' The petitioner Malik Muhammad Hanif while posted as Assistant Food Controller at P.R. Centre, Gujar Khan, District Rawalpindi, was deputed to conduct physical verification of the stock position of wheat store at P.R. Centre-I, Islamabad. He made the checking keeping in view the Book Balance, found no shortage and submitted a report accordingly. Some time later there were serious complaints of heavy shortage of wheat stocks at P.R. Centres I and II, Islamabad. A judicial inquiry was held under the orders of the Commissioner, Rawalpindi, in July and August, 1985, and the shortage of wheat stocks from both these centres was confirmed. As a result, the Anti-Corruption Department registered a case vide F.I.R. No,17 of 1985, dated the 21st of August, 1985, under sections 409, 420, 468, 471 and 109, P.P.C. Read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947, against eleven officials. The petitioner was, however, not found involved either in the report of the Inquiry Committee or reported against in the F.I.R. His own stores at Gujar, Khan were as well checked but no discrepancy was noted. He was, however, arrested on the 8th of October, 1985, on the ground that his report of physical verification of the stocks at P.R. Centre-I, Islamabad, was wrong as statedly he had suppressed therein such a huge shortage of wheat. A formal challan was submitted against him before the learned Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Rawalpindi, where he was still facing trial without a single witness having been so far examined against him. Because of registration of the corruption case against him, the Department placed him under suspension alongwith other officials vide the order-dated the 16th of October, 1985, (Annexure 'C'). He was served with a charge-sheet dated the 31st of July, 1985; the Director Food, Punjab, was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct inquiry into the charges against him, and he submitted his reply to him on the 4th of September, 1986.
2. Facing a long suspension for about four years and simultaneously a trial as an accused before the Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), he made repeated requests to at least reinstate him. His assertion was that once treating his case similar to that of another official Raja Nisar Ali, Assistant Food Controller, who was equally placed under suspension with him, the Food Minister directed his reinstatement but his orders were not complied with. He added that during his long suspension no less than fifteen officers junior to him were promoted to higher scales in a way superseding him.
Aggrieved by an infinite suspension and an unending criminal trial, he brought the present writ petition seeking relief at least of reinstatement on the grounds firstly, that under Rule 6(1) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, his suspension beyond three months was bad in law inasmuch as it was not approved by the authority concerned, nor was he given any intimation thereabout; secondly that quite a few of his colleagues like Abdul Khaliq Dogar, Mirza Muhammad Sharif, Sardar Pervaiz Ali and Raja Nisar Ali, A.F.Cs. Had been reinstated notwithstanding the fact that almost all of them were nominated specifically by the Inquiry Committee in their report as also in the F.I.R. Lodged at the instance of the Anti-Corruption Department; thirdly that his case was much stronger than that of Raja Nisar Ali, A.F.C., who had made a physical verification of the stores exactly like him three months later, that is on the 30th of June, 1985, finding no pilferage; fourthly that the physical verification made by him was in strict compliance with the instructions on the point (Annexure '0') leaving no room to doubt its veracity; and fifthly that his continued suspension and trial were oppressive and mala fide, against which he had no remedy except to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.
3. The respondent-Province contested the writ petition pointing out in their comments that the verification report submitted by the petitioner was false inasmuch as shortage of 56,135 bags of wheat valuing Rs,1,14,51,540 was noted by the Inquiry Committee. They, however, admitted that the Inquiry Committee did not include the petitioner's name among those whom they had found to be involved, nor was he named in the F.I.R. They equally admitted that quite a few others suspended alongwith the petitioner had since been reinstated. They justified prolongation of his suspension as it was being extended with the approval of the competent authority. They maintained that delay in finalization of the inquiry or trial did not vitiate the entire process, nor did it justify his reinstatement.
Lastly, they pleaded that the type of relief he was seeking could have been obtained only from the Punjab Service Tribunal and that the High Court was not competent to grant the same.
4. At the outset an order, dated the 30th of October, 1989, of my learned brother Gul Zarin Kiani, J., passed in writ petition No,3554 of 1989, was relied upon by the petitioner showing that his colleague Mirza Muhammad Sharif suspended alongwith him was reinstated as per order at page 49 in pursuance of his writ petition and that since unlike him the petitioner was not named in the report of the Committee nor in the F.I.R., a fortiori he had a stronger reason to ask for the same treatment.
A perusal of the order shows that the learned Advocate-General had assured the Court that if the inquiry was not concluded by the 31st of December, 1989, the Government would not extend period of his suspension and would order his reinstatement in service. On the face of it, there was no reason whatsoever to refuse such a treatment to the petitioner whose case was on a much higher footing. The Court took note of the prolonged suspension whereas the respondent-Government not only assured avoidance of its further extension but also its termination by ordering reinstatement of the official. The present petitioner was aggrieved mainly of the same indefinite period of suspension, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been implicated either by the Committee or the Anti-Corruption Department in the F.I.R. The discriminatory treatment being met out to him calls for action on the basis of Article 25 of the Constitution.
5. Rule 7(6) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, stipulates a period of sixty days for completion of the inquiry from the date when he submits reply. The petitioner tendered his reply on the 4th of September, 1986, and ordinarily the inquiry should have been over by the 4th of November, 1986. Quite ironically it still continues and the suspension is also extended alongside. Although learned counsel representing the respondent claimed that the suspension was being extended with the approval of the competent authority, yet it could not be demonstrated if over all these years, any intimation of such extension was given to the petitioner.
