DECISION ' This Revision Application wider section 38(3-A) of I.R.O., 1969, is directed against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabad dated 15-8-1990 whereby he determined the amount payable to the respondents under section 51(2) of I.R.O., 1969.
2. I have heard Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh, learned Advocate for the applicant and Mr. Bashir Awan, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through record and proceedings of the case.
3. The brief facts of the case are that 51 aforementioned respondents were admittedly employees of the applicant. In the month of September, 1988 by an agreement, which is termed as 'Golden Hand-shake Scheme' and which has been produced as Annexure R/2, the respondents agreed to leave the service of the respondents on payment of the agreed amount. The C.BA. Union of the applicant's establishment had raised certain demands by way of Industrial Dispute on 1-1-1988 which demands were settled by an agreement dated 12-3-1989 signed by the C.BA. Union and the applicant establishments which was effective from 1-1-1988. Under this agreement certain additional benefits in the basic pay and allowances were allowed to the workmen. The respondents claim the determination and payment of the difference between the wages paid to them and the wages and other allowances as fixed under the agreement for the period they remained in service, by filing a collective application under section 51 of I.R.O., 1969, which was allowed by the learned Labour Court.
4. Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh learned counsel for the applicant has raised preliminary objection that the respondents could not file a collective application under section 51 of I.R.O., 1969, as there was no provision corresponding to subsection (10) of section 25-A in section 51. He was, however, unable to show any provision of law or authority under which the filing of such collective application was prohibited. Under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 in subsections (1) and (2) prefix (A) is used before the word 'worker' which signifies that the word worker used in this section was in singular form therefore, subsection (10) was added permitting the workers having common grievance arising out of common cause of action to make a joint application to the Labour Court.
However, in section 51 there is no prefix "A" before the word 'workman'. Under General Clauses Act a singular word used in a statute would include plural and vice versa. The I.R.O. Is welfare legislation for the benefit of workmen and therefore it has to be interpreted liberally. The interpretation favourable to the worker has to be adopted. In absence of any legal provision or any authority against such joint application the objection of Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh with regard to his joint application by the respondents is rejected.
5. The next question that requires consideration is whether the respondents, after having left the service and after obtaining the legal dues under `Golden hand-shake Scheme', could move the Labour Court for payment of any benefits under the agreement. As pointed above the Industrial dispute/demands were raised by the C.BA. On 1-1-1988 when the respondents were admittedly in service of the applicant. No doubt the agreement has been signed on 12-3-1989 viz. After the respondents had left the service of the applicant but this agreement has been put into effect from 1-1-1988. Mr. Bashir Awan has relied upon clause (d) of section 39 of I.R.O., 1969 which reads as under:-- "39. Settlement and award on whom binding.--(1) A settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding or otherwise between the employer and the Collective Bargaining Agent or an award of arbitrator published under section 31, or an award or decision of Labour Court delivered under section 37 or the decision of a Tribunal under section 38 shall---
(a) be binding on all parties to the Industrial Dispute,
(b) .......................
(c) ..
(d) where a Collective Bargaining Agent is one of the parties to the dispute, be binding on all workmen who were employed in the establishment or industry to which the industrial dispute relates on the date on which the dispute first arose or who are employed therein after that date."
6. The plain reading of this provision would clearly show that the respondents would also be entitled to the benefits under the settlement:
7. The settlement has been produced as Annxure R/1. Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh has relied upon sub-clause of the item No, 1 of the agreement with regard to the duration and language of the agreement at page 3 of the agreement. This clause which is in 'Urdu' may be translated as under:- - "This agreement would be applicable to the permanent employees of Zeal Pak Cement Factory Linked, Hyderabad who were on the pay roll of the company at the time of the signing of the agreement or those who are retired on completing 60 years of age after 1st January, 1988."
8. It is argued by Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh that by virtue of this clause, the entitlement and benefits thereunder would not be available to the respondents who were admittedly not on the pay roll of the company at the time when this agreement was signed.
