittedly, no Talabs had been made in present case. No decree had been passed on the basis of the claim made by the respondent. The suit was instituted under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 which was substituted by the N.-W.F.P. Act, 1987. Under subsection (3) of section 35, the cases which had not been decreed by that time, shall stand dismissed except those in which right of pre-emption is claimed under the provisions of this Act."
23. The latest of the series is the case of Ghulam Sarwar v. Abdul Jalil and 2 others PLD 1990 SC 500 wherein the impact of N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, came up for consideration and after quoting section 35 in extenso, it was observed:-- "This section envisages the pendency of appeals and cases against the judgments and decrees which have become final. Finality and pendency of appeal do not ordinarily go together. What is final cannot be the subject of appeal and what is subject of appeal cannot be final."
' And again: "Reading all these together the conclusion which is inescapable is that the meaning which is to be given in this section is that the 'judgment or decree which terminates action in Court which renders it'. The question whether necessarily it must be a decree in favour of the pre-emptor is not a question which needs examination in this case nor are we properly assisted to embark on that species of decision. In this case that question does not arise at all. When the North-West Frontier Province Preemption Act, 1987 came into force, the final judgments and decrees of the two Courts existed and indeed there was a decree in favour of the pre-emptor by the first Appellate Court.
Therefore, this was a matter which was rightly dealt with by the High Court under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, and subsection (3) of section 35 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987 was not attracted."
24. Viewed in the perspective of the law as contained in section 35 of the Pre-emption Act, 1987, and the case-law discussed above, I am clear in my mind that in a case, once a decree having been granted by the trial Court or Appellate Court before the deadline i.e, 31-7-1986, all subsequent proceedings relating thereto shall be governed and continued in accordance with the provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 and subsection (3) of section 35 of Pre-emption Act, 1987, would not be attracted. The instant case, with its facts in mind, does not appear to me an exception to the aforesaid principle and I have no hesitation to hold it accordingly, particularly when the decree granted herein had not been set aside later in the revision and the suit was remanded to the trial Court for a limited purpose. The preliminary objection thus is disposed of in the terms indicated above.
25. Reverting to the merits of the case and examining the propriety and legality of the impugned judgments and decrees of both the learned lower Courts, it will be worthwhile to reproduce the provisions of law referred to in the remand order:-- "Order IV, Rule 1, C.C. Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint Co the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf."
"High Court Rules and Orders. Chapter 1, Part B, Rule 7(c). Reception by ministerial establishment prohibited. The members of the ministerial establishment are strictly forbidden to receive petitions, plaints or other documents direct from lawyers and their clerks or from litigants except when the Judge is on leave and no other judicial officer is in charge of his current duties. District Judge, should, however, invariably make arrangements for the reception of plaints and petitions etc. By another officer of a Court when an officer is temporarily absent on leave, tour or otherwise. Where there is single judicial officer at a station such as a Moffasal or outlying Courts, arrangements should be made for the reception of plaints, petitions, documents, etc. By the Tehsildar or the Naib- Tehsildar in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner."
' West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. Section 23. Temporary vacancy of Civil Judges.
' In the event of the death, suspension or temporary absence of any Civil Judge, the District Judge may empower any other Civil Judge of the District to perform the duties of the Judge of the vacated Civil Court, either at the place of such Court or of his own Court, but in every such case the registers and records of the two Courts shall be kept separately."
26. A bare reading of the above-quoted provisions would collectively give rise to a legitimate impression that these provisions were enacted/prescribed to provide such mechanisam as to facilitate presentation of plaint to a Court, or an Officer authorised in this behalf, in order to ensure a proper presentation of plaint to, and received by, a person with a judicial sense of responsibility.
