DECISION ' By this Revision Application the Informants have invoke suo motu revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 38(3-a) of I.R.Q., 1969, in order to examine the correctness, legallity and propriety of the proceedings pending before the learned Sindh Labour Court No, VII, Sukkur in application No,3 of 1989 under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969.
2. I have heard Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, learned representative for the Informants. None is present for the respondent. I have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. It appears that the respondent had filed an application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, seeking relief against his dismissal by the Informants viz. Sui Gas Transmission Company Ltd:
4. The main contention of Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani is that the provisions of I.R.O., 1969, are not attracted in the case of employees of the informants as the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the 'Act') is made applicable by the Government of Pakistan to the employees of the informant Company. He has mainly relied upon the decision of Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another PLD 1982 SC 125. In that case the question at issue was whether the employ as of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, whose services were terminated, could seek relief from the National Industrial Relations Commission for their reinstatement. The N.I.R.C. Ordered the reinstatement of the employees which order was challenged by writ petition in the High Court but High Court also dismissed the writ petition. The orders of the High Court were challenged in the Supreme Court where their Lordships, after discussing various provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 came to the conclusion:-- "Section 5 dealt with the cessation of employment either at the behest of the employer or the employee. It would thus include termination of service according to the terms and conditions, discharge, dismissal, absence or abandonment and retirement. The direction issued in terms of rule 3(2)(d) concerning the termination of employment will also be covered in view of the wide and all embracing language of this section. Any discontinuance of employment has necessarily to be judged from the test laid down in the section, namely, that it was 'without reasonable excuse'.
Therefore, if the respondents felt aggrieved either by their termination of service or dismissal, they should have taken steps to institute the proceedings as provided by section 7 and in that, event it would have been open to the Court to determine as to whether the termination, according to the terms and conditions of service, or by way of dismissal or discharge, was without lawful excuse or not as the expression 'without reasonable excuse' signifies an excuse which is not lawful, ' In the result, therefore, I would hold that the High Court was in error in holding that the specified authority could decide the question in regard to the termination of service of the respondents and allow the appeals with costs. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writs issued are recalled."
5. This question again came in consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Television Corporation v. M. Babar Zaman and others 1989 SCMR 1549. Their Lordships considered and interpreted their earlier decision in the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. Their Lordships again examined scheme of the Act and provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and 7-A of the Act and made the following observations:- "Keeping in view these provisions it is clear that it is a servant of any Government in Pakistan authorised by the Federal Government who alone is competent to administer the law by taking note of breaches and violations within the scope of its authorisation and by filing complaints in respect of them at his discretion. The remedy provided is of a criminal prosecution. The parties directly affected, whether employers or the employees, have been conferred no right or benefit to seek redress or to obtain it within the purview of the Act. The provisions of the Act and their examination in K.E.S.C's case establish a distinction between the regulatory powers (exercisable by the Federal Government or an authority specified by it under section 6 of the Act), punitive powers (exercisable by a servant of the Government empowered to file a criminal complainant in writing under section 7 of the Act) and the adjudicatory powers in other respects left untouched by the Act. The regulatory power was held in that decision not to extend, encroach upon or affect in any manner the adjudicatory set up. When it is provided in section 7-A of the Act that 'the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) or any other law' the impact is created only to the extent of contrariety and not in the domain where there is no contrariety. Section 3 applies to the Act to every employment under the Federal Government and in spite of the Act there is an established adjudicatory system of Service Tribunals for Civil Servants. Similarly, those who fall in the category of workman and are not exempted from application of Industrial Relations Ordinance can have recourse to the Labour Courts. Those who are excluded from the Labour Courts also can resort to Constitutional jurisdiction, if the rules governing them happen to be statutory."
' Their Lordships further observed:-- "It is clear to us that the provisions of the Act supersede every other provision only to the extent of contrariety and not beyond. For matters not covered by the provisions of the Act, the ordinary law will have application particularly in the matter of adjudication."
6. In view of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the latest decision, it would be clear that the Labour Courts still retain jurisdiction to grant relief of reinstatement to the workman under section 25-A which power is not taken away under the provisions of the Act as the authority appointed under the Act cannot grant such relief.
7. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani has also relied upon certain other case law which are decisions of the High Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal about the ouster of jurisdiction of Labour Courts but I need not discuss them in view of this clear decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Television Corporation v. M. Babar Zaman and others.
8. The Revision Application is, therefore, dismissed.