The rule would be deemed to require communication of such an order to the petitioner, as after all he was supposed to know his fate while hanging in fire. Even otherwise, extending suspension period could not be regarded to be a limitless affair despite its approval by the authority. The mere fact that initially a period of sixty days was provided for finalization of the inquiry would show that a priori there was need of completing the same invariably within the aforesaid unextendable period.
The discretion given to the authority for approving such extensions could not possibly be used as a handle of oppression in order to humiliate the official beyond endurance. It is well-known that during suspension the official does not get his full emoluments. He is paid something much less for sustenance and to make him undergo such a rigour alongwith his dependents was another aspect which would not permit any misuse of the provision. Besides suffering financial difficulties all this while, the petitioner was able to show that he was meanwhile superseded by more than a dozen officers junior to him. This itself was a severe set back to him because without having been found to be guilty finally, he had to face supersession by a large number of officers much junior to him. A guilty person may be punished, but without holding him guilty, to punish him by refusing him his emoluments and simultaneously making him suffer supersessions was something too disproportionate. He deserved some consideration on this score as well.
6. It would be appreciated that rule 7(6) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1975, was a subsequent addition envisaged probably to cater for the need of making it obligatory to complete such inquiries within a stipulated time-frame. It was introduced with a purpose presumably in the backdrop of letting them linger on loosely for any length of time.
Obviously such a limitless process was tyrannous and had to be of necessity curbed. Not only an immutable period of sixty days was prescribed for finalization of an inquiry, but a further restriction in point of time was imposed upon the Inquiry Officer, making it essential for him to submit his findings and the grounds thereof to the authorised officer within ten days of the expiry of the said period of sixty days. Prescribing sixty + ten days in order to reach practically a deadstop in departmental inquiries could not be frustrated on an assumption that extension of the period of suspension blessed with the approval of the authority was immune from such objections.
Otherwise it would make redundant the innovative provision of rule 7(6) ibid. The principle according to Maxwell at Pp.36 - 38 is to avoid imputing redundancy to the Legislature and no word of the Statute is to be left out as otiose. Pendency of this inquiry for long four years besides the petitioner's tortious suspension of equal length, and absence of extension of the ten-day period fixed for submission of the findings, had no proportion whatsoever to the period of sixty + ten days contained in sub-rule (6) mentioned above. Reliance was placed upon Mian Ghulam Nabi and three others v. The Government of the Punjab, Health Department, Lahore and others 1988 PLC (C.S.) 31 in support of the contention that if the authority itself passed the order of suspension or gave approval to its extension subsequently, it would not constitute a reason to set aside the inquiry. With respect, the discussion in the reported case was confined to the purport of rule 6, without taking into account the later rule i,e, rule 7(6) which provided an unrelaxable time-frame for completion of the basic inquiry. It is an established principle as per Maxwell at Pp.339-340 that all the provisions of a Statute are to be applied in a complementary manner so that none of them is rendered superfluous. Still further the provision appearing in a Statute in its later part is to be preferred and by this interpretation rule 7(6) ibid would claim precedence obliging the Inquiry Officer and the authorised officer to complete the whole exercise within sixty + ten days. This is how repetitive extensions of the period of suspension would be incompatible with a rule which appears in the Statute not only at a later stage, but also was introduced later in time.
7. The record establishes that after physical verification of the stores conducted on 31st of March, 1985, by the petitioner, Raja Nisar Ali, A.F.C., too had conducted the same type of verification on the 30th of June, 1985, and had issued the same type of certificate. The instructions for such verification as at No,4 (page 53 of the present file) had had to "be based on entries made in the stock registers" and further that the correctness of weight was essentially the duty of the staff under whose supervision the stocks were initially stored. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he was not supposed to have verified the weight and that he was only to base his report on the entries made in the stock registers, appeared to be unexceptionable. He could rightly claim protection under the plea that even a subsequent verification of the same type did not disclose any shortage.
In fact, had there been any discrepancy in stores, at least the officer making verification after so short a period, would have been able to unearth it. Failure on his part to report any deficiency quite justifiably lent support to the correctness of the report of the petitioner made a couple of months earlier. Above all, if the officer making the later report could be reinstated in spite of his having been named in the F.I.R., there was no reason to refuse the same treatment to the petitioner, who was mentioned neither in Committee's report nor in the F.I.R.
8. The next objection canvassed by counsel for the respondent was that the writ was incompetent as the petitioner would have a remedy before the Service Tribunal against any final order which might be passed against him. Reliance in this behalf was placed upon Aslam Ali Shah v. Collector of Central Excise & Land Customs and others 1983 PLC (C.S.) 498. Asa broad based proposition, there may be no cavil with it that a final order in the inquiry would be subject to the petitioner's right of appeal etc. Before the Service Tribunal. But the fact remains that his grievance stems from the oppressive suspension and the unending inquiry awaiting decision for five years against which he had no efficacious remedy elsewhere. This is how he could come in writ jurisdiction.
9. The writ petition is allowed with costs; the order of the petitioner's suspension dated 16-10-1985 (Annex: 'C') and also the charge-sheet dated 31-7-1986 (Annex: `E') still sustained against him in violation of rule 7(6) of the Punjab Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, . Are declared to be illegal, void, without lawful authority and of no legal effect against him.