1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---This appeal through leave of the Court has arisen out of a service matter. The respondent's Service Appeal was allowed by the Federal Service Tribunal. It had arisen out of the following facts and circumstances:- The respondent No.1 was appointed as an Editor of a Baluchi Publication, in Border Publicity Organization, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan at Quetta in NPS-16 on 18-12-1973. Within a year he was re-appointed on 11-11-1974 as Deputy Director Grade-18 through the following Notification: "No.1(10)/74-BPO, Mr. Surat Khan Marri Editor "ULUS" Border Publicity Organization, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Auqaf and Haj, Baluchistan, Quetta, has been appointed as Deputy Director, in Grade 18 plus Special Pay of Rs.100 (one hundred) per month, in the same organization on purely temporary basis, with effect from the forenoon of the 5th October, 1974, until further orders.
(2) This supersedes this Ministry's Notification No.1(10)/474-MPO, dated 23-10-1974."
2. When the information group was constituted by office memorandum No.2/8/75-ARC, dated 17-6- 1977, the respondent was not inducted therein for a long time. On 21-10-1979 he was offered the induction on the condition that his seniority would count from the approval of his name for such induction. He accepted this offer but also took up the position that his seniority in Grade-18 in the Information Group shall count from the date he was appointed as Deputy Director in Grade-18.
3. Perhaps on account of this conditional acceptance the case; of the respondent lingered on for few more years when on 19-10-1983 the disputed notification was issued under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act by the competent authority. As he was not inducted in the Information Group from the date desired by him he made a representation which having failed; he preferred an appeal before the Service Tribunal which having been accepted. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the following questions:---- "After hearing both the learned counsel we consider it a lit case to examine; whether, the appeal before the Service Tribunal, in the circumstances of this case, was badly time-barred and on that account no relief should have been allowed. Apart from the question of limitation in this case, two other general questions of law of public importance have been raised; whether, the Government has the power to regularise an ad hoc appointment with retrospective effect from the date of original induction of the civil servant as ad hoc appointee; and if not; whether, ; without this power being available to the Government the Service' Tribunal can exercise such power or jurisdiction."
4. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the law as contained in the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Rules was clear that the respondent would be entitles to count his seniority only from the date of his regular appointment to the post. And because according to him the Service Tribunal could pass only those orders which a departmental authority could have passed; therefore, the law applicable is against the respondent, the impugned order merited to be set aside.
5. Subsection (4) of section 8 of the Civil Servants Act reads as follows:--- "Seniority in a post, service or cadre to which a civil servant is promoted shall take effect from the date of regular appointment to the post: Provided that civil servants who are selected for promotion to a higher post in one batch shall, on their promotion to the higher post, retain their inter se seniority as in the lower post."
6. Undoubtedly the Proviso does not apply to this case, therefore, prima facie, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants having found support from the purview of subsection (4) of section 8 learned counsel for the respondent was asked to meet it.
7. He relying on some of the judgments of the High Court including one delivered by one of us (Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah) as Judge of the erstwhile West Pakistan High Court in Jafar Ali Akhtar Yousafzai v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another PLD 1970 Quetta 115 contended that the ad hoc appointment in this case without regularisation for nearly nine years could not be justified on the touchstone of any norms of justice. He, therefore, emphasized that as also admitted from the appellants' side and even taken as a ground in the memo for petition for leave to appeal, what the departmental authority could have done leas been done by the Tribunal; namely, it has removed the hardship, therefore, tile order of the Tribunal should be upheld.
8. Prima facie, the argument of the learned counsel appears to be attractive and to some extent also has the support of judgment of this Court in M, Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic (if Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 22. It was observed therein that it is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and indeed "its obligation" to decide all questions of "law and fact". It was further held that as a legal proposition Tribunal has "wide powers under section 5 of the Act, as it may on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against." A hope/expectation was also expressed in the said judgment that the Service Tribunal presided over generally by a serving or a retired Judge of the High Court "would be able to do full justice to the appellant".
9. However, the question remains; whether, in delaying the regularisation of the appellant which would have made him senior to several other persons, the competent authority did not do justice to the appellant or in fact avoided injustice to several other civil servants in the facts and circumstances of this case.
10. We having examined the merits come to the conclusion that the respondent's upgradation from Grade-16 even if on ad hoc basis to Grade-18 within about a year from his appointment in Grade- 16 was a windfall for him. Learned counsel himself admitted that as there was no person available the competent authority appointed the only then available person on "ad hoc basis" Even if we exclude the difference between ad hoc and temporary appointment which though some times have been equated with each other, the fact remains that upgrading of the respondent was merely to make a stopgap arrangement. In an ordinary case if he had to earn his promotion under normal fitness and other conditions it might have taken him many years to reach Grade--18. When this aspect of the case is put in juxtaposition to what the competent authority did in favour of the respondent to remove his hardship under the residuary powers contained in section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, the result would be the same as was arrived at by the competent authority. There could be a difference of opinion in shade only as to whether the regularisation should have been made in 1983 or a year earlier or even a year later. This by itself would not make the order of the competent authority liable to be set aside by the Tribunal.
11. In our view, no injustice had been done to the respondent and this is also what he felt; because, he having been shown as extraordinary favour in having been upgraded without any competition and without putting in the normal period of service for further promotion, treated it as something--- beyond expectation and did not bring under challenge the act or omission of the authorities concerned at the relevant stages. His conduct further supports our supposition that the order passed by the competent authority fixing a particular date of regularisation of respondent's service was not such which even by ` extension of the rule laid down in the case of M. Yamin Qureshi by this Court, could be of any use to the respondent. Accordingly, for this reason the respondent could not have been allowed such date of regularisation so as to adversely affect the seniority right of others which had become vested. See Dr. l Sabir Zameer Siddiqui v. Mian Abdul Malik PLD 1991 SC 226. This appeal, accordingly, is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.