' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 1373 and 5084 of 1985 in which identical question of law and fact arise.
2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No, 1373 is Punjab Club, Lahore while the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 5084 is the Lahore Gymkhana Club, Lahore, both of which were incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913 as a profitmaking organisations. The Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution constituted under the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 called upon the petitioners to pay contributions towards the Old-Age Benefits Scheme for its employees. By the notice (Annexure 'B') dated 12th August, 1984 the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution demanded Rs,33,950 from the Punjab Club as contribution alongwith 20% increase, in all Rs,50,925 for the period of July 1976 to July 1984. It was however objected by the petitioner that the provisions of Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 were not applicable to the Clubs and therefore the petitioner had no liability to make any contribution. As the respondents insisted in its demand for the payment of disputed amount, the petitioner challenged its action by filing Writ Petition No, 1373 of 1985.
' In other case Writ Petition No, 5084 of 1985, notice dated 5th March, 1985 demanding pay of Rs,1,74,600 in respect of the employees of Lahore Gymkhana Club as contribution, and increase was served by the institution which has been impugned.
The question which falls for determination in both these petitions is as to whether the provisions of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 are applicable to the petitioner.
3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in both these petitions contended that the petitioners' organisations which have been established for non-profit making purposes and registered as such under the Companies Act, 1913 were clubs and were neither an industry nor an establishment within the meaning of Employees' Old-Ake Benefits Act, 1976 and therefore, the demand raised by the respondent was invalid. The learned counsel pointed out that the clubs were for the first time made liable by amending the definition of establishment in section 2(e) of the Act by Ordinance 17 of 1983 and as such petitioner had no liability for the period before the amendment. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the clubs were "establishment" within the meanings of Act and fall within the purview of Act and the amendment was brought about merely for the purposes of elucidation and clarification. The objection as to the maintainability of this petition was also raised by the learned counsel on the premises that the petitioners had other adequate remedies available to them which they failed to avail of and as such these petitions are not competent.
4. According to section 1(4) of the Act, it applies to every industry and establishment in which more than ten persons are employed. In the unamended Act the establishment was defined by clause
(e) of section 2 as an organisation whether Industrial, Commercial or otherwise. The definition was substituted by Ordinance 17 of 1983 as under:- ' Establishment means-- "an establishment to which the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 (West Pakistan Ordinance No, VII of 1969) for the time being applies, and, notwithstanding anything contained in section 5 thereof, includes clubs, hostels, organisations and messes, not maintained for profit or gain and establishments, including hospitals, for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute or mentally unfit persons."
The dispute in both the cases relates to the period prior to this amendment brought about by Ordinance 17 of 1983. The question which, therefore, arises is as to whether the clubs run by the petitioner can be said to be establishments under unamended law. .5. In the Act, as originally promulgated the establishment was defined as an organisation, industrial, commercial or otherwise. From this definition, it is apparent that the organisation need not be industrial or commercial in character but even other organisations fall within the definition of establishment. However, the contention on behalf of the petitioners was that the word "otherwise" had been used conjunctively and is to be interpreted ejusdem generis with phrases "industrial" and "commercial" and as such an organisation which is neither commercial nor industrial would be outside the purview of the Act. It is difficult to accept this interpretation which places undue constraints on the definition. Such a narrow interpretation of a provision appearing in a beneficial and remedial statute would be against the legislative intent. It is well-established that such enactments should be construed so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. As ruled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Koh-i-Noor Chemical Company Ltd. v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution PLD 1977 SC 197 in view of the object of such a legislation, as wide as interpretation should be placed on the definitions appearing therein as is permissible within the language used in the statute. There is thus no warrant for construing the word "otherwise" ejusdem generis. Similar argument was raised before the Supreme Court in Don Bosco High School v. The Assistant Director, E,O.B.I. And another PLD 1989 SC 128 but repelled by observing that the intention of the legislation clearly was to give a general and broader meaning to this term and the organisation need not be profit making in character.
6. According to the Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition) Organisation includes a Corporation, a Government, Sub-Division or Agency, business trust, estate, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest or any other legal or commercial entity. There can be no dispute and in fact it stands admitted in para. 1 of both these petitions that the two clubs are organisations, though according to the petitioners, non-profit making in character, for the common use of its members. It cannot, therefore, be contended that these clubs were not organisations within the meaning of the original Act.
