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K.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 442

M.A. BAQI KHAN vs THE STATE

CitationK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 442
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Cr. Misc. No.147 of 1990
Date1991-04-10
Judge(s)Qaisar Ahmed Hamidi
ResultN/A

QAISER AHMED HAMIDI, J.- This application filed under section 561-A Cr.P.C, has given rise to interesting questions of law, but when the statutory provisions with which it is concerned are examined the decision does not present great difficulty.

2. The facts are simple and may be briefly summed up as follows.

3. The applicant who claims to be a Deputy Secretary General, Pakistan Tele-Communication Union (Traffic) had invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Constitution Petition No.D-350 of 1983, whereby the orders dated 26.5.1982 and 2.2.1983 passed by learned Single Member of the NIRC and by the Full Bench of the NIRC, respectively, were challenged. The petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 7.3.1989 and the case was remanded to Full Bench of NIRC for re-hearing of the appeal. On 15.10.1989 the respondent No.2 filed a complaint against the applicant before a Member NIRC for the offence under section 56 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, mainly on the ground that the applicant not being a Deputy Secretary General of the above Union was making false claim with a view to prolong the forth- coming referendum. On 17.12.1989, the learned Meipber NIRC proposed to dismiss the complaint under section 203 Cr.P.C, with the following observations:- "The complainant was also directed to produce the judgment of the High^ Court. The judgment of the High Court reveals that the case was remanded to the Full Bench with the directions to decide the appeal after hearing both the parties on all the points which may be urged. Since the High Court had remanded the case to the Full Bench and the complainant has been given an option to agitate any point before the Full Bench, I, therefore, observe that without the determination and decision of the Full Bench no criminal proceedings can be initiated. The complaint is, therefore, premature, the same is dismissed under section 203 Cr.P.C. However, the complainant can urge this point before the Full Bench where the appeal is said to be pending for disposal."

4. However, before the order could be signed and announced it was brought to the notice of learned Member NIRC that the Full Bench had dismissed the appeal filed by the applicant on 9.10.1989 for non-prosecution and consequently a notice was ordered to be issued to applicant on the same day. It appears that the applicant avoided the attendance and consequently the case was brought on regular file and process was issued against him. It is in these circumstances that the applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashment of criminal proceedings pending against him in the Court of Member NIRC.

5. I have heard Mr. Sulleman Habibullah, learned counsel for applicant, Mr. Khalid Ather, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. Salman Ansari, learned counsel for State. Mr. Ansari has supported the prayer of the applicant made for the quashment of proceedings.

6. The learned counsel for applicant has confined his arguments to the following contention;

(i) That the Member NIRC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance against the applicant for the offence under section 56 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1%9, which in view of the provisions contained under section 35(5)(c) was triable exclusively by the Labour Court having jurisdiction.

(ii) That the member NIRC was not competent to revise his own order dated 17.12.1989, in view of the bar contained under section 369 Cr.P.C.

7. The first contention is, however, effectively answered by the language of section 22-A (8)(f) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which empowers the NIRC to try offences punishable under:-

(i) Section 53, other than sub-sections (1) and (5) thereof; and

(ii) any other section, in so far as they relate to employers or workers in relation to an industry-wise trade union, a federation of such trade unions, a federation at the national level or officers of such union or federation.

8. The 'Explanation' added to section 22-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the following words makes the entire position clear:- "Explanation.- ln this section and in succeeding provisions of this Ordinance, the expression "industry-wise trade union", "federation of such trade unions" and "federation at the national level" refer to a trade union the membership of which extends to establishments in more than one Province and a federation of trade unions whose membership extends to registered trade unions in more than one Province."

9. The Pakistan Tele-Communication Union (Traffic) is, therefore, covered by the above explanation and the Member NIRC had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint filed against the applicant under section 56 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

10. There is ample authority for the proposition that powers of review are not available to a Criminal Court and the judgment or an order in the nature of judgment when dated, signed and announced cannot be recalled. The following judgments lend support to this view:-

(i) Raiu and another vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1928 Lahore 462)

(ii) Pahu Rant and others vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1933 Calcutta 870_

(iii) Rehmat Ali alias Lunda vs. The State. (1971 S.C.M.R. 513)

(iv) Juan Sullivan vs. The State (1971 S.C.M.R. 618)

(v) Muhammad Khan vs. Muhammad Aslam and 3 others.(T971 S.C.M.R. 789)

(vi) Khan Muhammad vs. The State (1985 P. Cr.L.J. 578)

(vii) Rahim Jan vs. Ahmed Jan and another. (1986 P Cr.LJ. 122)

(viii) Nazeer Masih vs. The State. (1986 P. Cr.LJ. 1224)

(ix) Faizullah and another vs. Mst. Pervaiz Akhtar and 3 others (P.L.D. 1987 Azad J & K. 29)

(x) Niazi and 3 others vs. (Ghullam Dastgir and another (1987 P. Cr.L.J. 1432), and

(xi) Darva Khan vs. The Stale (P.L.D. 1989 Karachi 115).

11. It is, however, established position of law that a judgment or an order is inoperative and is nothing but an expression of opinion till it is pronounced. It can, therefore, be changed and altered before it is actually announced. The perusal of the record shows that the first order dated 17.12.1989 was not signed and announced, which fact finds place in the second order passed by learned Member NIRC on the same day which is duly signed by him.

12. No illegality or irregularity was, therefore, committed while taking cognizance against the applicant. The application made under section 561-A Cr.P.C, seeking quashment of proceedings pending against the applicant has got no merits and is accordingly dismissed.

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