For, the concept of a Court is not complete without its Presiding Officer. Nor a Court without a Judge and comprising of Reader, or for that purpose any other official attached to it can, by any stretch of imagination be called a Court. Again with reference to section 23 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, I simply fail to comprehened as to how temporary vacancy of a Judge can be construed as, or equated with, death or suspension of the Judge, moreso when the very caption of the said provision pertains to 'temporary vacancy of Civil Judges'. In this context I do not subscribe to the view expressed by the learned counsel for the respondents either in his definition of the Court or that of the expression when the Court is closed for none of the aforequoted provisions would suggest so nor the cases reported in AIR 1941 Nag. 216 and PLD 1978 Lah. 1049 are convincingly pertinent thereto.
27. It appears, and I regretfully observe, that a strict compliance of the aforequoted provisions has fallen into oblivion due to lapse of time but, in my considered view, it cannot be said that the same have lost efficacy in an efficient administration of justice.
28. For, let it be borne in mind that a legal duty is cast upon the District Judge to make alternative arrangements in accordance with section 23 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 as also Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, Chapter 1, Part B, 'for the receipt of plaints petitions, documents etc. In the absence of Presiding Officers, of such subordinate Courts in their respective districts. This is all the more necessary because noncompliance thereof is likely to give rise to such complications as is instantly confronting us and which resulted in unnecessary protracted litigations and delayed justice; latter's notoriety notwithstanding. In the light of the foregoing the District Judge cannot be absolved cf the responsibility that devolved on him in taking due action when a judicial officer, presiding over a Court within his administrative domain proceeds on leave for howsoever short a period it may be.
29. No better example of this situation can be presented than the instant case where the District Judge, Bannu was bound to make alternative arrangements for reception of plaints, petitions, documents etc; the Court of Civil Judge being the lone Court at Lakki and it was precisely in such a situation that even the Tehsildar or Naib-Tehsildar of the area could be entrusted with powers to receive the plaints during his absence. In this context, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent about directory nature of section 23 (ibid) also loses its force, if it had any.
30. It is, however, a matter of record, and even the evidence recorded by both the learned lower Courts in this regard, would indicate, that no such step as envisaged by law and the rule referred to above had been taken by the learned District Judge, Bannu for the period, the learned Civil Judge, Lakki was on leave.
31. This situation necessitated a reference to the judgment of this Court dated 13-11-1984 whereby in the first round of litigation the case was remanded to the learned trial Court in the following terms:- - "It shall thus be seen that during the temporary absence of the Presiding Officer of a Civil Court alternate arrangements for reception of plaints etc. Are to be made by the District Judge and in the present case some arrangements must have been made by the District Judge Bannu. The learned Additional District Judge should not have relied upon the contents of the application in deciding the question of limitation in affirmative because, as aforesaid, some arrangements must have been made for the receipt of plaints etc. During the temporary absence of Civil Judge, Lakki. This point needed clarification by production of evidence and in this connection official of the office of the District Judge, Bannu could have been called as a witness to show whether any official of the Court of Civil Judge or the Tehsildar or Naib-Tehsildar, Lakki or for that matter any other Civil Judge of the District had been authorised by the District Judge to receive the plaints or petitions etc. As an allegation had been made by the plaintiff that the Presiding Officer was on leave upto 7-5-1979 and he had presented the plaint on the next day, it was in the interest of justice that the learned Additional District Judge should have remanded the case back to the Civil Judge to record additional evidence on this issue and then decide the same in the light of the evidence produced before him. The learned Additional District Judge had reversed the finding of the learned trial Judge on this issue without any evidence on the record. This is an irregularity going to the very root of the case. The valuable rights of both the parties are involved one way or the other on this issue."
32. In the context of the aforequoted remand order, it is amazing that both the learned lower Courts despite the fact that no such alternative arrangements as required under the law were found to have been made, still were of the view that the petitioner should have presented his plaint before the District Judge, Bannu. Such a view is not only contrary to the clearly indicated terms of remand order but in my considered opinion, also manifests neither a symptom of healthy administration of justice nor a correct step towards the cause and interest of expeditious disposal of cases. In fact the impugned judgments of both the learned lower Courts have penalised the petitioner for an act of the Court or rather should it be termed as inaction of the District Judge in his failure to comply with the law as contained in section 23 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 as also Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders Chapter 1, Part B. It is now a settled law that no one can be penalised for an act of the Court. Nor in this case the petitioner can be treated as such.
