1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, C J.---1 and 2. Granted.
3. This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is filed by the petitioner to challenge the order of Sindh Labour Appellate Authority dated 26-11-1990. The facts relevant for the decision of this petition may be stated as follows:- ' The Collective Bargaining Agent of the workers of the petitioner entered into an agreement with the petitioner on 25-9-1986. Under the above agreement the piece rated workers were entitled to the payment of yearly bonus at the rate of Rs,1,000 irrespective of their monthly pay. The respondent No, 3 was accordingly paid the bonus for the year 1987 in the year 1988 at the rate of Rs,1,000 respondent No, 3 did not accept the bonus at the above rate and claimed payment of bonus at the rate equal to his monthly salary. As the petitioner did not agree to the demand of respondent No, 3, the later filed a grievance petition before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Labour Court after hearing the parties dismissed the claim of respondent No,3. On appeal the Labour Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Labour Court and directed that the difference between the monthly salary of the petitioner and the amount of bonus paid for the year 1987 be paid to the respondent No,3. The petitioner has challenged the above decision of the Appellate Tribunal.
2. ' Mr. Ch. Ashraf Khan learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions before us.
3. ' It is, fustly, contended by the learned counsel of the petitioner that the proviso relied on by the learned Appellate Authority in support of the decision is not applicable in the present case as while calculating the benefit the Court has to see the entire body of the workmen who have been benefited under the Collective Agreement and not the grievance of an individual workman. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the respondent No,3 having already accepted the bonus for the year 1986 at the rate of Rs,1,000 he was estopped from challenging that position and he could not lay claim for the bonus at the rate equivalent to his monthly pay during subsequent year 1987. The third contention of the learned counsel is that the claim was time barred as the cause of action had accrued to the petitioner at the time the agreement was entered into between the Collective Bargain Agent and the management of the petitioners. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we are of the view that none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel has any force. Section 4, of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, relied by the learned Appellate Authority reads as follows:- "4. Modification of Standing Order.-The Standing Orders may be modified by means of a collective agreement and not otherwise: ' Provided that no such agreement shall have the effect of taking away or diminishing any right or benefit available to the workmen under the provisions of the Schedule."
4. ' It is quite clear from the proviso to section 4 that any agreement entered into between the Collective Bargaining Agent and the management cannot affect or take away or diminish any right or benefit available to workmen under the provision of the schedule. It is not disputed before us that in terms of the schedule to the Act respondent No,3 was entitled to the bonus equivalent to monthly pay. It is however, contended that the Collective Agreement entered into between the CBA and petitioner was based on the consideration of overall benefit to the body of the workers as a whole and as such unless the agreement was found in conflict with the law after taking into consideration the remuneration Of all the workers of the petitioner, it could be held against the law in the case of the individual worker. Learned counsel laid much stress on the word 'workmen' used in the proviso to section 4 of the Ordinance and contended that from the above expression it is quite clear that the grievance of the individual workman was outside the scope of the proviso. We are unable to agree with the interpretation placed by the learned counsel on section 4 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. The expression 'workmen' includes a 'workman' and, therefore, in our view if the agreement was found in conflict with the provision of Standing Orders Ordinance with reference to the claim of an individual worker the same could not be enforced. The Appellate Court, therefore, rightly reached the conclusion that respondent No,3 was entitled to the benefit as guaranteed under the schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance.
5. ' The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the bonus for two years namely, 1986, 1987 were declared by the petitioner, and respondent No,3 having accepted the bonus for one year namely, 1986 @ Rs,1,000 without protest, was debarred from challenging the rate of payment of bonus for the Year 1987. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. There can be no estoppel against a statute. The proviso to section 4 clearly provides that any agreement which is to the disadvantage of the workmen cannot prevail if it is in conflict with the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance. In the present case it is not disputed before us that the payment of the bonus for the year 1987 which was made in 1988 was less than the monthly salary which is guaranteed under the Schedule to the Act. In these circumstances we are of the view that the learned Labour Appellate Court rightly decided that respondent No,3 was entitled to receive the bonus as provided in Ordinance. With regard to the last contention of the learned counsel suffice it to say that the claim for bonus for the Year 1986 was not allowed by the Tribunals below, being barred by time. However, for the bonus for the Year 1987 which was admittedly paid in 1988 the application under 25-A of the I.R.O. Was held to be within the period prescribed under the law. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the grievance application was made by the respondent No,3 within the prescribed period from the date of dispute. In these circumstances, no exception could be taken to the order of the Appellate Tribunal. For the aforesaid reasons the petition is dismissed summarily.