' By this petition under Section 115 of the C.P.C., the plaintiff, Mian Ghulam Bari, seeks the revision of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated 4-6-1989, whereby the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the plaintiff's appeal against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Lahore, dated 12-9-1987. The learned Civil Judge, by that order, returned the plaint of the plaintiff's suit under Order 7, rule 10 of the C.P.C.
2. The short question requiring determination in this revision petition is whether the learned Courts below were right in holding that the Civil Courts at Lahore lacked territorial jurisdcition. This question arose as follows.
3. The plaintiff is running the publicity business in the name and style of " `Adservice' throughout Pakistan from Peshawar to Karachi, including Quetta" and has his office at Shahrah-e-Quaid-e- Azam.1 His business consists in displaying "the illuminated signs technically called 'Pole Plastic Signs' ". He obtained permission from the Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad, "for the fixation of such Plastic Signs with the street light electric poles and Rs, 20 per sign per month is paid as Publicity Tax" and also obtained electric energy from the defendants, namely, the Water and Power Development Authority (to be called the WAPDA) and its officers in Faisalabad "for his then exising 16 Plastic signs". Disputes arose between the plaintiff and the WAPDA on the payment of electricity charges and this led to a lengthy correspondence between them. By its letter dated 21-12-1980, the WAPDA issued 'disconnection order', saying that "since the plaintiff had not paid the bills by the grace date of 15-1-1981, he had forfeited his right to be charged under the net rate of tariff applicable to his installations". Ultimately, the plaintiff had to make the payments under protest; yet his electricity supply was disconnected.
4. The plaintiff's case briefly was that this act of the WAPDA and its officers resulted in immense loss to his goodwill; it also caused him mental torture and the "rude behaviour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 towards the plaintiff brought him under humectation". He, therefore, claimed damages and quantified them as follows: For non-display Rs. 3,717.00 On account of reconnection feeRs. 300.00 Labour charges Rs. 525.00 Cost of electricity goods Rs. 1,633.00 Labour charges Rs. 150.00 Mental torture and Rs. 5,000.00 loss in reputation Rs. 10,000.00 The total being Rs 21.325.00
5. It was said that "the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff against the defendants at Lahore and the same has still subsisted for the reason that the defendants have not settled the account with the plaintiff in spite of his hard efforts" and that the cause of action arose at Lahore also because the principal office of the defendants is located here.
6. In the written statement, a preliminary objection, namely, that the Courts at Lahore have no jurisdiction to try the suit as the alleged incident of wrong bills took place at Faisalabad, was taken.
7. The learned trial Judge held that the suit fell within section 20 of the C.P.C.; that under the second explanation to Section 20, "the defendants shall be deemed to carry on business at Faisalabad also. Admittedly the connection of the plaintiff's Plastic Signs was disconnected at Faisalabad and the alleged wrong bills were also issued there".
8. The learned Additional District Judge affirmed that finding.
9. Learned counsel for the parties agreed before me that the learned Courts below were right in holding that the case falls to be dealt with under section 20 of the C.P.C. That section provides that "every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction--
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises."
' The second explanation to Section 20 enacts that "a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at the sole or principal office or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place".
10. The learned Courts below appear to have proceeded on the footing that this was a case of breach of contract and as the contract between the parties was allegedly entered into and broken at Faisalabad, only the Courts at Faisalabad had the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.
11. It is contended for the plaintiff that his case comes both under clause (a) and clause (c) of section 20 of the C.P.C. And as the principal defendant, namely, the WAPDA, has its principal office in Lahore, he is entitled to invoke to his aid the provisions of clause (a) read with the second explanation. Learned counsel for the defendants, respondents herein, however, argued that the expression "corporation" does not apply to statutory bodies like the WAPDA. In this view, the WAPDA is not carrying on any business in the ordinary sense of that word. The function it is performing as a statutory body is a delegated function of Government and it must, therefore, be treated on the same footing as the Federal or Provincial Government. For his contention, learned counsel referred to Muhammad Saeed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1954 Sindh 117 and Mian Fazal Muhammad Nizam-ud-Din Baig & Co. v. The Province of West Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah.
453. In both these cases, the suits were against Government and not against a Corporation and I do not think that these cases are helpful.
12. In my opinion, it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether the functions which under the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, the WAPDA performs are functions of Government. For whatever its business, if it is a corporation within the meaning of the Second Explanation to Section 20 of the C.P.C., then the place of its sole or principal office is the place where it carries on that business.
13. A corporation may be created under the law by one of the following methods:
(1) by an Act of Parliament;
(2) by an Act of a Provincial Legislature; or
(3) under the Companies Ordinance, 1984.
' Corporations created under the Acts of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies are called statutory corporations. But whatever the method by which a corporation is created it is recognized as having a personality distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body or the personality of the individual holder for the time being of the office in question. (See Halsbury's Laws of England Volume 9 Fourth edition, para 1201).
14. The WAPDA was created under section 3 of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958; it is a body corporate "entitled to acquire and hold property, shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by that name sue and be sued". There is, therefore, no doubt that the WAPDA is a "statutory corporation" in the accepted sense of that expression.
15. Section 20 makes no distinction between a statutory corporation and a corporation registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and there is, therefore, no doubt that the WAPDA is within the provisions of Explanation II to Section 20. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 740). As that section makes no such distinction and by fiction of law, it is "deemed to carry on business at the sole or principal office" all that remains to be seen is whether it has its principal office at Lahore. For if it has, then it will be deemed to carry on business at Lahore.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that Water and Power Development Authority Act nowhere says that the WAPDA has its sole or principal office in Lahore. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the averment in para 18 of the plaint, which averment was that the WAPDA's principal office is located at Lahore, was not expressly denied in para 18 of the written statement.
Learned counsel for the respondents was right in his assertion that there is nothing in the Act itself, saying that the principal office of the WAPDA will be at Lahore. We may also assume that there is no such thing in the regulations made under section 29 of the Act. But then the question will be a question of fact. As was observed in De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited v. Howe 1906 (A.C.) 455 where the contention was that a company resides where it is registered and nowhere else, "a company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business". The true rule, it was held, is that "the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides".
17. The fact is so well-known that we can take its judicial notice that the WAPDA has its principal office in Lahore. It must, therefore, be deemed to carry on its business at Lahore.
18. In the result, I would set aside the judgments of the Courts below and hold that the Civil Courts at Lahore have the jurisdiction to try the suit. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
They shall appear before the learned Civil Judge, Lahore, on 18-12-1990.