Petitioner Abdul Sattar has filed the present application for quashment of proceedings, by way of his prosecution for offences under section 229, P. P. C. The petitioner is a Film Distributor and holds exclusive rights for exhibition, exploitation, of a Punjabi film known as "KHATRANAK". This film was certified by a Board of Film Censors appointed in pursuance of section 3 of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, for exhibition, vide certi--ficate dated 20-8-1974. The film was exhibited and screened in various towns of Pakistan including Karachi. On 13-9-1974, the District Magistrate, Karachi, informed the petitioner that the certificates issued by the Board of Film Censors, have been cancelled by the Federal Government. On the following day viz. On I4-9-1974 the same District Magistrate made another communication to the effect that the Secretary of the Central Board of Film Censor had allowed exhibition of the same film. On the night between 16th and 17th September 1974, Police Officers of 9 Police Stations of Karachi registered 9 separate cases against the petitioner at their respec--tive police stations under section 292, P. P. C. These 9 cases are the subject---matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Applications 735 to 743 of 1574 and relate to the exhibition of the same film.
Subsequently two other cases on like allegations were also registered at two other police stations and these cases are the subject-matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Applications 189 and 256 of 1975. In all these cases the First Information Report is to the effect that some objectionable and nude scenes which had been excised by the Board of Film Censors were also being exhibited, with -the result- that sentiments of the public were injured on account of nudity. I am informed by Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo that some other cases have also been registered against the petitioner in some other cities of Pakistan. It is also stated in the petition, which averment is not disputed, that a complaint under section 8 of Censorship of Films Act, 1963, has also been filed against the petitioner by a competent authority as prescribed in section 9 of the same Act.
2. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo for the petitioner in all these cases and Mr. Usman Ghani Rashid, Assistant Advocate-General, Sind for the State.
3. The main contention of Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo is that these proceedings are a clear abuse of the process of the Court, besides being mala fide, and multifarious. It is additionally contended that the proceed--ings are not maintainable as the same have not been initiated by a proper authority. Mr. Hayat Junejo has heavily relied on a judgment of late Mr. Justice Illahi Bakhsh Khamisani in the case of State v. Iqbal Ahmad and others decided by the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan on Criminal Reference No. 610 of 1964 reported in 1971 P Cr. L J 745. The learned Assistant Advocate-General has reiterated the arguments adopted by the State in that judgment to resist these proceedings.
4. It would be seen on a bare perusal of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, that the statute is regulative and protective. By the Act a complete regulative code was brought on the Statute Book.
Section 3 provides for appointment of an authority consisting of a Board of two persons for examining and scrutinising films for public exhibition. Section 4 provides for certification of films and subsection (2) thereof states that if the Board after examination of the film considers the same to be suitable for exhibition, a certificate to that effect shall be issued. If the certificate is refused, the person interested in exhibition of the film has a right of appeal to the Central Government.
Again under section 5 the Board of Film Censors, and in cases of urgency the District Magistrates, have the power of suspension of ex--hibition of the film. Such power is again subject to a right of representation. Section 6 prescribes that the Central Government may specify the places for exhibition of the films. Section 7 confers power on the Central Govern--ment to decertify films already certified "in the interest of law and order or in the interest of local film industry or in any other national interest. Section 8 provides for penalty and punishment for the offences of exhibition of an uncertified film or a certified film after alteration or tampering. A punishment is also prescribed and subsection (3) of section 8 provides for a Court passing an order restraining the exhibition of films. The remaining sections namely, 9 to 14 are mainly procedural.
5. It would be seen that the mischief of exhibition of unsuitable films has to be curbed by the relevant authority under the Censorship of Films Act. The provision is regulative in nature and is aimed at providing full and effective control on exhibition of films. On the other hand it would be seen that the provisions are also protective in nature because a film may be screened at 30 or 40 cinema houses in Pakistan, each one of the houses gathering thousands of persons and in such circumstances a person, for reasons good, bad or indifferent, may drag the distributor to a prosecution in a criminal Court and such prosecutions may run into hundreds. To that extent the provisions of Censorship of Films Act appear to provide a pro--tection against multifarious prosecutions in different parts of the country for exhibition of the same film.