33. Thus, where undisputedly no alternative arrangements were made by the learned District Judge, Bannu, under section 23 of the Civil Courts Ordinance or/and under Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders, Chapter I, Part B, and in the absence of the Civil Judge, Lakki when there was no authorised officer to receive the plaints, the question that needs examination is as to whether presentation of the plaints to the Court, on the return of the Presiding Officer from his leave, or speaking more precisely from his temporary absence, the instant suit would still be deemed as barred by limitation. It is a common ground that the suit was filed only one day after the requisite period of limitation as prescribed in law. The learned Additional District Judge, Bannu at Lakki vide judgment dated 10-11-1982 had decreed the suit on the ground that an application presumably made under section 4 of the Limitation Act was annexed with the plaint and in this regard the learned Appellate Court had observed as follows:-- "It is very much clear from the record of the case that on 8-5-1979, Mr. Alam Khan through his general attorney Badshah Khan had submitted an application before the lower Court wherein he had stated that the Presiding Officer was on leave from 5-5-1979 to 7-5-1979 and it was, therefore, that he submitted his plaint on 8-5-1979. This being the position it cannot be said that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation, because the plaintiff-appellant cannot be deprived of his legal rights merely because on the last day of the period of limitation he could not file his suit in spite of the fact that the Presiding Officer was on leave."
' Section 4 of the Limitation Act states:-- "Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, or appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court reopens."
34. A plain reading of the aforequoted provision of law indicates that in case of limitation having expired during the closure of a Court, the suit, appeal or application can be filed... 'on the day that the Court reopens'. In other words, the period of limitation in such a situation would cease to run and a plaintiff would be in his right to file his plaint on the reopening day of the Court. Thus, in the context of the uncontroverted factual aspect of the case in that the learned Civil Judge had proceeded on leave; that no arrangements had been made for the reception of the plaints during his absence and that the suit could not have been instituted prior to 8-5-1979, this period of one day, by which the period of limitation exceeded, must be deducted in computing the period of limitation. Consequently the suit shall not be treated as barred by time. And I have no hesitation in holding so. One can seek strength in this regard from the decisions reported in AIR 1934 Lah. 622, 1989 SCMR 1204 and 1989 CLC 1984, which are very much relevant to the facts of this case and quite aptly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
35. Additionally the facts of the case also manifest that the petitioner was not slack in pursuing, or sleeping over, his rights and after finding no Court to receive his plaint, he waited and on the every day the learned Civil Judge resumed his Office, albeit late by one day in matter of limitation, he presented the plaint in accordance with the law as embodied in Order IV, Rule 1, C.P.C. And appended an application therewith under section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In this context of the matter, I have arrived at an inescapable conclusion that both the learned lower Courts have failed to comply with the direction contained in the revisional order of this Court and have misdirected themselves in dismissing the suit of the petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that from the evidence recorded by them, non-compliance of law and rule referred to above was established. And, furthermore, the petitioner had legitimately awaited the return of the Civil Judge and property presented the plaint to him under Order IV, Rule 1, C.P.C. As also under section 4 of the Limitation Act on resumption of his duties.
36. Resultantly, I allow the revision petition and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Lakki, dated 8-5-1979 as also those of the learned Additional District Judge, Bannu, at Lakki, dated 21-11-1987. Exconsequenti, holding the suit having been filed within time, I hereby grant a decree as prayed for in the plaint in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner against the defendants-respondents with no order as to costs.
37. As regards the sale price amounting to Rs,6,800, since it is quite less than Rs,16,310 the one assessed by the Commissioner, I find it as fixed in good faith and paid by the vendees. Accordingly the petitioner is directed to deposit the said amount on or before 15th July, 1991 failing which his suit shall stand dismissed.