1. ORDER Sardar Muhammad Amir Akbar Khan (Chairman).--This order will dispose of (hereinafter called the Ordinance) as common questions of facts and law are involved in them. The short facts necessary for the disposal of these petitions are that all the petitioners were permanent employees of the respondent who were retired on attaining the age of superannuation. All these petitioners have come up under Standing Order No. 18 of 196 < with a prayer that the respondent be directed to pay them one month's wages in lieu of notice of termination, pay in lieu of unavailed leave and gratuity. It was admitted at the time of arguments that the gratutity has been paid to each of workers and that each of them is entitled to pay in lieu of unavailed leave. The main contest on behalf of the respondent is that this Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of wages in lieu of one month's notice of termination and that none of the petitioners is entitled to notice wages as each one of them retired after attaining the age of superannuation. Since the facts are admitted no evidence was recorded. I would, therefore, first deal with the objection whether this Court has jurisdiction or not to grant the relief prayed for under Standing Order No. 18. The specific objection is that under Standing Order No. l2 what the respondent is required to pay is one month's wages in lieu of notice and that as the wages can be claimed under Payment of Wages Act of 1936, section 22 of which bars any authority other than the one provided in the Payment of Wages Act itself, Labour Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of wages in lieu of one month's notice provided for under Standing Order No. l2. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Standing Order No. 18 provides that any individual workman who has a grievance in respect of any matter under the Ordinance may seek a redress from this Court, The redress which the petitioners are now trying to seek is payment of one month's wages in lieu of termination notice as provided under Standing Order No l2 of the Ordinance A Since the relief being claimed has been provided for in the Ordinance itself, the same can be claimed under Standing Order No. 18. Tne first contention raised on behalf of the respondent cannot therefore, be accepted lt is admitted on both hands that the petitioners are workers falliag within the difinition of workman given in the Ordinance. We have now to consider whether the petitioners are entitled to wages in lieu of one month's termination notice, which was admittedly not given to the petitioners in this case. The Road Transport Corporation has framed Service Rules which are known as West Pakistan Road Transport Board Service Rules, 1959. Rule 3 of the above rules reads as follows:-- 'These rules and the rules subsequently modified from time to time shall apply to all incumbents of the posts in the Board's Service whose pay is debitable to the revenues of the Corporation, irrespective of the fact whether they were appointed prior to the formation of these rules or amendment thereto or thereafter save the following:-- (a) Any officer or servant between whom and the Board a specific contract or agreement exists in respect of any matters dealt with therein. In such a case matter dealt with therein shall be deemed to be modified to the extent shown in the contract or agreement. (b) Any person in respect of whose payment and conditions of service, a special provision is made by or under any law for the time being in force eg, thereby covered by (STANDING ORDERS) issued under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
2. Act, 1946." Rule 33 of these rules provide for age of retirement as 55 years. It was argued that though the Ordinance is applicable to the petitioners but as there is no provision in that Ordinance as to when a worker is to retire so rule 33.1 is applicable to the petitioner and as they had a notice of this rule that they are to retire after attaining the age of 55 years, they were not entitled to any notice of termination of service as provided in Standing Order No. l2 of the Ordinance. We have actualy to see whether rule 33.1 takea away the right of the petitioner to one month's notice before the termination of their services or wages in lieu thereof. There is no dearth of authority that the service rules g framed by the board are not statutory Rules and, as such, they cannot over- ride any statutory provisions. Standing Order No. l2 is a statutory provision. The service rules cannot override the provisions of Standing Order No. l2 which are applicable to the petitioners. Moreover, we have on record the following provisions in section 4 of the Ordinance:-- "The Standing Order may be modified by means of a collective agreement and not otherwise: Provided that no such agreement shall have the effect of taking away or deminishing any rights or benefits available to the worker under the provisions of the Schedule." The above provisions of law shows that even the worker himself cannot curtail his rights accruing to him under the Standing Order to his disadvantage. It is admitted that the Road Transport Corporation Rules have not been framed with the agreement of the petitioners but have been framed unilaterally, which the Board could legally frame, but those rules do not curtail the rights or benefits available to the petitioners under the Standing Order. As a matter of fact sub-clause (b) of the Rule 3 of the Service Rules is very clear * and excludes the application of the Rules to the workman. But if the employer himself frames some rules which are more beneficial to the workmen then the workmen are entitled to the benefits of those rules, but not are bound by the Rules which are to their disadvantage as compared to the Ordinance and will not be applicable to them. Since Standing Order No. l2 provides for wages in lieu of termination notice, the same will be available to the petitioner in case of termination of their services. The Ordinance does not provide for retirement at the age of superannuation. So the retirement of the petitioners will be considered to be termination of their service and, as such, they arel entitled to one month's notice before they are retired and if no notice is givenjc to them as provided for under Standing Order No. l2 then they are entiiledl to one month's wages in lieu thereof. In these circumstances, the second objection raised on behalf of the respondent cannot be accepted. The result of the above discussion is that the petitioners are entitled to one month's wages as none of theim has been given one month's termination notice as provided under Standing Order No. l2. I would therefore, direct the respondent to pay the petitioners one month's notice wages. Parties to bear their own costs.