6. In the present case the petitioner is already being prosecuted under section 8 of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, which prosecution I presume must have been launched .At the instance of a competent authority as prescribed by section 9 of the Censorship of Films Act. The question that then arises is whether the petitioner should in these circumstances be forced to face 11 more prosecutions on the same allegations at the instance of Police Officers of various Police Stations.
There may be scores of cases that may be filed against him. Such prosecutions to say the least do not appear to be bona fide or in furtherance of justice. There is hardly any reason why almost all the Station House Officers of Karachi should have thought it to file 11 separate prosecutions in 11 separate Courts of Karachi 11 on the basis of the same allegations. I may at this stage also refer to the preamble of Censorship of Films Act which reads that it is aimed at censorship of films and desertification of a certified film "in the interest of law and order" or "in any 'other national interest and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith". If the film is obscene film, it is certainly a matter filling within the ambit of maintenance of law and order and for such reason the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, provides a complete code of prevention of exhibition and punishment of contravention. It would seem that section 292, P. P. C. Could not be invoked in such cases.
Khamsani, J. In the case of State v. Iqbal Ahmad and others (1971 P Cr. L J 745) in the same context stated the case as follows :- "There can be no question of his prosecution under section 292 of the Penal Code. Under these circumstances, the applicability of section 26 of the General Clauses Act would not be attracted. All that section 26 of the General Clauses Act says is that there can be no bar to the prosecution of an individual if the offence alleged to have been com--mitted falls within the definition of two different enactments. It merely creates a bar on the punishment that can be imposed upon that person and says that the offender shall be punished only under one enactment. In view of my finding that the offence in this case by no means falls under section 292, P. P. C. And falls only under section 6 of the Cinematograph Act, there can be no question of the prosecution of the respondents by invoking section 26 of the General Clauses Act."
7. Nextly the question of maintainability of these proceedings deserves consideration. Cases are not unknown when a complainant knowing about the bar to cognizance for prosecution of some offences, resorts to device and camouflage by filing a prosecution on the same facts captioned under a different section of the statute or under a general statute. The most apt illustration is prosecution under section 182, P. P. C. For filing of a false report. A complainant in such a case may resort to by filing of a complaint under section 500, P. P.C. For defamation. It may be an argument that -since the same allegation gives rise to invocation of two different provisions of law he should not be prevented from resorting to a provision of his choice. The point like the similar one was considered by Faruqui, J in the case of Ramchand v. State (PLD 1966 Kar. 207). In that case the allegations against the accused Ramchand were that he had contravened the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The facts were that an accused was alleged to have committed several frauds in connection with evacuee property or foreign exchange. Offences under these special statutes require a complaint offered by the State Bank or the Custodian. The complainant however, resorted to a complaint under section 420, P. P. C. An application for quashment was made and Mr. Justice Faruqui relied on a case from Supreme Court of India viz. Bashirul Haq v. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 293) and reproduced the following passage from the judgment expressing his agreement. The passage runs as follows :- "Though in our judgment, section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to lie borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required., In other words, the pro--visions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195, Cr. P. C. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence, which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it."
On such process of reasoning the proceedings were quashed.
8. I myself am of the view that a complainant cannot be permitted to resort to proceedings under the general law on the basis of facts which attract the provisions of a special law, when prosecution of infringement of A the special law requires a complaint by a statutory authority. Such a course tends to set the provisions provided by the special statute at naught. This is precisely what has been done in these cases. The complainants having known that the film had been permitted f9r exhibition resorted to a different course by fling no less than 11 complaints in different Courts in the City of Karachi, what to speak of many more in the rest of Pakistan. It appears to me that this is a clear abuse of the process of Court and for such reason should be curbed.
9. In the result I quash the proceedings in these 11 cases. I wish to make it clear that the other case under the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, shall proceed to its conclusion in accordance with law.