7. The main stress of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that as the clubs have been specifically included in the definition of organisation by amending the Act, it was obvious that prior to amendment of the Act, clubs were covered 'by it was contended that if it was so, these was no necessity of amending the law. This submission of the learned counsel is not well-founded. It is not a rule of universal application that all amendments should be construed as having been enacted to bring about a change in law. Often amendments are declaratory and clarifying in character and are intended to remove any doubt or set at rest any controversy which might have arisen regarding its interpretation. Reference in this connection may be made to Crawford on Statutory Construction, para. 74 at page 107, which reads as under:- "74. Declaratory Statutes.--Generally speaking, declaratory statutes can be divided into two classes: (1) those declaratory of the common law, and (2) those declaring the meaning of an existing statute. Obviously, those declaratory of the common law should be construed according to the common law. Those of the second class are to be construed as intended to lay down a rule for future cases, and to act retrospectively. They closely resemble interpretation clauses, and their paramount purpose is to remove doubt as to the meaning of existing law, or to correct a construction considered erroneous by the legislature."
' Similar statement appears in Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition at page 58 wherein it has been stated that "for modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any Statute. Such Acts are usefully held to be retrospective."
' Another passage appearing at page 395 may also be reproduced with advantage:- "Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an oblivious omission in a former statute, or as Parke, J. (afterwards Baron Parke) said in R. v. Dursley (1832) 3 B & Ad. 465 (469), to 'explain' a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was pass.
Where an Act is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable. In Attorney-General v. Theobald (1890) 24 0 B D 557, section 11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, as to the liability of voluntarily settlements to stamp duty, was held retrospective, although the litigation in which its terms were involved had commenced before it was passed. Acts of this kind like judgments, decide similar cases pending when the judgments are given, but do not reopen decided cases. In Young v. Adams (1898) A.C. 469 (476), Loft! Watson held that ' Attorney-General v. Theobald and R. Dursley dealt with enactments have no analogy with the statute then before the Committee."
' Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes', 12th Edition at pages 224 and 225 opines that:--.
"If a statute is in its nature a declaratory Act, the argument that it is not to be construed so as to take away previously vested rights is inapplicable.
' Section 11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889 declared the provisions of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881 section 38, with regard to the imposition of stamp duties upon personal property passing under 'voluntarily settlements' should be construed as if that expression included any trust in favour of a volunteer. It was held that section 11 was retrospective, and that the construction provided by it must be applied even though the property sought to be taxed had passed to the beneficiaries and proceedings to recover the duty had been taken before the 1889 Act came into force. Similarly, section 6 of the Finance Act, 1898 provided, for the removal of doubt, that the definition of `conveyance on sale' in the Stamp Act, 1891 included an order for foreclosure. It was held that section 6 was declaratory and, therefore, retrospective, so that an order of 1896 foreclosing a legal mortgage required stamping as a conveyance on sale."
In the present case, the reason as to why clubs were specially included in the amended definition is not far to see. Previously, Establishment was defined in very general terms and amendment was intended to make it more expressed, comprehensive, specific and definite. By the amended definition, the Act was made applicable to all establishments to which West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 applied. However, section 6 of this Ordinance specifically provides that nothing in the Ordinance was to apply to clubs, hostels and messes not maintained for profit or gain. Consequently, in order to bring such establishments within the purview of the Act, a specific provision had to be made as otherwise it would not be applicable to clubs, hostels and organisations not maintained for profit and gain. By specifically including the clubs, hostels and messes within the definition of organisations the legislature clearly manifested its intention that though West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, was not applicable to clubs, hostels and messes not maintained for profit the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act would continue to apply.
This view finds support by a judgment of this Court in W.P. 1430 of 1987 whereby a charitable institution was held to be an establishment within the meaning of Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. To the similar effect is the decision of this Court in Anjuman-Faizul Islam v. E.O.B.I. W.P. No, 4178 of 1979 and of Sindh High Court in Adamjee Foundation and another v. First Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another PLD 1979 Kar.
510.
There is also merit in the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent, as the petitioners having failed to avail of the remedies available to them under the law, this Constitutional petition is not competent. Under section 33 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, any dispute in respect of any contribution or dues payable under the Act, has to be decided by the Institution against which an appeal can be filed to the Board.
' For the foregoing reasons these petitions are without any force and are therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.