' In a suit for permanent injunction maintained by the respondent-Housing Society for prohibiting interference with its use of the approach road of its housing scheme or in any way damaging/blocking the same and also claiming a mandate for restoring the said road to its original position; an application was filed for issuance of a temporary injunction to the same effect to ensure during the pendency of the suit. The defendant-petitioner contested the suit as also the application on a number of pleas and learned trial Judge, after duly attending to the matter, by his order dated 25-4-1989 issued the temporary injunction prayed for on the considerations that the plaintiff had got a strong prima facie case and is likely to suffer irreparable loss in the event of the road in question being obstructed or demolished and the balance of convenience lay in granting the desired temporary injunction.
2. Appeal there against filed by the defendant-petitioner came up for hearing before a learned Additional District Judge who re-assessed the matter in the light of the documents available on the record, and affirmed the order of the trial Court with the conclusion that all three considerations governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunctions are on the side of the plaintiff and proceeded to dismiss the appeal by his judgment dated 10-12-1989 after repelling the contention relating to incompetence of the suit on account of the provisions of Section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The defendant has now come up to this Court on revision.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, in addition to reiterating the contention with regard to incompetence of the suit, tried to argue that the plaintiff is not the owner of relevant land and the documents filed with the suit are forged and that the suit was even barred under the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. On account of an earlier suit brought and since withdrawn by the plaintiff.
4. As regards the contention based on Section 70 (ibid), it may be stated at the outset that, for more than one reason, views concurrently held by the two Courts below with regard to the expression, "in respect of any act touching the business of the Society" appearing therein do not fall to be reconsidered in this revision petition inasmuch as not only the scope of jurisdiction exercisable herein is materially different than that which governs the revision petitions arising out of judgments/orders relating to disposal of suits but also the matter is, by its very nature, such as may appropriately be left to be decided at the appropriate stage in the suit itself on the basis of evidence and pre-judgment thereabout may not be made therein and, more particularly so, because bye-laws of the petitioner Society have not been provided on the record for ascertaining its aims and objects and since the Proviso to subsection (2) of Section 115 of the C.P.C. Enjoins that revision petitions in the High Court will ordinarily be determined on the basis of their own records and there is no material available here for holding that the two Courts below may have anywise erred in coming to their views with regard to the acts touching the business of the Society. Similarly, there is no basis discernible on this record for the assumption with regard to the earlier suit and the bar of Order II, C.P.C. Getting attracted to the present suit of the respondent. The contentions relating to the plaintiff being landless and the documents relied upon by it being forged are not only new and had not been raised below but also there is no foundation in fact available for countenancing them.
' As such, neither of the foregoing contentions is capable of prevailing in the presence of views concurrently reached by the two Courts below after due consideration of the factors governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunctions. Such exercise of their respective discretionary jurisdictions bythe two Courts below cannot anywise be termed to be either fanciful or arbitrary for becoming amenable to interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, as per the enunciation of law contained in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (PLD 1970 SC 139) and re-affirmed in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others (PLD 1983 SC 53). Furthermore, it is inherent in the power of a Court seized of a lis to require the subject-matter thereof to be preserved without interference till such time that it may be able to decide the dispute.
Interim orders aimed at that end have to be regarded unexceptionable. Even as such, the interim order passed below cannot be denounced as being unlawful or improper. The contentions sought to be herein raised happen to rather be premature and may appropriately be attended to for being decided in the suit at the appropriate stage, without being anywise influenced by the tentative observations made above.
5. In result of the foregoing, there is not found any substance in the revision petition which is accordingly dismissed. No order as to hereof costs.