9. Under clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 39 as is reproduced above the C.B.A. Would be deemed to be representing the respondents and the agreement by virtue of this law would be binding on the respondents also. The agreement does not specifically provide that workers who were not on the pay roll of the respondents would not get the benefits under the settlement. The agreement, however shows that the benefits would be given under the settlement to those permanent workers who appear on the pay roll of the respondents at the time of signing of agreement. It is argued by Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh that by implication the workers who were not on the pay roll of the respondents at the time of signing of the settlement would not be entitled to get the benefits under the settlement. The question that requires consideration is whether the C.B.A.
Consciously and knowingly entered into such agreement whereby respondents, who left service earlier, were deprived of the benefits or whether the C.B.A. Became confused by use of the language which had double meaning, one explicit and other implied. If the C.BA. Had consciously and knowingly entered into the agreement whereby the respondents were deprived of the benefits the C.BA. By this agreement it would be causing injury viz. Financial loss to the respondents without their knowledge. The purpose of the Labour Laws and the creation of the C.BA. Under the Labour Laws is to get the wages and working conditions of the labourers improved through negotiations with the employer. It will be against the spirit of law and the purpose of establishment of the Collective Bargaining Agent if the Bargaining Agent agrees to deprive section of the workmen without their consent of the benefits. Under the circumstances the question that requires consideration is whether such part of the agreement which impliedly deprived the respondents of the benefits under the settlement, could be considered valid or void.
10. Section 23 of the 'Contract Act' provides:-- "The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless-- it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy."
' This section further provides that "every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void".
11. In the commentary of section 23 in the Contract Act by J.P. Singhal learned author observed:-- "In general a bargaining which contemplates a wrong to a third person, or to indefined members of the public, whether trespass, breach of trust, or fraud, is illegal."
12. When the C.BA. Raised industrial dispute and negotiated settlement they were representing the respondents also. By impliedly agreeing that the settlement would not be applicable to the respondents without the consent of the respondents the C.BA. Would be causing injury viz. Loss to the respondents therefore, such clause of the agreement would be unlawful and void.
13. Under the agreement the benefits are granted to the workmen from 1-1-1988 when the respondents were in service upto September, 1989 and therefore in my opinion they were entitled to receive the benefits under the agreement.
14. Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh further pointed that the amount claimed by each of the respondents is shown in the schedule attached to the application which apparently shows that there has been wrong calculation in the schedule. The respondents have claimed arrears of dues from 1/1988 to 9/1988 for nine months. Two items are specifically shown therein viz. Basic pay and allowances and the third column shows the total amount claimed by each respondent. There is obviously discrepancy between the dues under the two heads viz. Basic pay, allowances and the total amount claimed. For example, respondent Aijaz claims amount of Rs,260 as difference of basic pay per month and Rs,185 as allowances which makes the total amount of two items to Rs,445. If we multiply this amount by 9 the total will come to Rs,4,005 but he has claimed the total amount of Rs,39,000. There is nothing in evidence or in the application to show as to for what other benefits under the agreement, the total claim was raised from Rs,4,005 to Rs,39,000. Even the order of the learned Labour Court is silent about this additional amount in the claim.
15. Mr. Bashir Awan submitted that the respondents were claiming the gratuity, but the para with regard to gratuity was omitted in the application. Even in the schedule, it is not shown -as to whether respondents claimed gratuity and what was the amount of gratuity. Mr. Mir Muhammad Shaikh has relied upon a decision of this Tribunal in the case of Habib Ahmad v. Tobacco International Limited 1989 PLC 101 where it is held that "where a workman received an amount of Provident Fund which was contributed equally by the workman and the employer, he could not claim gratuity for the period during which the Provident Fund was in existence. As no claim for gratuity was made in the application, no evidence was led as to whether there was any Provident Fund Scheme in the applicant establishment. Besides, the Court could not grant relief which was not specifically prayed for by the petitioner. Even the order of the learned Labour Court is silent as to whether gratuity was allowed, and if it was allowed, on what basis.
16. In view of the above discussion the order of the learned Labour Court is modified to the extent that the total amount payable to each of the applicants would be the amount claimed by them as difference in basic pay and allowances as shown in the schedule for nine months. The order of the learned Labour Court is revised accordingly. The Labour Court is directed to re-calculate the amount payable to each of the respondents in the light of the above observation and then take such step as permissible under the law for the recovery of same and payment to the respondents.
The Revision Application stands disposed of in the above terms.